34. The accused-petitioner and his political party Workers Party of Bangladesh was always in support of reform of the quota system and accordingly, they made public comments and issued official press releases in July and August 2024 and urged all the parties for a peaceful resolution of the problems. On 9th July, 2024 the accused-petitioner urged the government to solve the quota issue and reform quota system in the light of the spirit of the War of Liberation and the Constitution of Bangladesh instead of relying on the judicial procedure [https://www.prothomalo.com/politics/b8zdp6o833]. On 17th July, 2024 he again he opined that it would be logical to reform the quota system in the light of the spirit of the War of Liberation and the Constitution of Bangladesh [https://banglanews24.com/politics/news/bd/1365052.details]. On 19th July, 2024 he urged the government not to use force during the movement [https://www.bd-pratidin.com/first-page/2024/07/20/1012546]. On 3rd August, 2024 the accused-petitioner called on the government to accept the nine-point demands of the protesting students. At the same time he also called on the leadership of the protesting students to sit in dialogue with the government to resolve the problems [https://www.prothomalo.com/politics/h984bgud54]. On 4th August, 2024, in an interview with the Daily Prothom Alo, he categorically stated, “সমাধান আলোচনার মাধ্যমেই করতে হবে। সরকার তো আলোচনার দ্বার খোলা রেখেছে। প্রধানমন্ত্রী বলেছেন, আলোচনার জন্য তাঁর দরজা খোলা আছে। কিন্তু তাঁরা আলোচনা করতে চান না। তাহলে তাঁরা কী চান, এটাই আমার প্রশ্ন।” [https://www.prothomalo.com/politics/1yhf9i3ysb] As such the stance of the accused-petitioner and the Workers Party of Bangladesh was always at par with the lawful demand of reform of the quota system in government jobs.

And this is the section on the specific rebuttal to the charges.

Charge No.1: Alleged meeting dated 19th July, 2024

1. 48. That the Prosecution alleges that on 19 July 2024, the accused-petitioner participated in a meeting held at Gonobhaban, the official residence of the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, attended by members of the 14-Party Alliance. It is alleged that, in that meeting, a decision was taken to impose a nationwide curfew, apply the “highest possible force” against protesters, and implement the alleged “shoot-at-sight” policy. It is further alleged that, by virtue of being present in that meeting, the accused-petitioner became criminally liable for “murder”, “attempt to murder”, “torture”, “other inhuman act”, “abetment”, “incitement”, “complicity” and “conspiracy” in crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and that his presence attracted superior responsibility under section 4(1)–(3) of the same Act.
   49. That with regard to the allegation as made above it is submitted that the allegation rests on speculative assumptions. The Prosecution has not produced any minutes, recordings, or corroborating testimony confirming that any such decision to impose a “shoot-at-sight” policy was made or discussed or adopted at the meeting of 19th July 2024. No document, communication, or witness statement has been disclosed that connects the accused-petitioner to any such decision.

Alleged “shoot at sight” order

1. 50. That it is further noted that the sole piece of material relied upon by the Prosecution is a media statement attributed to Mr Obaidul Quader, General Secretary of the Bangladesh Awami League, wherein he expressed his personal position on “shoot at sight”. It is undisputed that this was a statement absolutely of Mr Quader himself and not of the meeting, nor is there any material to suggest that he spoke on behalf of all those present, including the accused-petitioner, because he was not the spoke person of the said meeting. The Prosecution has not produced any material showing that Mr Quader’s comment reflected the collective decision of the meeting or even the formal stance of the Awami League. Rather it is clearly evident from the letter being No. 44.00.0000.075.02.001.2024-466 dated 19.07.2024 issued under the signature of the Senior Assistant Secretary, Public Security Division, Political Section-2, Ministry of Home Affairs that no such “shoot at sight” order was issued [Prosecution Documents (তালিকা, জিম্মানামা ও স্মারকমূলে প্রাপ্ত দালিলিক প্রমাণপত্র) Page 419].
   51. That it is submitted that the Government’s decision to impose nationwide curfew under section 24(1) of the Special Powers Act, 1974 and to deploy army throughout the country in aid to civil power under the Code of Criminal Procedure as contained in the aforesaid letter dated 19.07.2024 was a lawful course of action as a measure to preserve public safety during widespread violence which is the mandate of the law upon the Government. As per section 24(2) of the said Act, 1974 if any person contravenes any order made under section 24(1), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both as such no question of “shoot-at-sight” arose at all. Thus, the said decision cannot by itself constitute a crime under section 3(2) of the Act, 1973. Curfews are lawful administrative tools used worldwide during violent civil unrest. The Prosecution has produced no legal and factual material that the accused-petitioner either recommended or supported the use of excessive force or that any such force was applied pursuant to a directive he endorsed.
   52. That it is submitted that the allegation that the accused-petitioner was “present and thereby automatically liable” is contrary to settled principles of criminal responsibility. Presence alone does not create culpability under section 3(2). Section 4(2) of the Act requires proof that an individual “ordered, solicited, incited, or induced the commission of such a crime” or “in any other way contributed” to its commission “intentionally” or “in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.” The Prosecution has failed to allege, let alone prove, any such intentional contribution, knowledge, or common purpose.
   53. That it is submitted that the alleged meeting of 19th July 2024 was a political coordination meeting of the 14-Party Alliance — a broad coalition comprising multiple political parties with differing levels of influence and responsibility. The accused-petitioner attended the meeting merely as a political stakeholder and had no executive power, control, or decision-making authority within the Government. Accordingly, he could not have taken part in, or consented to, any governmental directive, let alone one as serious as a “shoot-at-sight” order.
   54. That it is submitted that the accused-petitioner’s attendance at the meeting, far from indicating criminal complicity, was motivated by a genuine effort to seek a political solution to the national crisis. His consistent public statements during that period, including the call for restraint and lawful response, stand in direct contradiction to the Prosecution’s portrayal.

Alleged shooting firearms from helicopter

1. 55. That the Prosecution alleged in the Formal Charge that protesters were shot from helicopter by using SMG and Chinese Rifles upon detecting their position by using drones. These allegations are contradictory to the findings of the OHCHR Fact Finding Report on which the Prosecution heavily relied. Regarding the use of helicopter during the movement, the OHCHR Fact Finding Report states as follows:

“The Inspector General of Police and the Director-General of RAB have both acknowledged that RAB helicopters dropped tear gas and sound grenades on protesters but could not confirm that security forces shot firearms from RAB helicopters. RAB reported to OHCHR that it had fired 738 teargas shells, 190 sound grenades and 557 stun grenades from helicopters, but asserted that had not shot once with rifles or shotguns from helicopters, during the period of 1 July to 15 August 2024.

OHCHR has obtained and analysed a number of videos that showed personnel on RAB and police helicopters shooting tear gas from launchers. These launchers can look like rifles or shotguns from a distance, but the tear gas grenade leaves a distinctive white smoke trail when the launcher is fired. OHCHR has not been able to obtain any videos clearly showing shooting from rifles or shotguns from helicopters…

Based on the information obtained, OHCHR cannot confirm or exclude the shooting of rifles or shotguns from helicopters. It is possible that some victims who were hit seemingly from above by projectiles were in fact hit by rifles fired from elevated positions, by projectiles fired into the air and that then fell down, or by projectiles that ricocheted or fragmented before they hit the victim. The matter requires further investigation, with the full cooperation of RAB, Police and Army, including the personnel they deployed on helicopters.” [Para 142-144]

1. 56. That it is submitted that even though the OHCHR categorically recommended to conduct further investigation regarding the alleged shootings from helicopter with the full cooperation of RAB, Police and Army including the personnel who were deployed on helicopters, there is no evidence in the documents submitted by the Prosecution along with the Formal Charge that any such investigation was ever carried out.

Alleged 1400 deaths and 25000 injured

1. 57. That allegation made by the Prosecution that the accused-petitioner contributed to the deaths of more than 1400 civilians and the grievous injury suffered by more than 25000 civilians is without any basis and unsubstantiated by any legal evidence. Even though the Prosecution alleged 1400 deaths, the interim administration published the list of only 836 victims as evident from the Prosecution documents (Page 74-156). More so, at least 52 fake victims were found in the said list published by the interim administration which was also acknowledged by the interim administration as evident from news reports [https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/5kf3vl2dep]. On the other hand, the Prosecution alleged that more than 25000 civilians were injured, but as per the list published by the interim administration the actual number is only 13800 which also contains some fake names [https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/asw0d3xy8x].
   58. That it can be presumed that the Prosecution pick the number of deaths as 1400 from the OHCHR Fact Finding Report without any further scrutiny whereas the list published by the interim administration shows only 836 deaths. It is important to note here that the Secretary of the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs Ishrat Chowdhury told BBC Bangla that the number mentioned by the OHCHR might have included members of law enforcement agencies and others who were not counted by the Government. She categorically told, “সেই সংখ্যায় তো পুলিশও মারা গেছে। অন্য পক্ষেরও কেউ মারা গেছে থাকতে পারে। তাদের মিলিয়ে ধরেছে কী-না, কিংবা তারা কীভাবে কাউন্ট করেছে সেটা আমরা তো বলতে পারবো না। সেটা তাদের কাছেই জানতে হবে।… আমাদের শুধু অভ্যুত্থানে নিহত শহীদদের তালিকা করেছি” [https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/cgkr1y6j246o]. Thus, the Formal Charge submitted against the accused-petitioner clearly proves that the investigation agency along with the Prosecution implicated the accused-petitioner in the instant case without any investigation at all.
   59. That it is further submitted that the inherent improbability of the allegation undermines its credibility. It defies logic and common sense to suggest that numerous senior political figures, meeting openly in a well-known government venue, would collectively agree to an unlawful policy of extrajudicial killing — a policy that, if ever adopted, would be an explicit self-incrimination. The Prosecution’s theory lacks any basis in reason, practice, or political reality.
   60. That it is asserted that no legal and factual material submitted by the prosecution exists that the accused-petitioner exercised “effective control” over any military, paramilitary, or police unit, as would be required for command responsibility under section 4(3) of the Act. The Prosecution has not demonstrated that he had any capacity to order, permit, or acquiesce in the conduct of law-enforcement agencies, nor that he had any duty to supervise or prevent the alleged acts.
   61. That it is further noted that section 4(1) of the Act provides that “any individual who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be responsible and liable for punishment.” The Prosecution has not identified any individual act or omission by the accused-petitioner amounting to participation in, or contribution to, any of the alleged crimes. The requirement of individual responsibility is wholly absent.
   62. That it is submitted that section 4(2) further provides that criminal liability arises only where a person “orders, solicits, incites or induces the commission of such a crime” or “aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission.” The Prosecution has failed to present any act or statement by the accused-petitioner meeting these statutory criteria. There is no proof of order, solicitation, inducement, or aid, nor any intentional contribution as envisaged under section 4(2)(d).
   63. That it is stated that the claim of “superior responsibility” misconceives the law. Section 4(3) imposes liability on commanders or superiors who “fail to prevent or punish” their subordinates for crimes committed under their effective control. The accused-petitioner, being a civilian political leader outside government, had no subordinates, no chain of command, and no operational control. Consequently, section 4(3) cannot apply to him in any manner.
   64. That it is submitted that, as in Charge No. 1, the Prosecution’s reliance on conjecture and media snippets rather than primary evidence falls below the threshold of a prima facie case as required by section 9(1) of the Act and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure.
   65. That it is further submitted that the Prosecution has failed to establish actus reus, mens rea, or causation linking the accused-petitioner to any of the alleged crimes. The alleged “decision” of 19 July 2024 is unsupported by prosecution documents and materials, uncorroborated by purported witnesses, and contradicted by logic and context.
   66. That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 1, premised on conjecture and devoid of evidentiary support, is liable to be summarily rejected as disclosing no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

Charge No.2: Alleged public rally dated 26th July, 2024 and meeting dated 29th July, 2024

1. 67. That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 29 July 2024, during a meeting of the 14-Party Alliance, the accused-petitioner described the political party Jamaat-e-Islami as “terrorist,” “sectarian,” and “communal,” and that in so doing he sought to divert the student protest movement, thereby inciting violence and repression. It is further alleged that these remarks amount to incitement, facilitation, abetment, and participation in crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g) and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2) and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.
   68. That with regard to the allegation as made above it is submitted that the allegation is legally unfounded, factually misconceived, and politically motivated. The charge mischaracterises a factual statement of historical truth as “incitement.” Calling Jamaat-e-Islami a terrorist and communal organisation does not constitute a crime under any provision of the Act, nor under any recognised principle of international criminal law and not related with the student movement.
   69. That it is further noted that the allegation itself implicitly concedes that Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing had become deeply involved in the violent phase of the 2024 movement. Otherwise, criticism of Jamaat-e-Islami could not logically be equated with criticism of the movement itself. The Prosecution’s own framing thereby corroborates the Defence’s case that extremist infiltration had occurred.
   70. That it is stated that Jamaat-e-Islami’s long record of sectarian and violent activities is a matter of judicially recognised fact, not political opinion. This very International Crimes Tribunal has in several judgments—Chief Prosecutor v. Ghulam Azam (para 375), Chief Prosecutor v. Motiur Rahman Nizami (para 416), and Chief Prosecutor v. Maulana Abdus Sobhan (para 578)—described Jamaat-e-Islami as a “criminal enterprise” and a “communal as well as criminal organisation” which were upheld by the Hon’ble Appellate Division. The party’s culpability for crimes against humanity and genocide committed during the 1971 Liberation War has thus been conclusively established in this Tribunal’s own jurisprudence by various previous judgments.
   71. That the then government banned Jamaat-E-Islami under section 18(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009. It is pertinent to note here that fundamental right to freedom of association as enshrined under Article 38 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is not an unfettered right, rather subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order. The proviso of Article 38 categorically states, no person shall have the right to form, or be a member of the said association or union, if – “(c) it is formed for the purposes of organizing terrorist acts or militant activities against the State or the citizens or any other country”. As such the then government’s decision to ban Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing Islami Chhatro Shibir under Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009 was consistent with the Constitution in the prevailing situation at the relevant time.
   72. That it is submitted that even after independence, Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have continued a pattern of extremist activity. For instance, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) lists numerous violent acts attributed to Shibir [https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/ics_tl.htm]. The IHS Jane’s Global Terrorism and Insurgency Attack Index 2013 ranked Islami Chhatra Shibir as the third most active non-state armed group in the world, just one rank below the Taliban of Afghanistan [Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/jamaats-islami-chhatra-shibir-was-once-ranked-third-most-active-non-state-armed-group/articleshow/112916171.cms]. The European Parliament has likewise urged that political parties “associated with terrorist acts” in Bangladesh, including Jamaat-e-Islami, should be banned and urged Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to distance itself from Jamaat [The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/delink-with-jamaat-7244]. Jamaat-e-Islami is the party the top leadership of which has continued to espouse dangerous sectarian rhetoric, including a recent public call for a “final resolution” of the Ahmadiyya community [Dhaka Tribune, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/306207/jamaat-releases-statement-condemning-ahmadiyya], a chilling echo of the Nazi-era calls for “final solution” that led to the Holocaust during the Second World War. Describing such conduct as communal or terrorist is therefore a statement of fact, not an act of hate speech. There are numerous examples like these.
   73. That it is submitted that truth, in particular historical truth, cannot constitute incitement. Under international jurisprudence, incitement requires a direct call to commit an imminent unlawful act. The prosecution failed to show any remark of the accused-petitioner which may constitute the offence of ‘incitement’ under the Act, 1973 or international law.
   74. That it is submitted that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder as a crime against humanity; section 3(2)(g) criminalises abetment, conspiracy, or incitement; and section 3(2)(h) covers complicity or failure to prevent. The Prosecution has failed to show any actus reus linking the accused to an actual offence, or any mens rea demonstrating intent to commit or facilitate such acts.
   75. That it is further noted that the accused-petitioner had no position of authority or control over any enforcement agency or armed group at the material time. His presence in a political alliance meeting does not in law give rise to “command responsibility” as categorised under section 4(3). The Prosecution has not alleged, let alone proved, that he issued any order or had any capacity to prevent or punish alleged crimes.
   76. That it is submitted that the charge fails to meet the gravity threshold of an international crime. Labelling a political organisation “terrorist” cannot reasonably be compared to genocidal or dehumanising rhetoric seen in Rwanda or Nazi Germany. The accused’s remarks were grounded in well-documented fact, not prejudice or falsehood. To equate them with incitement to mass atrocity trivialises the very notion of crimes against humanity.
   77. That it is submitted that the proposed Charge No.2 based on decision to ban Jamaat-e-Islami reveals a lack of neutrality on the part of the prosecution. The immediate past Chief Prosecutor himself previously acted as defence counsel for senior Jamaat leaders who were convicted by this Tribunal and has long been politically aligned with Jamaat-linked entities, including the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party. His inclusion of this allegation reflects a conflict of interest and a political bias rather than a genuine prosecutorial purpose.
   78. That it is further submitted that the accused-petitioner, a valiant freedom fighter and lifelong advocate of secular, democratic values, has consistently opposed Jamaat-e-Islami’s communal ideology. The present charge appears to be a politically motivated reprisal against him precisely because of his historic stance against Jamaat and its collaborators in 1971.
   79. That it is submitted that under section 4(2) of the Act, liability requires that any contribution to a crime be intentional and made with the aim of furthering a criminal purpose. The Prosecution has failed to provide any evidence of any such intention.
   80. That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 2 discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. The Prosecution has failed to demonstrate any act, intent, or consequence connecting the accused to the alleged crimes.
   81. That it is respectfully prayed that the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged from Charge No. 2 in its entirety, the same being baseless in fact, unsupported in law, and inimical to the principles of justice on which this Tribunal was founded.

Charge No.3: Alleged liability for 23 (Twenty Three) deaths in Badda and adjacent area

1. 82. That the Prosecution alleges that from 19 July to 5 August 2024, twenty three persons — Md. Emon, Md. Hafizul Shikder, Md. Emdadul Haque, Liton, Md. Rayhan, Md. Nur Hossain Piyas, Md. Shohag Mia, Abdul Jabbar Sumon, Sagar Rahman, Md. Sirajul Bepari, Md. Al Amin Hossain Agomon Chishti, Md. Sajid Hawlader, Ashraful Hawladar, Alauddin Mollik, Alamgir Molla, Nishan Khan, Ramjan Ali, Al Amin, Sohel Mia, Al-Amin, Abu Rayhan, Mizanur Rahman, Md. Kamal Hossain Shobuj— were killed, and that the accused-petitioner is criminally liable for their deaths. It is further alleged that the accused acted as a “link” between local leaders of the Awami League (AL), the district police administration, and AL cadres, thereby facilitating a “shoot-on-sight” policy and the use of lethal force. The Prosecution asserts liability under sections 3(2)(a), (g) and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2) and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.
   83. That it is categorically stated here that the alleged place of occurrence, i.e. Badda and surrounding area, is not the constituency of the accused-petitioner as such the accused-petitioner has no causal nexus with the alleged deaths.
   84. That with regard to the allegation as made above it is submitted that as per section 16(1)(c) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 every charge against an accused person shall state such particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused person notice of the matter with which he is charged. But the proposed Charge No.3 does not contain any particulars as to the date and time of occurrence, place of occurrence and manner of occurrence as such the proposed Charge No.3 is liable to be rejected summarily.
   85. That it is submitted that the allegations made under the proposed Charge No.3 are factually baseless, legally untenable, vague and internally inconsistent. No evidence—documentary, oral, or digital—connects the accused to the specific killings alleged. The charge relies entirely on conjecture and the repetition of unverified narratives already addressed under earlier charges concerning imposing curfew and supposed “shoot-on-sight” orders.
   86. That it is stated that the Prosecution has failed to produce any witness statement, communication record, or directive demonstrating that the accused issued, transmitted, or endorsed any instruction to use lethal force. No causal link has been established between any words or actions of the accused and the tragic deaths referred to in the charge, thereby fail to establish the actus reus or mens rea required under section 3(2) of the Act.
   87. That it is submitted that, even on the Prosecution’s own showing, the accused had no command, control, or supervisory authority over any of the persons allegedly involved in the incident. Accordingly, the doctrine of “superior responsibility” under section 4(3) of the Act—requiring effective control and the ability to prevent or punish—has no application. The standards articulated in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (ICTY, 1998) make clear that mere political influence or presence at alliance meetings cannot establish command responsibility.
   88. That it is further stated that the Prosecution has not submitted any credible legal or factual material of a plan, policy, or conspiracy as required by section 4(2)(d) of the Act. No minutes of meetings, communications, or contemporaneous documents have been produced to show that the accused shared any criminal purpose or intention with those who allegedly committed the killings. Absent of proof of intent or knowledge, liability under section 4(2) cannot arise.
   89. That it is stated that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. No evidence has been provided that the killings in Badda formed part of any such attack, let alone that the accused participated in or furthered it. Isolated incidents of violence—however regrettable—cannot satisfy the threshold of crimes against humanity.
   90. That it is submitted that the absence of lawful authority, causal connection, and intention—combined with contradictions within the Prosecution’s own evidence—renders the allegation wholly speculative. To attribute liability to the accused on the basis of political association or alliance membership would offend the principles of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and individual criminal responsibility enshrined in section 4(1) of the Act.
   91. That it is therefore respectfully submitted that Charge No. 03 is liable to be summarily rejected and the accused-petitioner is entitled to be discharged in the interests of justice, as it discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. Because, the Prosecution’s theory is unsupported by evidence, contradicted by its own record, and legally unsustainable.

EVIDENTIARY DEFECTS AND LACK OF PRIMA FACIE CASE

1. 92. That it is submitted that the failure of the Prosecution and the Investigation Agency to consider the prevailing situation of the country at the relevant time that the movement was peaceful up to a certain point, and suddenly it turned into a terrorist attack killing police officials, breaking prisons, burning police stations, destroying mega public infrastructures, like – Metro Rail, Mayor Hanif Flyover, BTV etc., which may have compelled the law enforcing agencies on duty under the relevant provisions of law permitting law enforcement officials to use firearms and such failure shows that the investigation carried out against the accused-petitioner is grossly flawed as such the Formal Charge submitted on the basis of the said investigation is liable to be rejected summarily.
   93. That the accused-petitioner humbly submits that the prosecution’s case rests upon a handful of vague, repetitive, mechanical, and unreliable witness statements and a controversial confessional statement made by former IGP Chowdhury Abdullah Al Mamun. None of these materials disclose any direct or indirect nexus between the accused and the incidents alleged. The prosecution has failed to produce a single credible item of evidence that attributes to the accused any act of order, incitement, facilitation, participation, or encouragement within the meaning of section 3(2) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and accordingly, the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.
   94. That it is submitted that the doctrine of superior responsibility invoked by the prosecution is totally inapplicable in the instant case. Section 4(3) of the Act makes a commander or superior criminally liable only where he “had effective control” over subordinates, knew or should have known that they were committing crimes, and failed to prevent or punish them. The accused, at the relevant time, was neither a commander nor a superior officer; he held no executive authority or control, and therefore could not exercise “effective control.” The elements of command responsibility articulated in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (ICTY, 1998) are absent in this case.
   95. That it is submitted that section 4(2) of the Act further provides that any contribution to a crime must be intentional, made either with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of a group or in the knowledge of the group’s intention to commit the crime. No such intention or knowledge has been alleged, let alone proved, against the accused. On the contrary, the available evidence as included in the prosecution document does not show any involvement of the accused-petitioner with the alleged crimes.
   96. That it is further submitted that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Fact-Finding Report (2025) has been wrongly presented as evidence in the instant criminal proceedings. The said report itself categorically disclaims being a criminal investigation conducted under judicial standards. It expressly states that its findings were based on open-source and testimonial materials, and that it was not intended to determine individual criminal responsibility.
   97. That it is submitted that one member of the OHCHR fact-finding team publicly clarified that the report was never meant to be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding, domestic or international. Nevertheless, the prosecution has misrepresented the report by submitting it as substantive evidence before this Tribunal—an attempt to borrow the institutional credibility of the OHCHR (and by extension, the United Nations) to lend false legitimacy to an otherwise deficient case. This is both misleading to the public and contrary to fair-trial principles.
   98. That it is further submitted that it is also important to note that the report in question was produced solely under the administrative authority of the OHCHR and not as a United Nations-mandated investigative mechanism—unlike the Independent International Fact-Finding Missions on Myanmar, Venezuela, or Palestine, which were established through formal resolutions of the Human Rights Council. The present report therefore carries no quasi-judicial or evidentiary status and cannot lawfully be used to sustain criminal charges before this Honourable Tribunal. The prosecution’s reliance upon it constitutes a “legitimacy grab” unsupported by any legal basis.
   99. That it is submitted that the prosecution has failed to assess any legal framework governing the use of force by law enforcement or how such framework was allegedly breached. Nor has it shown how the accused’s political position, without any executive role, related to the incidents complained of. In the absence of a demonstrated nexus between the accused’s conduct and any prohibited act under section 3(2) of the Act, the theory of the prosecution collapses.
   100. That it is further noted that section 3(2) of the Act defines crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but only when committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.” The prosecution has failed to establish that any such attack occurred pursuant to a policy, plan, or direction in which the accused participated. Isolated acts of violence by law enforcement or third parties, even if proved, cannot satisfy this threshold.
   101. That it is stated that the cumulative defects—unreliable witness statements, unverified digital evidence, suppression of exculpatory material, misuse of the OHCHR report, and the absence of command authority or intent—render the prosecution’s case wholly unreliable. Even taking the evidence at its highest, it fails to establish any prima facie actus reus, mens rea, or causal nexus linking the accused to the alleged crimes under sections 3(2) or 4 of the Act.
   102. That it is most respectfully submitted that there exists no sufficient ground to frame any charge against the accused-petitioner. The materials presented are speculative, derivative, and legally inadmissible, falling short of the prima facie standard required by section 9(1) of the Act. The prosecution has therefore failed to establish even a triable issue, and the formal charge is liable to be rejected in its entirety.

ONE-SIDED INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED BY BLANKET INDEMNITY

1. 103. That it is stated that the investigation agency and the prosecution refrained itself from investigating into the actual context of July-August atrocities. The OHCHR Fact Finding Report found existence of “violent mobs”, “mixed crowd” consisting of “vandals”, “violent rioters”, people engaged in “violent behaviour”, “mob armed with sticks and stones and who looked different from other protesters” on many occasions. But the investigation agency and the Prosecution did not take any step at all to identify those people who were mainly responsible for the atrocities occurred at the relevant time.
   104. That it is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution’s investigation is fundamentally flawed, suffering from political bias and selectivity, having been conducted with the singular aim of targeting the Petitioner while intentionally disregarding overwhelming exculpatory evidence concerning the true perpetrators of the July 2024 atrocities. Specifically, the Prosecution has committed a dereliction of its statutory duty by consciously failing to investigate or acknowledge credible, publicly documented evidence of grave crimes committed by elements aligned with the protest movement, including confessions from key organisers, the Narsingdi Jail Break, police killings, the use of military-grade weapons etc., which would have established that the violence was the product of a pre-planned armed conspiracy, and not of any incitement by the Petitioner. This deficiency is compounded by the subsequent actions of the interim administration, which issued a blanket indemnity under the জুলাই গণঅভ্যুত্থান (সুরক্ষা ও দায় নির্ধারণ) অধ্যাদেশ, ২০২৬ shielding the actual perpetrators from prosecution, thereby establishing a pattern of selective justice that violates the principle of equality before the law and compromises the bona fides and independence of the entire process, rendering the prosecution legally unsustainable before this Honourable Tribunal, and as such, the formal charge is liable to be rejected.

RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED PERSON TO CHALLENGE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION AT THE PRE-TRIAL STAGE

1. 105. That it is stated that Rule 37 of the International Crimes Tribunals Rules of Procedure, 2010 provides, if the Tribunal, upon consideration of record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, finds that there is no sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, it shall discharge the accused. Rule 37 of the said Rules, 2010 is consistent to the procedure of confirmation of charges laid down under Article 61 of the Rome Statute. As per Article 61(6) of the Rome Statute, at the hearing of confirmation of charges an accused person may (a) Object to the charges; (b) Challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and (c) Present evidence.
   106. That it is stated that the right of the accused-person to challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor and contest its probative value, particularly on the ground of insufficiency, at the pre-trial stage was affirmed in a number cases such as Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), where the Pre-Trial Chamber declined to confirm charges due to lack of substantial grounds to believe the accused committed the alleged crimes.
   107. That it is submitted that in the case of A.T.M. Azharul Islam vs. The Chief Prosecutor reported in 33 BLT (AD) 113 the Hon’ble Appellate Division held, “Indeed, a judicial responsibility attached to this Court at all material times to plug the gaps of the understanding of the applicability of the substantive standards of customary international law in the facts and circumstances which ought not to have been overlooked.” Hence, in the light of the said decision of the Hon’ble Appellate Division and the provision Article 61 of the Rome Statute read with Rule 37 of the International Crimes Tribunals Rules of Procedure, 2010, it is most humbly submitted that there is no sufficient ground to presume that the accused person committed the crimes charged as such the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.
   108. That it is submitted that the Formal Charge submitted by the Prosecution does not disclose any prima-facie case against the accused-petitioner under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, nor is there sufficient ground to presume that the accused-petitioner committed any offence and as such, the accused-petitioner may kindly be discharged from the instant case.