Closing written argument by defence, part 2

This is the second of three sections of the defence’s written closing argument dealing with the application of the offence of crimes against humanity.

THE  EVENTS OF    JULY-AUGUST  2024   DO    NOT    CONSTITUTE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (S. 3(2)(a))  

It is submitted that the Prosecution has failed to satisfy the mandatory contextual elements (“chapeau requirements”) of Crimes Against Humanity under Section 3(2)(a) of the  International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (hereinafter  referred to as the Act, 1973). It transpires from the evidence  adduced by the Prosecution that there is no evidence of a  “widespread” or “systematic” attack directed against a  “civilian   population.”   Rather,   the    evidence   clearly  demonstrates that law enforcement authorities had to  respond to an organized armed attack against public  infrastructures and personnel [Prosecution Documents, 4th  Volume, Page 1492, 1529, 1646 and 1674]. This exercise  of force was consistent with the State’s “responsibility to  protect” and the right to self-defence under the Constitution,  Penal Code, Police Regulations Bengal and UN Basic  Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law  Enforcement Officials. Absent proof of a policy to target  civilians, and given the accused’s lack of requisite  knowledge, the charges are legally unsustainable.

In the case of Chief Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina and others [ICTBD Case No. 02 of 2025, judgment delivered on 17 November 2025], the Hon’ble Tribunal-1 adopted the  substituted definition of crimes against humanity laid down  under section 3(2)(a) of the Act, 1973 (Clause (a) was  substituted by section 4(b)(i) of the International Crimes  (Tribunals) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2024 (Ordinance No.  XIV of 2024) (With effect from 6th January 2009)) that  mirrors the standards articulated in Article 7 of the Rome  Statute and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal  Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International  Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda (ICTR) and International  Criminal Court (ICC), holding that the Act, 1973 is “fairly  consistent with current international standards.” The  Tribunal affirmed that crimes against humanity require the  existence of an attack, that such attack be widespread or  systematic, and that it be directed against a civilian  population, further emphasising that these elements apply  irrespective of whether the underlying violence occurs in  wartime or peacetime. The Tribunal, currently, holds that  the mental element for crimes against humanity is satisfied  where the accused knew or should have known that the  attack was widespread or systematic, and nonetheless  incited, ordered, facilitated, or failed to prevent the  atrocities.

The contextual elements are absent
International jurisprudence consistently holds that as the contextual elements, the crimes against humanity require the existence of a widespread or systematic attack directed  against a civilian population, and that each underlying act  must be committed as part of that broader attack. In Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC Trial Chamber II,  Judgment, 7 March 2014, the Court held that the contextual  element requires proof of an “organizational policy” and an  attack that is “either massive in scale or methodically      organized” against civilians. Similarly, the ICC Pre‑Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on  Confirmation of Charges, 12 June 2014, emphasized that  the attack must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State  or organizational policy,” with the acts forming “a course of  conduct” rather than isolated events.

The ICTY’s seminal formulation in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1999, established that the attack need not occur during armed conflict, so long  as it constitutes “a systematic or widespread course of  conduct” against civilians. This approach was further developed in ICTY Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Appeals  Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, which held that the  contextual element is satisfied where the attack is “not  random, but carried out in an organized manner” and  civilians are the primary target. The ICTR likewise affirmed  this standard in ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber  I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, holding that crimes against  humanity arise when prohibited acts form part of a “massive,  frequent, large-scale attack against a civilian population,”  perpetrated with knowledge of that context.

Across all three tribunals, the contextual requirement thus demands: (1) an attack of a widespread or systematic nature;  (2)  directed against civilians; and  (3) a link between each accused’s conduct and the broader  attack, with the perpetrator aware of the factual  circumstances establishing the attack’s character.

The defence submits that none of these contextual elements  are present in the prosecution case against Hasanul Haq Inu;  rather, he was targeted for his anti-Jamat-e-Islami political  ideology and statements.

There was no ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack
To establish the contextual elements of “Crimes Against Humanity” under Section 3(2)(a) of the Act 1973 (as  amended in 2024), the Prosecution must first prove that the  events of July-August 2024 constituted a “widespread”  attack. Jurisprudentially, “widespread” refers to the large-  scale nature of the attack and the cumulative number of  victims, often involving acts committed over a broad  geographical area (Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY Case  No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 22 February  2001, para. 428). In the context of the 2024 uprising, the Prosecution is burdened with proving that the reported  casualties were not disparate incidents of civil unrest but a  singular, massive assault on the civilian population spanning  multiple administrative districts.

Secondly, the Prosecution must demonstrate that the attack was “systematic,” necessitating proof of the organized  nature of the violence and the “improbability of its random  occurrence” (Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07,  Judgment, 7 March 2014, para. 1123). This element requires evidence of a “State or organizational policy” to  commit such an attack, which may be inferred from a  “pattern of crimes” or the synchronized use of state  resources (Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-  T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 203). To meet this  burden regarding the July-August 2024 events, the  Prosecution must show that the deployment of the Police,  RAB, BGB, and Army, alongside the implementation of  internet blackouts and “shoot-on-sight” orders, were  components of a deliberate, pre-planned policy orchestrated  by the 14-party alliance leadership. Legal commentators  have noted that establishing this “policy” is critical, as mere  “spontaneous” or “isolated” reactions to riots do not satisfy  the systematic requirement (Cambridge International Law  Journal, “The ICTA 1973: What is so ‘International’ about  it?”, 17 July 2025).

In section 3(2)(a) of the Act, 1973, words “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”  attributing with the words “knowledge of the attack” have  been used and in explanation the word “attack” has been  shown to have referred to Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute.  As per Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, “Attack directed  against any civilian population” means a course of conduct  involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in  paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or  in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit  such attack. So, the word “attack” should be considered and  viewed considering the facts and circumstances of the  relevant period. In the whole period from 1st July to 5th  August, 2024, no evidence so far could be produced before  the Hon’ble Tribunal that any act by or on behalf of State  was done as a matter of policy (which should be construed    widely) persuaded for such attack as alleged. Whereas  contrary fact is that when the attack was made on life,  property as well as on law enforcement agencies with  atrocities of a very highest degree at different places of the  country, the attempt to prevent those atrocities by taking  decisions on the spot as required and permitted under the  law. So, it is very clear that no attack was at all made  pursuant to or in furtherance of State or Organizational  policy as such the Prosecution’s attempt to characterize the  events of July-August, 2024 as crimes against humanity  fails.

Recently, this requirement was central to the recent finding in Chief Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina and others [ICTBD  Case No. 02 of 2025, Judgment, 17 November 2025],  where the Tribunal held that the scale of the crackdown  across Dhaka, Chattogram, and other major hubs satisfied  the “widespread” threshold. However, the defence does not  agree with the findings since the situation in July-August  2024 satisfies the elements of a non-international armed  conflict (NIAC) as defined under common article 3 of Geneva  Conventions 1949, which attracts the offences under section  3(2)(e) of the 1973 Act:

 “(e) violation of any humanitarian rules  applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the  Geneva Conventions of 1949;”

EXISTENCE  OF A    NON-INTERNATIONAL   ARMED    CONFLICT (NIAC)  

A Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) is defined by two key elements: a high intensity of violence and a sufficient  degree of organization of the non-state armed groups. In  addition, the conflict must be protracted and exceed the  intensity of the internal disturbances. The documents  submitted by the prosecution and the recent news reports  satisfies both the elements. Regarding the protracted nature  of the conflict, it can be found that the violence committed at  that time was intense and exceeded the intensity of internal  disturbances. The Hon’ble Tribunal must consider the  following indicators to decide upon the protracted nature of  the conflict

The law enforcing agency was not targeting any ‘civilian  population’ -International    Standards  on    “Civilian  Population” and Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH)
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), specifically the principle of distinction, the “civilian population” is defined by  exclusion: it comprises all persons who are not members of  State armed forces or organized armed groups. Crucially,  protection is forfeited “for such time as they take a direct  part in hostilities” (Rule 6, Customary IHL; Article 13(3)  AP II). The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Galić [Case No. IT-98-  29-T, Judgment, 5 December 2003, para. 50] held that the  presence of individual combatants within a population does  not deprive it of its civilian character; however, if   population is used as a “human shield” or is dominated by  organized belligerents, the target loses its protected status.  Furthermore, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on DPH  (2009) clarifies that “continuous combat function”—such as  those demonstrated by militant cells within a protest  movement—renders individuals legitimate targets. In a  Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), an “organized  armed group” is defined by its ability to plan and execute  military operations, a threshold confirmed in Prosecutor v.  Tadić [Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 70].

National Standard under the 1973 Act (as amended)
While the Hon’ble Tribunal-1 in its recent findings [e.g., Chief Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina, Case No. 02 of 2025]  interpreted “civilian population” through a broad human  rights lens, the Defence submits that this definition is legally  inapplicable in the context of the July-August 2024 events.  In Sheikh Hasina, the Tribunal adopted the following  standard, without providing any source, whatsoever:  “The attack must be directed against any  civilian   population. The   term    “civilian  population” must be interpreted broadly and  refers to a population that is predominantly  civilian in nature. A population may qualify as  a “civilian” even if non-civilians are among it.  As long as it is predominantly civilian the  presence within a population of members of  armed  resistance    groups,    or    former  combatants, who have laid down their arms,   does not as such, alter its civilian nature.”  [Sheikh Hasina, page 11, Last Paragraph]

On the other hand, in Chief Prosecutor vs. Md. Saiful Islam and others [ICT-BD (ICT-2) Case No. 02 of 2025] the  Hon’ble Tribunal-2 held, “the “civilian population” refers to  persons not actively participating in hostilities, whose  collective targeting forms the object of the criminal  campaign” [Para 15(E)].

It may kindly be noted here that as per Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh citizens  shall have the right to assemble and to participate in public  meetings and processions so far as it is peaceful and without  arms and subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by  law in the interests of public order or public health. Article  38(c) of the Constitution categorically imposes restriction on  forming any association if it is formed for the purposes of  organizing terrorist acts or militant activities against the  State or the citizens or any other country as such the civilian  status of a civilian is lost if he/she does anything in  contravention of Article 37 and 38 of the Constitution.

The Defence most humbly submits that Section 3(2)(a) of the Act, 1973 (as amended in 2024) must be read in  conjunction with the laws of war, as the intensity of the  violence reached the level of a NIAC. National jurisprudence  has previously recognized that armed insurgents do not  enjoy the protections of “civilians” under the Act. By failing  to account for the transition from “civilian protest” to “armed  insurrection,” the Prosecution’s current charges erroneously  characterize legitimate military responses to terrorism as  crimes against humanity.

Reclassification via “Meticulous Design” and Structured  Coordination
The Defence asserts that the opposition forces did not constitute a “civilian population” but an Organized Armed  Group. This is confirmed by the “Meticulous Design”  declaration of Dr. Muhammad Yunus, which admitted the  uprising was a pre-planned strategic operation, not an  organic civilian   assembly.   The    use   of    encrypted  communication channels (Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook  Messenger  etc.)   provided    the   command-and-control  infrastructure necessary for a belligerent party. The  deposition of P.W.8, who was a coordinator of the “protests” in Kushtia, confirms that protestors used  “whatsapp” group for their internal communication which  establishes their belligerent status. As held in Prosecutor v.  Limaj [Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November  2005, paras 84, 89-90], the ability to coordinate nationwide  tactical maneuvers—such as the synchronized “Long March”  and   the    “Bangla    Blockade”—is definitive   proof   of  organizational status. When a movement is “designed” to  dismantle the State, it ceases to be a civilian protest and  enters the realm of a military adversary.

Forfeiture of Protection through Lethal Force and  Weaponry
The “civilian” character of the protesters is further negated by the acquisition and use of military-grade weaponry. The  looting of 5,829 firearms and over 650,000 rounds of  ammunition from police stations and prisons (including the  Narsingdi jailbreaks as mentioned in of the OHCHR Fact  Finding Report, Para  110) constitutes  a   “military  acquisition” phase of a conflict. Moreover, the deployment of unidentified snipers using 7.62mm military rifles, as  highlighted by Brig. Gen. Sakhawat Hossain [Exhibit-Q  adduced  by  the  Defence, Link:  https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/who  -were-the-youths-carrying-762mm-rifles-meant-police-rab-  3675336], proves the presence of trained combatants  operating within the crowds. Under IHL, individuals who  arm themselves with military rifles and engage in sniper fire  are “combatants” by conduct. The presence of these lethal  actors within the masses turned the protesters into “human  shields” for a militant vanguard, thereby stripping the  overall group of its purely civilian status.

Strategic Targeting of National Infrastructure
The pattern of violence reveals a “military necessity” in the State’s response, as the opposition targeted only strategic  hubs and essential infrastructure—a hallmark of insurgent  warfare rather than civil rioting. The coordinated attacks on  the BTV (national television) [As mentioned in of the  OHCHR  Fact    Finding    Report,   Para    116],    power  distribution centers, Metro Rail, Setu Bhaban, Sadak   Bhaban, and key transport arteries like the Hanif Flyover  and national highways as evident from Exhibit-‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’,  ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘S’ and ‘T’ adduced by the  Defence represent a systematic attempt to paralyze the  State’s central nervous system. Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I (as customary law), these facilities are  “military objectives” when they provide a definite military  advantage to the attacker. The organized destruction of the  National Railway and bus terminals and blockade of key  roads and highways was intended to sever the State’s  logistical lines, a clear military objective that no “civilian  population” would or could execute without belligerent  intent.

Admissions of Belligerent Intent and Killings
Crucially, the student leaders themselves have publicly admitted to a combatant role. In numerous media  appearances and social media statements, leaders from the  Students Against Discrimination (SAD), Shibir and Chatra  Dal (student wing of BNP) together with Hizb-ut Tahrir and  other terrorist outfits have claimed that killing police  officials and members of the armed forces was a necessary  and intentional act to “obtain their objective.” It is evident  from Exhibit-‘P’ adduced by the Defence that Hasib Al  Islam, one of the coordinators of the anti-discrimination  student movement, said in public that the ‘July Revolution’  could not have been easily realized without the fire incidents  at metro rail stations or the killing of police officers. Official  figures confirm that at least 44 (Forty-Four) police officers  were killed, many in brutal retaliatory acts of lynching and  arson. These are not “unfortunate casualties” of a riot but  “enemy kills” in a conflict setting. By claiming responsibility  for the deaths of State security personnel as a means to  achieve a political takeover, these actors have self-identified  as belligerents, and the law must treat them as such.

Psychological Warfare through Digital Doxing and  Family Targeting
The Defence submits that the opposition’s use of social media influencers to conduct “digital vigilantism” serves as  further evidence of their status as organized belligerents.  During the July–August 2024 conflict, coordinated cells on  platforms such as Telegram and Facebook were utilized to  dox the personal identities, home addresses, and family  details of police and armed forces personnel. This systematic  campaign of intimidation was explicitly designed to compel  State officials to refrain from their lawful duties by  threatening their non-combatant relatives—a tactic that  constitutes an “act of hostility” under international law. In  the jurisprudence of the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Nahimana  et al. (Media Case) [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 3  December 2003, para. 948], the Tribunal recognized that  media platforms can be weaponized as instruments of  violence when used to facilitate specific attacks on identified  individuals. By transforming social media into a battlefield  for psychological warfare and the targeting of families, the  “influencers” and their networks were not exercising  “freedom of speech” as civilians, but were engaged in Direct  Participation in Hostilities (DPH) as defined in the ICRC  Interpretive Guidance (2009). Such conduct effectively  strips these actors and their coordinated networks of the  protections afforded to a “civilian population.”

The Illegal Use of Unarmed Persons as Human Shields
Furthermore, the Defence asserts that the high number of civilian casualties is the direct result of a systematic policy  by the militant vanguard to use unarmed students and the  general public as “human shields.” Evidence from field  reports indicates that armed militants, including those from  Jamaat-e-Islami, Students Against Discrimination (SAD),  Shibir and Chatra Dal (student wing of BNP) together with  Hizb-ut Tahrir and other terrorist outfits, deliberately  embedded themselves within large crowds of unarmed  civilians to launch attacks on police stations and state  infrastructure, such as the Metro Rail and BTV station,  while shielded by the masses. Under Customary IHL (Rule  97), the use of civilians to render military objectives immune  from attack is a grave violation. The ICTY Appeals  Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić [Case No. IT-95-14-A,  Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 654] and Prosecutor v.  Galić [Case No. IT-98-29-T, para. 58] emphasized that  while the presence of civilians does not exempt a military  target from attack, the party that uses human shields bears  the primary responsibility for the resulting “incidental loss  of life.” In this context, the protesters’ tactic of using  “unarmed students” as a buffer for their “meticulously  designed” armed insurrection shifts the legal and moral  liability for casualties from the State to the opposition  leadership.

RECHARACTERIZING THE OPPOSITION AS AN  “ORGANIZED   ARMED   GROUP”  (THE  ORGANIZATION ELEMENT)   

The Defence submits that the July-August disturbances were not spontaneous civilian riots but were orchestrated by  a “decentralized organized armed group.” While the  Prosecution characterizes the protesters as “general people,”  the level of coordination—evidenced by the “Long March to  Dhaka,” the systematic targeting of state infrastructure, and  the synchronized use of digital communication for command  and control—demonstrates a functional command structure.  Under the jurisprudence of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Limaj  et al. [Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November  2005, Paras 84, 89-90], the Tribunal held that a group does  not need a “pyramidal” military structure to be considered  “organized.” It is sufficient if the group has the “ability to  plan and execute military operations.” The Defence argues  that the coordinated attacks on 450 police stations and the  Prime Minister’s residence represent examples of a “unified  military strategy” carried out by militants operating under  the guise of a student movement.

Justification of Force and the Principle of Distinction (The  Intensity Element)
The Defence asserts that the “protracted armed violence” reached the requisite intensity of a NIAC, as defined in  Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. [Case No. IT-04-84-T,  Judgment, 3 April 2008, Paras 49, 60]. This intensity  necessitated the deployment of the Armed Forces under the  relevant Police Regulations to suppress an “armed  insurrection.” In this context, the targets were not “civilians”  but individuals who had lost their protection by taking  “Direct   Participation   in Hostilities    (DPH)”    (ICRC,  “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation  in Hostilities,” 2009, p. 43). Consequently, any casualties  among the truly innocent were not “murder” or “crimes  against humanity” but rather “incidental loss of life”  resulting from proportionate attacks on legitimate military  objectives. As held in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić [Case  No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 5 December 2003, Para 58],  the presence of some civilians within a group does not  deprive the entire group of its status as a legitimate target if  it is dominated by persons taking part in hostilities.

Internet-Based  Coordination as  Evidence   of   a  “Decentralized Organized Armed Group”
The Defense submits that the 2024 uprising satisfied the “Organization” requirement of the Tadić test through a  sophisticated,  decentralized  command-and-control  infrastructure primarily facilitated by digital means. In  modern conflict, the lack of a traditional pyramidal military  hierarchy does not preclude the existence of an organized  armed group. As held in Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. [ICTY  Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November 2005,  paras. 84, 89], organization is evidenced by the “ability to  plan and execute military operations.” The coordinated  nationwide “Bangla Blockade” and the “Long March to  Dhaka” were synchronized through encrypted platforms like  Telegram and WhatsApp, which served as a virtual  headquarters. Scholarly authority supports this, noting that  “decentralized groups… consisting of fluid alliances of small  subunits with loose coordination” can fulfill conflict  classification criteria if they demonstrate shared military  strategies and the pooling of resources (Vité & Gallino,  “Decentralized armed groups: Can they be classified as  parties to NIAC?”, International Review of the Red Cross,  Vol. 106, No. 926, 2024). The use of the internet for real-  time tactical adjustments and the systematic targeting of  450 police stations confirm that the protesters operated as a  disciplined party to a conflict, rather than a spontaneous  civilian assembly.

The “Meticulous Design” Declaration of Dr. Muhammad  Yunus
Crucially, the “organized” and “planned” nature of the movement has been publicly confirmed by the former Chief  Adviser, Dr. Muhammad Yunus. During his address at the  Clinton Global Initiative on the sidelines of the 79th UN  General Assembly, Dr. Yunus explicitly stated that the  revolution was “not organic” but was a “meticulously  designed agitation” which was “very well designed” and “not  just suddenly came.” By introducing Mahfuz Alam as the   “brain” behind the uprising, Dr. Yunus effectively admitted  to the existence of a high-level strategic “policy” and  “organizational plan” to overthrow the state. This  declaration is a “statement against interest” that confirms  the Prosecution’s own narrative of “peaceful students” is a  facade; legally, it establishes the “Policy” and “Plan”  elements required to characterize the opposition as an  organized party to a conflict.

Evidence of Territorial Takeover and Lethal Capabilities
A scan of State security reports and contemporaneous media reveals that the insurrection involved a categorical intent to  seize territory and use lethal force. On August 1, 2024, the  government officially banned Islami Chhatra Shibir (the  student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami) under the Anti-Terrorism  Act, identifying them as “militants” who had transitioned  from civil protest to an “armed uprising” [Official Gazette,  August 1, 2024]. Reports from security agencies during the  final days of the movement noted that student leaders (most  of whom are now formed as the leaders of a new political  party, i.e., National Citizen Party (NCP)) within the radical  factions of Shibir, Hizb-ut Tahrir etc. had openly planned for  a “final takeover” of Dhaka, targeting the Prime Minister’s  residence and the Secretariat as a means of territorial  conquest. Subsequent security operations following the  transition   discovered    significant   “weapons    caches,”  including firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs),  which were “pre-positioned” by militant-linked figures to  ensure the success of the takeover (SecDev Report, “The   Ballot and the Algorithm,” February 2026). These instances  of “sabotage capability” and the “coordinated destruction of  450 police stations” represent a “full-scale lethal” campaign  to dismantle state authority, thereby stripping the  perpetrators of their civilian status under the principle of  Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) (ICRC Interpretive  Guidance, 2009).

During the height of the July-August 2024 conflict, organized mobs and protesters launched coordinated attacks  on police stations and detention facilities across Bangladesh,  resulting in the looting of approximately 5,829 firearms and  over 650,000 rounds of ammunition, including military-  grade Chinese rifles, sub-machine guns (SMGs), and  thousands of grenades. Significant prison breaks occurred at  the Narsingdi District Jail (July 19) and Sherpur District  Jail (August 5), where attackers freed over 2,200 inmates—  including high-risk militants—and seized dozens of rifles and  shotguns. These events, characterized by the systematic  seizure of lethal weaponry to be used against state forces,  provide compelling evidence that the situation had crossed  the “intensity” and “weapons” thresholds required to be  legally classified as a Non-International Armed Conflict  (NIAC).

The Weapons Threshold and the Presence of Unidentified  Armed Combatants
The Defence further submits that the intensity of the July- August 2024 conflict is underscored by the widespread use  of military-grade weaponry by unidentified actors, satisfying   the “weapons threshold” required to establish a NIAC. This fact was repeatedly corroborated by Brigadier (Retd) M    Sakhawat Hossain, the former Home Affairs Adviser of the    interim government. In multiple public statements and    briefings—most notably following his visit to injured    personnel at the Combined Military Hospital on August 12,    2024—Brig Gen Hossain expressed alarm at the discovery    of 7.62mm ammunition (typically associated with AK-47s    or SLRs) and the use of 7.62mm rifles by “unidentified    persons in civilian clothes” (Exhibit-Q adduced by the    Defence). He specifically highlighted a grave incident at the    Ansar gate, questioning who these “civilians” were that    possessed and fired prohibited military-grade weapons.    Under the jurisprudence of the ICTY in Prosecutor v.    Boškoski & Tarčulovski [Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment,    10 July 2008, para. 177], the “type of weapons used” is a    primary indicative factor of a NIAC. The presence of snipers    and the deployment of high-caliber rifles by non-state actors    operating in civilian attire demonstrate that the state was    not engaged in crowd control against “peaceful protesters,”    but was instead facing an armed insurrection involving    combatants who had met the lethality threshold of an    organized armed group. This evidence effectively rebuts the    “Crimes Against Humanity” narrative by showing that the    casualties occurred within the context of active hostilities    between two armed sides. Recent interview of Dr. Asif    Nazrul, Former Adviser, Ministry of Law, Justice and    Parliamentary Affairs with BBC Bangla also corroborates    the statements made by Brig. (Retd.) M. Sakhawat Hossain.

The concept of ‘armed attack’ against the civilians, public  infrastructure and the law enforcing agencies
The Defence submits that the events of July–August 2024  must be legally recharacterized as a response to a  coordinated “armed attack” rather than a systematic assault  on a civilian population. Under international law and Article  51 of the UN Charter, the State possesses an inherent right  to self-defence—both individual and collective—when faced  with an organized use of force that threatens its territorial  integrity and the safety of its citizens. The evidence of this  “armed attack” is found in the “meticulous design” of the  uprising, which saw the synchronized targeting and  destruction of over 450 police stations and the systematic  looting of 5,829 firearms and 650,000 rounds of  ammunition. Furthermore, the strategic sabotage of  essential national infrastructure—including BTV stations,  the Metro Rail, power distribution centres, and national  highways—indicates a belligerent intent to paralyze the  state’s central nervous system, a hallmark of military-grade  operations rather than civilian rioting. As highlighted by  Brig. Gen. Sakhawat Hossain, the presence of unidentified  actors utilizing 7.62mm military rifles underscores that the  law enforcement agencies were not engaged in crowd  control,   but   were   repelling   a   lethal   insurrection.  Consequently, the state’s exercise of force was a lawful  application of the “responsibility to protect” against an  organized armed group, rendering the charges of Crimes  Against Humanity legally unsustainable.

The attacks on State infrastructures and personnel by “violent mobs”, “mixed crowd” consisting of “vandals”,  “violent rioters”, people engaged in “violent behaviour”,  “mob armed with sticks and stones and who looked different  from other protesters” were also reported in the OHCHR Fact  Finding report [Prosecution Document, 3rd Volume, Page 1014-  1126] which clearly proves that the state’s exercise of force  was a lawful application of the “responsibility to protect”  against an organized armed group.

Conclusion on the inapplicability of crimes against  humanity
In conclusion, the Defence submits that the Prosecution’s “civilian population” narrative is a legal fiction. When a  group is organized through a “meticulous design,” armed  with   thousands    of   looted   rifles   and   snipers,   and  systematically targets the State’s power and transport  infrastructure while declaring a mission to kill police, it is a  party to a conflict, not a “civilian population” under section  3(2)(a) of the Act, 1973. Consequently, the State’s response  was a lawful engagement with an armed enemy, and the  charges of Crimes Against Humanity must be dismissed as  the fundamental “target” element is absent.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The Defence submits that the actions of the State and its security    apparatus    during the   July–August 2024  disturbances were mandated by the legal doctrine of the  Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which imposes a primary  duty   upon    the    State    to   safeguard    its   population,  infrastructure, and sovereignty from organized violence.  This exercise of force was not a “systematic attack” but a  lawful and proportionate response to an organized armed  insurrection, conducted in strict adherence to both national  statutory frameworks and international legal obligations.

The Responsibility to Protect Under National Law
Under the national law, the State enjoys R2P under the following laws:
– The Constitution
– The Penal Code
– The Police Regulations

Under the Constitution of Bangladesh, the State is the ultimate guarantor of the security and property of its  citizens.   The  Defence    asserts   that when public  infrastructure—such as the Metro Rail, BTV stations, and  power distribution centres—is targeted by “meticulously  designed” sabotage, the state is constitutionally bound to  intervene to prevent the total collapse of the Republic’s  central nervous system. This constitutional duty to maintain  public order is further operationalized through the Penal  Code, which provides for the Right of Private Defence  (Sections 96–106). The state, acting through its agents, has   the legal authority to use force, including lethal force, to  defend against an imminent threat of death, grievous hurt,  or the destruction of strategic national assets by an  “organized armed group”.

This authority is precisely regulated by the Police Regulations of Bengal (PRB), which outline the graduated  use of force to disperse unlawful assemblies that have turned  into violent insurrections. The Defence submits that the  deployment of the Police, RAB, and eventually the Armed Forces was a structured progression intended to suppress a  “full-scale lethal” campaign that included the looting of  5,829 firearms and the killing of 44 police officers. Such  actions were not “crimes against humanity” but were  “military necessities” conducted under the state’s domestic  legal mandate to restore the rule of law and protect the  civilian population from the chaos of an armed takeover.

The Responsibility to Protect Under International Law
Under the International Law, R2P arises from the following instruments:
– UN Charter
– ICC Statute

In the international sphere, the State’s actions are anchored in the UN Charter, specifically the inherent right of  individual and collective self-defence under Article 51. The  Defence argues that the “armed attack” launched by    opposition forces—characterized by the use of 7.62mm military rifles and snipers as highlighted by Brig. Gen.  Sakhawat Hossain—triggered the State’s right to defend its  survival. Under international jurisprudence, the R2P  doctrine emphasizes that sovereignty entails the primary  responsibility of a State to protect its population from mass atrocities. When a “third-force” or “decentralized organized  armed group” utilizes human shields to paralyze the  government, the State’s failure to act would constitute a  dereliction of its international duty.

Furthermore, while the ICC Statute (Rome Statute) defines crimes against humanity, it simultaneously recognizes the  primary jurisdiction of States to maintain internal security.  The Defence submits that the State’s response was  consistent with international standards of “necessity and proportionality” in a Non-International Armed Conflict  (NIAC) setting. By targeting belligerents who had forfeited  their civilian protection through Direct Participation in  Hostilities (DPH), the state acted to fulfill its “responsibility  to protect” the broader, truly civilian population from the  systematic violence of the insurrectionists.

In addition, while the Rome Statute prohibits crimes against  humanity, it does not criminalize the lawful use of force to  suppress an armed insurrection within a Non-International  Armed Conflict (NIAC) setting. As held in Prosecutor v.  Stanislav Galić, the presence of some civilians within a  group does not deprive that group of its character as a  legitimate military target if it is dominated by persons taking   a direct part in hostilities [Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment,  5 December 2003, para 58]. Furthermore, in Prosecutor v.  Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber clarified that the party using  “human shields”—in this case, the militant vanguard  embedding themselves among students—bears the primary responsibility for incidental loss of life resulting from  legitimate military operations [Case No. IT-95-14-A,  Judgment, 29 July 2004, para 654].

Actions Taken for Individual and Collective Self-Defence  (Art. 51 of the UN Charter)
The Defence submits that the State’s exercise of force during the   July–August 2024    disturbances    was   a  lawful  manifestation of the inherent right to individual and  collective self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN  Charter. This right is triggered when an “armed attack”  occurs against the State, its infrastructure, or its personnel.  The Defence asserts that the systematic targeting of 450  police stations, the looting of 5,829 firearms, and the  deployment of   7.62mm military-grade   snipers by  unidentified actors—as documented by Brig. Gen. Sakhawat  Hossain—constituted  a   full-scale   armed   attack that  necessitated a defensive military response to preserve the  Republic.

Individual and Collective Self-Defence Against Real and  Pre-emptive Threats
The State’s response was justified not only as a reaction to ongoing violence but as a necessary measure against a pre-  emptive threat to the constitutional order. The “Meticulous  Design” declaration by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, which  characterized the uprising as a pre-planned strategic operation, confirms that the State was facing an imminent  and   organized    attempt to   dismantle   the   national  administration. Under international law, the “inherent right”  of self-defence includes the right to take anticipatory action  when the threat of an armed attack is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment  for deliberation” (The Caroline Case, 1837; Whiteman’s  Digest of International Law, Vol. 12, p. 467).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed that while the right to self-defence is primarily directed against  State actors, it is equally applicable in the context of large-  scale violence by non-State organized armed groups when  their actions are of such “scale and effects” that they would  have been classified as an armed attack if carried out by a  State (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,  Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 195).  Furthermore, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the  Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the  ICJ recognized that a State may defend itself against attacks  by irregular forces if those forces act with sufficient   organization and intensity [Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p.  168, para. 147].

Protection of the State under the UN Security Council and  Special Rapporteurs
The UN Security Council, through Resolution 1373 (2001), emphasizes that all States have the responsibility to prevent  and suppress terrorist acts and to protect their territory from  being used by organized groups to launch attacks [UNSC  Res 1373, para. 2(b)]. The Defence submits that the 14-  party alliance acted collectively to fulfill this international  obligation when faced with a militant vanguard that targeted  strategic hubs such as the Metro Rail, BTV stations, and  power distribution centres.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), in its recent Opinion No. 40/2025 (Bangladesh), specifically  addressed the importance of ensuring that criminal charges  are not used to penalize political expression [para. 48].  However, the Defence distinguishes the Accused’s case by  asserting that the State was not targeting speech, but was  engaged in a lawful defense against an armed insurrection that satisfies the intensity and organization requirements of  a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).

As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms  while countering terrorism, States have an affirmative  obligation to protect the life and security of individuals    within their jurisdiction from the “lethal” activities of non- State   actors    [Report of    the   Special   Rapporteur,  A/HRC/16/51, para. 26]. Consequently, the actions taken  by the Accused—who held no ministerial or MP status—  were focused on supporting the government’s lawful policy  of protecting the Republic from a “meticulously designed” takeover, a role consistent with the principles of state  preservation and collective self-defence.

THE USE  OF    FORCE  AGAINST  TERRORISTS    PARTICIPATING   UNDER  THE  DISGUISE  OF    PROTESTERS   

The Lawful Use of Force Against Militants Disguised as  Protesters
The Defence submits that the high number of casualties reported during the July–August 2024 conflict was a direct  consequence of the State’s lawful engagement with armed  terrorists and insurgents who deliberately operated under  the guise of civilian protesters. Under International  Humanitarian Law (IHL), specifically the principle of  distinction, while civilians are protected from direct attack,  this protection is forfeited for such time as they take a Direct  Participation in Hostilities (DPH) [Rule 6, Customary IHL;  Article 13(3) AP II]. The Defence asserts that the  “meticulously designed” insurrection involved a militant  vanguard that utilized student crowds as “human shields” to  launch lethal attacks on state personnel and infrastructure,     thereby transforming a civil assembly into a legitimate  military objective.

Forfeiture of Protection and the ICRC Standard on DPH
According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009), an act  constitutes DPH if it is likely to adversely affect the military  operations of a party and there is a direct causal link between  the act and the harm. The Defence highlights that the  systematic looting of 5,829 firearms and 650,000 rounds of  ammunition from police stations and prisons, followed by the  use of 7.62mm military-grade rifles against security forces,  satisfies the “belligerent nexus” required to classify these  actors as combatants. As highlighted by Brig. Gen.  Sakhawat Hossain, the presence of unidentified snipers  within the protest zones confirms that the law enforcement  agencies were not facing “unarmed students” but a  sophisticated armed group embedded within the masses.

Jurisprudence on Combatant Status in Urban Conflict
International jurisprudence supports the State’s right to target individuals who hide within a civilian population to  conduct attacks. In Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, the ICTY  Trial Chamber held that the presence of individual  combatants within a population does not deprive the  population of its civilian character; however, specific  individuals who take part in hostilities become legitimate  targets, and the proportionality of an attack must be judged   based on the threat they pose [Case No. IT-98-29-T,  Judgment, 5 December 2003, paras 50, 58]. Furthermore,  in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber clarified that  the party that utilizes “human shields” to immunize a  military objective—such as the militant cells embedding  themselves in crowds to attack BTV stations or the Metro  Rail—bears the legal responsibility for any incidental loss of  life resulting from a lawful military response [Case No. IT-  95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para 654].   Justification Under the 1973 Act and the Penal Code   50.   Under national law, specifically Section 3(2)(a) of the Act,  1973 (as amended in 2024), crimes against humanity can  only be committed against a “civilian population”. The  Defence submits that once a group engages in organized  armed violence, looting military weaponry, and targeting the  State’s “central nervous system,” they cease to be a civilian  population under the law. This is further reinforced by the  Right of Private Defence under Sections 96–106 of the  Penal Code, which mandates the use of force to repel an  imminent threat of death or the destruction of strategic  assets. Consequently, the force used by the security  apparatus was a lawful exercise of the State’s “responsibility  to protect” against a terrorist-led insurrection, and the  Accused’s support for such measures was a fulfilment of his  duty to the Republic rather than an act of criminal  conspiracy.

The Conceptual Nexus: IHL and the Responsibility to  Protect (R2P)
The Defence submits that the State’s actions during the July–August 2024 disturbances were a direct expression of  the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It must be noted that  while the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977  Additional Protocols (AP I and II) do not explicitly use the  term “Responsibility to Protect”—a doctrine formally  codified much later at the 2005 UN World Summit—these  foundational treaties provide the essential legal DNA for the  norm. IHL imposes a positive duty on States to protect their  populations from mass atrocities, effectively serving as the  legal   substance   that    R2P’s   “first   pillar”   aims   to  operationalize:   the   State’s   primary    responsibility   to  safeguard its people from war crimes and crimes against  humanity.

Sovereignty as Responsibility and the Protection of  Infrastructure
Under this framework, sovereignty is redefined not merely as a right but as a responsibility. The Defence submits that  the State’s deployment of force to safeguard “military  objectives” and strategic national infrastructure—including  the Metro Rail, BTV stations, and power distribution  centres—was a lawful fulfilment of its duty under both  domestic mandates and the spirit of international law. When  these essential assets were targeted by a “meticulously  designed” insurrection, the State was legally obligated to  intervene to prevent a total collapse of order. This response  is consistent with the protective principles found in  Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2) and the inherent right  of self-defence under the UN Charter.

The NIAC Context and Direct Participation in Hostilities
In the context of a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC), the State’s responsibility to protect necessitates the  use of force against those who have forfeited their civilian  status through Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH). As  articulated in Additional Protocol II, Article 13(3), civilian  protection is withdrawn for such time as individuals take a  direct part in hostilities. The Defence contends that the  State’s response to the looting of over 5,800 firearms and  the presence of 7.62mm military snipers was a targeted  operation to fulfil its R2P mandate by neutralizing  belligerents. This action was taken to ensure the safety of  the broader, truly civilian population from the systematic  violence of the insurrectionists.

Justification Under Article 51 of the UN Charter
Finally, the invocation of R2P alongside Article 51 of the UN Charter justifies the State’s actions as a lawful exercise  of individual and collective self-defence against an “armed  attack”. The Prosecution’s attempt to characterize this  response as a “systematic attack” on civilians ignores the  State’s legal obligation to repel a “meticulously designed”  agitation by an organized group. By adhering to the  principles of necessity and proportionality rooted in the    Geneva Conventions, the State acted as the ultimate  protector of the Republic’s survival. Consequently, the  charges against the Accused, who supported this lawful  state preservation, are legally unsustainable.

QUESTION OF DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE  

In some occasions, the question of disproportionate use of force by law enforcement authorities arose. In this regard it  is submitted that disproportionate use of force alone does not  constitute any crimes against humanity if the elements of  crimes against humanity, as discussed earlier, are not  fulfilled. However, this does not leave the victims without  any remedy. The process of ascertaining whether the police  used disproportionate force has been laid down in the Police  Regulations Bengal.