Closing written arguments by Defence 3

This is the third of three sections of the written arguments submitted by the defence to the Tribunal focusing on various legal issues relevant to culpability.

ACCUSED’S POSITION IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT SITUATION   

International Standards on Knowledge and Superior  Responsibility
Under international criminal law, the mens rea for a superior (civilian or military) requires the Prosecution to prove  beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused either had  “actual knowledge” or “constructive knowledge” (should  have known) of the crimes. The ICC Rome Statute (Article  28) distinguishes between military commanders and civilian  superiors, requiring for the latter that the superior “either  knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly  indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to  commit such crimes.” This high threshold was affirmed in  Prosecutor v. Bemba [ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, 21  March 2016, paras. 191, 193-195], where the Trial  Chamber held that knowledge cannot be presumed; it must  be established through specific information available to the  superior. Similarly, in the ICTY Čelebići Case (Delalić et  al.) [Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998,  paras. 383-386], the Tribunal ruled that “had reason to  know” requires the possession of sufficiently alarming  information to put the superior on notice of the risk of  crimes. Regarding political leaders, the ICTR in Prosecutor  v. Nahimana et al. (Media Case) [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,  Judgment, 3 December 2003, para. 976] emphasized that a  leader’s general awareness of a violent political climate is  insufficient to establish knowledge of specific criminal acts  committed    by    subordinates.    (Reference:    Cassese’s  International Criminal Law, 3rd Ed., p. 185; “The  Knowledge Requirement in Superior Responsibility,” Opinio  Juris, 12 May 2017).

The Standard under the International Crimes (Tribunals)  Act, 1973
The domestic standard under the 1973 Act (as amended in 2024) mirrors these international requirements. Section  4(3) of the amended Act stipulates that a superior is  criminally responsible only if they “knew or, owing to the  circumstances at the time, should have known” that  subordinates were committing crimes. Crucially, the 2024      amendment  harmonized the   definition   of   superior  responsibility with Article 28 of the Rome Statute, shifting  the focus to “effective control.” Jurisprudence from the  Bangladesh ICT, such as in Chief Prosecutor v. Abdul  Quader Molla [ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 2012, Judgment, 5  February 2013], has previously acknowledged that a  political leader cannot be held liable for the acts of others  unless there is a clear nexus of command and specific  knowledge. In the context of the July-August 2024 events,  the Prosecution must establish that Mr. Inu was privy to the  operational orders of the security forces—a burden that  remains entirely unsatisfied.

Lack of Command and Influence due to Political Position
The Defence submits that the accused person’s political status at the time of the alleged crimes rendered it impossible  for him to possess the requisite knowledge or “effective  control.” Following the January 2024 elections, the accused  was not a Member of Parliament (MP) nor did he hold any  ministerial portfolio. As the President of a minority coalition  partner (JaSoD) within the 14-party alliance, he occupied  no position within the state’s administrative or military  hierarchy. He lacked any legal or de facto authority to issue  orders to, or receive operational briefings from, the Police,  RAB, or the Armed Forces. Unlike a Home Minister or a  Prime Minister, a peripheral coalition leader is not part of  the “core command” that receives real-time intelligence on  field operations. Therefore, he was legally and factually  “outside the loop” of the state’s security apparatus.

Absence of Prosecution Witness Testimony
The Prosecution’s case is fundamentally flawed by a total lack of testimonial evidence linking Mr. Inu to the knowledge  of the atrocities. A review of the depositions reveals that  none of the Prosecution witnesses—including those from the  law enforcement agencies or the civil administration—have  testified that the accused was present at operational  meetings or that he was copied into any communications  regarding the use of lethal force. There is no “insider”  testimony suggesting he was informed of the specific  casualties or the “shoot-on-sight” orders as they were being  executed. In the absence of such direct evidence, the  Prosecution’s attempt to impute knowledge based on his  mere political affiliation is a violation of the principle of  individual criminal responsibility.

Conversations with Sheikh  Hasina as Political Consultation
The Prosecution relies heavily on phone records and  reported conversations between Mr. Inu and the ousted  Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina. The Defence submits that  these   interactions   prove  nothing regarding criminal  knowledge. In a period of national crisis and armed  insurrection, it is a standard political practice for the head of  a coalition party to consult with the Head of Government.  These conversations were focused on political stability and  the protection of the Republic, not the operational of   security    crackdowns.  As noted   in   international  jurisprudence, “political support” for a government’s general  policy to restore order is not equivalent to “knowledge” of  the specific illegal methods used by field units to carry out  that policy.

Media Statements and Social Media as Political Rhetoric
The Prosecution further seeks to establish knowledge through Mr. Inu’s appearances on television talk shows and  social media posts. The Defence asserts that these public  statements constitute political rhetoric and propaganda  aimed    at countering    the  “misinformation”    of   the  insurrectionists, rather than evidence of criminal mens rea.  Supporting a government’s narrative of “suppressing  terrorists” (consistent with the NIAC setting) is a lawful  exercise of political speech and does not imply knowledge of  specific human rights excesses occurring in the field.  Publicly defending the state’s “responsibility to protect” is a  far cry from possessing specific knowledge of the  “widespread” or “systematic” nature of alleged crimes  against humanity.

Lack of Knowledge in a NIAC Setting and “Third-Force”  Interference
Finally, the existence of a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC)—characterized by intense urban warfare and the  presence of “third-force” snipers—creates a “fog of war” that  precludes a civilian leader from having accurate knowledge. As highlighted by Brig. Gen. Sakhawat Hossain, the    presence of unidentified persons using 7.62mm military    rifles suggests that the violence was multi-faceted and    chaotic. During the internet blackouts and the systematic    attacks on 450 police stations, the flow of reliable    information was severed. If even senior military advisers    were unaware of the identity of certain armed actors, it is    logically impossible for a civilian political leader like Mr. Inu    to have possessed the “clear and reliable information”    required by the Bemba standard to establish constructive    knowledge of atrocities. The Defence most humbly submits    that this Hon’ble Tribunal must reject the Prosecution’s    characterization of the “civilian population” through a broad    human rights lens, as seen in recent findings such as Chief    Prosecutor vs. Sheikh Hasina. Such an interpretation    constitutes a legal fiction in the context of the July–August    2024 events, as it fails to account for the factual reality that    the violence reached the requisite intensity and organization    of a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). Under the    laws of war and Common Article 3 of the Geneva    Conventions, the definition of a “civilian” is not absolute;    protection is forfeited for such time as individuals take a “direct part in hostilities”. By failing to acknowledge the    transition from civilian protest to a “meticulously designed”    armed insurrection—evidenced by the looting of over 5,000    firearms, the use of 7.62mm military snipers, and the    systematic targeting of strategic national infrastructure like    the Metro Rail and BTV stations—the Prosecution    erroneously categorizes legitimate state responses to    belligerents as crimes against humanity. Therefore, the term  “civilian population” under Section 3(2)(c) of the 1973 Act  must be interpreted through the lens of NIAC jurisprudence,  which recognizes that an organized group acting with  belligerent intent and utilizing human shields loses its  protected status and can no longer be classified as a  “civilian” population per se.

EVIDENTIARY DEFECTS AND LACK OF PRIMA FACIE CASE

That the accused-petitioner humbly submits that the prosecution’s case rests upon a handful of vague, repetitive,  mechanical, and unreliable witness statements and three  alleged audio recordings dated 20.07.2024, 20.07.2024,  and 04.08.2024. None of these materials disclose any direct  or indirect nexus between the accused and the incidents  alleged. The prosecution has failed to produce a single  credible item of evidence that attributes to the accused any  act of order, incitement, facilitation, participation, or  encouragement within the meaning of section 3(2) of the  International   Crimes (Tribunals)    Act,   1973, and  accordingly, the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.

That it is submitted that the prosecution has failed to assess any legal framework governing the use of force by law  enforcement or how such framework was allegedly  breached. Nor has it shown how the accused’s political  position, without any executive role, related to the incidents  complained of. In the absence of a demonstrated between the accused’s conduct and any prohibited act under  section 3(2) of the Act, the theory of the prosecution  collapses.

That it is stated that the cumulative defects—unreliable witness statements, unverified digital evidence, suppression  of exculpatory material, misuse of the OHCHR report, and  the absence of command authority or intent—render the  prosecution’s case wholly unreliable. Even taking the  evidence at its highest, it fails to establish any actus reus,  mens rea, or causal nexus linking the accused to the alleged  crimes under sections 3(2) or 4 of the Act.

INCOMPLETE,   ONE  SIDED,  PERFUNCTORY    INVESTIGATION

The investigation of the case is incomplete, one sided and perfunctory. Though investigation Officer of the case, who  deposed before the Hon’ble Tribunal as P.W. 10 implicated  the Accused for alleged killing of 1400 individuals and  injury suffered by 25000 individuals, he admittedly did not  investigate all the events occurred in July-August, 2024  throughout the country as he admitted in cross examination,  “আলম িদন্ত সম কাকি সকি ঘটনা িদন্ত কলর নাই।” During cross  examination, his attention was drawn specifically to the  events mentioned in the OHCHR Fact Finding Report  (Prosecution Exhibit-19(Series), Prosecution Documents,  3rd   Volume,    Page-1014-1126), particularly   BNP’s  involvement in the movement, attack in BTV Bhaban,  destruction and arson to 450 police stations, attack to Police  Stations in Savar and Sylhet, petrol bomb attack and killing of 2 RAB personnel and 4 Ansar-VDP members in Jatrabari  Police Station, Narsingdi Jail Break, attack to the office of  Ekattor TV and the investigation officer admitted that he  did not investigate into those events.

The investigation officer implicated the Accused Mr. Hasanul Huq Inu with the alleged killing of 6 individuals in  Kushtia on 05th August, 2024 between 13.30-16:00 hours.  It is important to note here that 5 separate Ejahars were  lodged with Kushtia Police Station and 1 petition of  complaint was filed with the Court of Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Kushtia separately in relation to killing of 6  individuals respectively [Exhibit-‘V’ (Series), ‘W’ (Series)’,  ‘W (Series)’, ‘Y (Series)’, ‘Z (Series)’ and ‘AA (Series)’  adduced by the Defence]. Though the investigation officer  claimed during his cross examination that he visited Kushtia  Police Station, but when he was asked about the aforesaid  cases, he replied that he does not have any knowledge about  those cases. Moreover, the investigation officer admitted in  his cross examination that he interrogated a number of  material witnesses in relation to the said killings, but they  were not included in the list of witnesses of the instant case.

The investigation officer denied that the Accused said anything supporting the quota movement in social media or  mass media, but it is evident even from the Prosecution  evidence (Video clips of Mirror Now, News24 and RTV)  that the Accused always supported the quota movement and  he urged for reform of the quota system.

It is a fact of common knowledge that the events of July- August, 2024 arose out of the Judgment and Order dated  5th June 2024 passed by the High Court Division of the  Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Writ Petition No. 6063 of  2021. Subsequently, on 21st July 2024, the full bench of  the Appellate Division led by the then Chief Justice Obaidul  Hassan set aside the High Court’s Judgment dated 5th June  2024 and no review application was filed against the said  decision of the Appellate Division till today. But the  investigation officer admitted in cross examination that he  does not have any knowledge about the said Judgment and  Order of the Appellate Division.

The aforementioned lacuna of the investigation are not mere missions of the investigation officer, rather it proves that the  investigation of the case was incomplete, one sided and  perfunctory.

NUMBER ALLEGED DEATHS – 1400 OR 836?

The Prosecution alleged that 1400 individuals were killed and 25000 individuals were injured during the events of  July-August, 2024. But it transpires from the list of  deceased persons as published in the Bangladesh Gazette as  adduced by the Prosecution that only 836 people  purportedly died and only 13800 people were purportedly  injured. It is important to note here that the said list as  contained in the Bangladesh Gazette does not mention any  date and place of occurrence which creates serious doubt  about the authenticity of the list. Moreover, recent news  reports show that questions have been raised from various

quarters about certain names which were falsely included in  the Gazette of people killed and the Gazette of injured people  during the    July-August,  2024  unrest/conflict.  [https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/fwfrgqyww;  https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/july  -uprising-fighters-govt-cancels-gazette-recognition-128-  4022251;  https://www.kalerkantho.com/online/national/2026/03/0  2/1654607]

NO NEXUS WITH ‘INCITEMENT’

That it is further submitted that in the above context, the accused-petitioner’s remarks characterising the movement  as “sectarian” and “terrorist” were not incitements to  violence but factual descriptions of an ongoing violent  campaign against the State and civilian population. His  statements were grounded in evidence then publicly  available and shared by multiple observers, including  journalists and commentators sympathetic to the protesters  themselves. To penalise such statements as “incitement”  would be to criminalise truth-telling and responsible political  assessment. The accused’s comments, properly understood,  sought to caution against lawlessness and call for restoration  of order, not to promote or legitimise any crime.  Accordingly, the  prosecution’s theory  of  “mischaracterisation equals incitement” fails for want of  actus reus, mens rea, and causal nexus.

THE PROSECUTION COULD NOT ESTABLISH THE  ‘PROXIMITY’ TEST

The Failure to Establish the ‘Proximity’ Test: Lack of  Legal and Operational Nexus
The Defence submits that    the    Prosecution    has  fundamentally failed to satisfy the “proximity” test, which is  essential to establish individual criminal responsibility,  particularly for civilian leaders. Under international criminal  law, proximity refers to the closeness of the relationship  between the accused’s conduct and the physical commission  of the crime. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski  established that for a leader to be liable for “aiding and  abetting,” their acts must have a “substantial effect” on the  commission of the crime—a link that requires a high degree  of proximity [Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, 24 March  2000,    para 162].   Furthermore,  regarding   superior  responsibility, the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema ruled  that for civilian leaders, the Prosecution must prove  “effective control,” which is the material ability to prevent or  punish crimes [Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 7 June  2001, paras 42–45]. The ICC Statute (Article 28(b))  further narrows this for civilians, requiring that the crimes  concern activities within the “effective responsibility and  control” of the superior. As affirmed in Prosecutor v. Bemba,  without a direct and proximal chain of command or influence,  liability cannot be imputed [Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,  Judgment, 21 March 2016, paras 191, 193-195].

Applying these international standards to the present case,  the Defence asserts that there is a total “proximity vacuum”  between Mr. Inu and the alleged atrocities of July–August  2024. The Prosecution’s narrative rests on the assumption  that Mr. Inu, as a “14-party alliance leader,” possessed the  requisite influence to direct state forces. However, at the  time of the alleged crimes, Mr. Inu was not a Member of  Parliament (MP) and held no ministerial portfolio. In the  administrative and political structure of Bangladesh, a  person who is not an MP lacks the statutory authority to  influence local law enforcement or the administrative  machinery of the Awami League (ALBD). Unlike an MP,  who often exercises de facto control over local police through  “D.O. letters” or chairing local committees, Mr. Inu was a  private citizen leading a minority coalition party (JaSoD)  with no legal or operational proximity to the police or the  armed forces.

Consequently, the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate how a civilian leader outside the government hierarchy could  have exercised “effective control” or provided a “substantial  contribution” to field operations. As established in the NIAC  context, the violence was driven by a “meticulously  designed” insurrection and repelled by state forces following  a specific chain of command to which Mr. Inu was a stranger.  The testimony of Brig. Gen. Sakhawat Hossain regarding  unidentified snipers and the looting of 5,829 firearms  further distances Mr. Inu from the operational reality on the  ground. Without official status or a demonstrated nexus to  the “trigger-pullers,” the Prosecution’s case relies on “guilt  by association,” which is an impermissible standard under  the 1973 Act and international jurisprudence including  Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,  para 976]

THE PROSECUTION COULD NOT ESTABLISH THE‘INTENT’ REQUIREMENT (MENS REA) OF THE CRIMES:

Comparative Standards of Intent in International Criminal  Law
The requirement of “intent” has evolved from the rudimentary “common plan” of the Nuremberg Tribunal to  the highly codified standards of the modern era. The  Nuremberg Charter (Article 6) focused on “participation in  a common plan” but did not provide a granular definition of  mens rea. In contrast, the ICTY and ICTR developed a  nuanced jurisprudence distinguishing between direct intent  (purpose) and knowledge (virtual certainty). In Prosecutor  v. Tadić, the Appeals Chamber held that the mens rea for  Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) requires the “intent to  participate in a common plan and to further the criminal  purpose of that plan” [Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15  July 1999, para 228]. Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,  the ICTR clarified that for crimes against humanity, the  perpetrator must have acted with “knowledge of the attack”  and the intent to be part of it [Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,  Judgment, 2 September 1998, para 580]. While the ICTA  1973    (Bangladesh) initially   relied   on   a   broader  interpretation of intent tied to the “commission” of acts, the  2024 amendments and global judicial trends have shifted  toward the ICC Rome Statute standard. The ICC, under  Article 30, provides the most rigorous definition: a person  has intent if they “mean to engage in the conduct” and “mean     to cause a consequence or are aware that it will occur in the  ordinary course of events.” (Reference: Gerhard Werle &  Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal  Law (4th edn, OUP 2020) 185–190).

The Defence submits that the ICTBD should adopt Article 30 of the Rome Statute as the definitive standard for mens  rea in this case. This standard, often referred to as the  “Intent and Knowledge” rule, ensures that criminal liability  is not imputed based on mere political support or general  rhetoric. As noted by William Schabas, Article 30 serves as  a “default rule” that excludes lower forms of culpability  unless explicitly stated otherwise [William A. Schabas, The  International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome  Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 473]. By following this  standard, the Tribunal ensures international legitimacy and  adheres to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, requiring  the Prosecution to prove that Mr. Inu specifically meant for  the alleged atrocities to occur as a consequence of his actions  or was virtually certain they would occur.

Applying the Article 30 standard, it is evident that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Mr. Inu possessed  the requisite mens rea. The Prosecution relies on Mr. Inu’s  presence at meetings and his political statements supporting  the “suppression of unrest.” However, as a non-MP and non-  Minister, Mr. Inu lacked the operational capacity to “mean  to cause” any specific consequence. His intent was clearly  directed toward state preservation and the restoration of  order against what he perceived as a “meticulously designed”  insurrection (NIAC context). There is no evidence—      documentary or testimonial—that Mr. Inu desired the death  of civilians or was “aware that it would occur in the ordinary  course of events” as a direct result of his political  consultation. As held in Prosecutor v. Bemba, a leader’s  general awareness of a violent climate does not satisfy the  specific mens rea required for crimes against humanity [Case  No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, 21 March 2016, paras  191–194].

Evaluation of the Prosecution’s Evidence
The Prosecution has been entirely unsuccessful in establishing the mental requirement of intent. The evidence  presented—primarily phone logs with Sheikh Hasina and  media interviews—demonstrates only political alignment,  not criminal intent. In the absence of a “smoking gun”  communication where Mr. Inu directs or accepts the murder  of   civilians,   the   Prosecution’s   case   rests   on   the  “membership-based” liability rejected by the ICTY in  Prosecutor v. Krstić, which held that “general membership  in a criminal group is not sufficient to establish intent for  specific criminal acts” [Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2  August 2001, para 601]. Mr. Inu’s intent was to perform  his duty as a coalition leader during a national crisis; the  Prosecution’s attempt to reframe this as an “intent to kill” is  a speculative leap that fails the “beyond reasonable doubt”  threshold.

Inapplicability of Negligence and Recklessness
The Prosecution’s secondary, implied argument—that Mr.  Inu “should have known” and was therefore negligent—is  legally flawed. Negligence is a lower mental standard  generally reserved for Command Responsibility under  Article 28 of the Rome Statute, where a superior has a “duty  of care” to monitor subordinates. However, as established in  the “Proximity Test,” Mr. Inu had no “effective control” over  law enforcement or the military. Without a legal or  administrative chain of command, he had no duty of care  toward the actions of state forces. As noted in the Čelebići  Case, the “should have known” standard cannot be applied  to a person who lacks the material ability to prevent or  punish the acts [Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16  November 1998, paras 383–386]. Therefore, negligence  cannot form the basis of his liability.

Similarly, the Prosecution cannot establish recklessness (conscious   disregard    of   a   substantial   risk).   Under  international law, recklessness requires that the accused was  aware of a risk and proceeded regardless of the outcome. In  the chaotic setting of the NIAC—involving 7.62mm snipers  and the looting of 5,829 firearms—Mr. Inu’s support for the  government was based on the belief that the state was  repelling an armed insurrection. This is not a “conscious  disregard” of civilian life, but a “conscious response” to a  lethal threat. Furthermore, the ICC has largely excluded  dolus eventualis from the definition of Crimes Against  Humanity under Article 30, requiring a higher threshold of  “virtual certainty.” As Mr. Inu was physically and  operationally removed from the field, he could not have had   the specific awareness of the risk required to be “reckless.”  (Reference: Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens  Rea in International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2013)  245–250).

By failing to meet the “Intent and Knowledge” standard of Article 30, and being unable to apply lower standards like  negligence or recklessness due to the Accused’s lack of  proximity and command, the Prosecution’s case regarding  the mental element of the crimes is legally bankrupt.

WHETHER THE STATEMENTS MADE ON TV CAN BE  CONSIDERED AS PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT  CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY?

International Standards on Speech-Based Liability
Under international criminal law, speech-based liability—  particularly regarding Crimes Against Humanity (CAH)—  is subject to a stringent “directness” and “causation” test.  Unlike genocide, where “direct and public incitement” is a  standalone crime under Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome  Statute, for CAH, speech acts are typically prosecuted as  instigation or ordering. The ICTR in the seminal Media Case  (Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al.) established that for speech  to be criminal, it must be “direct”—meaning it must  specifically urge the commission of a crime—and it must be  “public” [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 3 December  2003, para 1017]. The ICTY further clarified in Prosecutor  v. Kordić & Čerkez that political speeches, even those that  are inflammatory or promote a specific nationalist agenda,   do not constitute instigation unless they are a “clear  prompting” and a “substantial factor” in the perpetrator’s  decision to commit the crime [Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,  Judgment, 26 February 2001, para 387]. Scholarly  consensus, including that of Kai Ambos, asserts that the  mens rea for speech-based liability requires the specific  intent to prompt a criminal act, not merely a general intent  to promote a political narrative [Kai Ambos, Treatise on  International Criminal Law: Volume I (OUP 2013) 165–  168].

The ICTBD Standard and the Necessity of International  Harmonization
Section 3(2)(g) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (as amended) lists “abetment” and “incitement” as  modes of liability. However, the Act does not define the  threshold for “incitement” in the context of television  broadcasts. The Defence submits that the ICTBD must  follow the international standard for two reasons: (1) the  2024 amendments were specifically intended to harmonize  the Act with the Rome Statute; and (2) interpreting  “political speech” as “criminal instigation” without a direct  causal link violates the principle of legality. Domestic case  law, such as Chief Prosecutor v. Abdul Quader Molla, has  previously explored the nexus between leadership and  rhetoric, but the high threshold for “substantial contribution”  remains the gold standard in modern international law [ICT-  BD Case No. 02 of 2012, Judgment, 5 February 2013,  paras 390-395]. To deviate from this would risk labeling  every political coalition supporter a criminal instigator.

Application to the Accused: Rhetoric vs. Criminal  Instigation
The Prosecution alleges that Mr. Inu’s statements on Mirror Now, News 24 and RTV constitute incitement to commit  crimes against humanity. The Defence asserts that these  principles cannot be applied against the Accused. Mr. Inu’s  statements were made within the context of a Non-  International Armed Conflict (NIAC), where the State was  facing an “armed attack” involving the looting of 5,829  firearms. His calls to “suppress terrorists” or “defend the  Republic” were aimed at legitimate military objectives—  restoring order against armed belligerents—rather than  targeting a “civilian population.” There is no evidence of a  “direct prompting” to kill civilians. Under the Nahimana  standard, unless the Prosecution can prove that a specific  soldier or police officer committed a murder because of Mr.  Inu’s TV appearance, the causal link is severed. As a non-  MP with no executive power, his words carried no  “operational weight” over the security forces.

The UN Position: WGAD Opinion No. 40/2025
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), in its opinion regarding Shahriar Kabir, has provided a  definitive position on this issue. The WGAD found that  detaining political allies of the 14-party alliance for their  public stances constitutes a violation of international law,  categorizing such detentions as Category V (discrimination  based on political opinion). Specifically, the WGAD noted   that the State must not penalize individuals for political  discourse that does not reach the high threshold of “advocacy  of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes  incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” [Opinion  No. 40/2025 (Bangladesh), para 48, 52]. This reinforces  the Defence’s position that Mr. Inu’s media presence is  protected political expression rather than criminal conduct.

Freedom of Expression vs. Allegations of Incitement
The Prosecution’s attempt to reframe political rhetoric as “incitement” is a direct assault on the right to Freedom of  Expression guaranteed under Article 39 of the Constitution  of Bangladesh and Article 19 of the ICCPR. International  law distinguishes between “hate speech” and “incitement.”  As noted by William Schabas, political leaders are entitled  to high levels of speech protection during times of national  crisis, provided they do not call for specific prohibited acts  [William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A  Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016)  450]. Mr. Inu’s interviews were a defense of the State’s  “Responsibility to Protect” and its actions against a  “meticulously designed” insurrection. By criminalizing these  statements, the Prosecution is effectively attempting to  prosecute a “political viewpoint,” which the WGAD has  explicitly identified as a hallmark of arbitrary detention.

In the absence of a “direct and public” call to commit specific atrocities, and given the lack of any causal link between his  televised words and the field-level deaths (many of which  are attributed to “third-force” snipers), the Prosecution has  failed to establish that Mr. Inu’s statements constitute a  crime. His speech falls squarely within the bounds of  protected political expression during an armed conflict.

THE QUALITY OF EVIDENCE AND THE CHAIN OF  EVIDENCE PRESERVATION

Evidence obtained in violation to the 1973 Act [section 19(1F), or the Rules of Procedure or any internationally  accepted laws, e.g. ICCPR, Rome Statute is inadmissible, if  the violation raises substantial doubts on its reliability, or its  admission is antithetical to and seriously damages the  integrity of the proceedings.

The Admissibility Standard under Section 19(1F) and the  Rome Statute
The Defence submits that the quality and reliability of evidence are paramount in maintaining the judicial integrity  of this Tribunal. Under the International Crimes (Tribunals)  (Amendment) Ordinance,  2024,    Section 19    was  significantly revised to incorporate international standards  for evidentiary admissibility. Specifically, Section 19(1F)  provides that evidence obtained through a violation of  internationally recognized human rights is inadmissible if the  violation casts “substantial doubt on the reliability of the  evidence” or if its admission would be “antithetical to and  would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.”  This provision is a direct adoption of Article 69(7) of the  Rome Statute, which serves as the lex specialis for the  exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in international   criminal law. (Reference: Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos, The  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A  Commentary (3rd edn, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos 2016)  1747).

Judicial Tests for Reliability and Integrity
International jurisprudence has consistently emphasized that the provenance and chain of custody of evidence are  critical to its reliability. In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga  Dyilo, the ICC Trial Chamber held that for evidence  submitted from the “bar table,” the Prosecution must  demonstrate its “reliability and provenance” to ensure its  admission does not prejudice the fair trial of the accused  [ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material  from the Bar Table, 24 June 2009, para 35]. Similarly, in  Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, the Court reiterated that  while it has a broad discretion to admit evidence, such  evidence must meet a threshold of reliability, particularly  when it   is   collected   under   “unique   investigative  opportunities” where the potential for contamination is high  [ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on Request to Admit Evidence  Preserved Under Art. 56 of the RS, 10 August 2016, para  7]. The Defence asserts that where the Prosecution fails to  document a transparent and unbroken chain of preservation  for digital assets—such as cell phone records—the evidence  must be excluded as its reliability is inherently compromised.

The Causal Link in Digital Evidence Gathering
A pivotal requirement for the exclusion of evidence under Section 19(1F) and Article 69(7) is the “causal link”    between the human rights violation and the acquisition of the  evidence. The ICC in Prosecutor v. Al Hassan clarified that  the phrase “obtained by means of a violation” requires the  Chamber to identify a direct causal relationship between the  breach of a right and the gathering of the evidence [ICC-  01/12-01/18, Decision    on requests related   to   the  submission into evidence of Mr. Al Hassan’s statements,  para 33]. Regarding the phone calls allegedly involving Mr.  Inu, if these were intercepted without judicial authorization  or in breach of the Right to Privacy (Article 17 of the  ICCPR), there is an undeniable causal link. The illegal act of  interception is the sole “means” by which the audio data was  obtained. Such evidence is not merely an “irregularity” but a  substantive violation that “seriously damages the integrity  of the proceedings.”

Violations of ICCPR Articles 7 and 9 as Grounds for  Exclusion
The Defence further submits that violations of Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture/Cruel Treatment) and Article 9  (Right to Liberty and Security) of the ICCPR during the  investigative phase necessitate the exclusion of resulting  evidence. If digital devices were seized following an  arbitrary arrest (violating Art. 9) or if access codes were  obtained under duress (violating Art. 7), the evidence is fruit  of a poisonous tree. As noted by legal scholars, the admission  of evidence obtained through the violation of non-derogable  rights is fundamentally antithetical to the “integrity of the  proceedings” regardless of its supposed probative value. By  failing to adhere to international digital forensics standards       (such    as   ISO/IEC  27037 for    identification   and  preservation), and by gathering evidence via unauthorized  surveillance, the Prosecution has presented material that  fails both the reliability and the integrity tests established by  the 1973 Act.

Lessons from the ICC Yekatom and Ngaïssona Judgment
The Defence submits that the Prosecution’s reliance on digital evidence—specifically the alleged phone recordings  and social media data—fails the rigorous standards of  forensic reliability established in international criminal law.  As recently analyzed in the ICC Trial Chamber V judgment  in Prosecutor v. Yekatom and Ngaïssona [ICC-01/14-  01/18,   Judgment,   2025,   See:  https://opiniojuris.org/2025/08/08/digital-evidence-  before-the-icc-lessons-from-the-yekatom-ngaissona-  judgment/], digital evidence must be scrutinized for its  “technical integrity” before it can be assigned any probative  value. The Chamber emphasized that the mere presentation  of a digital file is insufficient; the Prosecution must provide  metadata, hash values, and a comprehensive record of the  extraction process to prove the file has not been altered or  manipulated. (Reference: ‘Digital Evidence before the ICC:  Lessons from the Yekatom & Ngaïssona Judgment’, Opinio  Juris, 8 August 2025, See: the above link). In the present  case, the Prosecution has submitted “bar table” evidence that  lacks these essential forensic markers, rendering the  material technically “anonymous” and legally unreliable.

Lack of Author Testimony and Corroborating Metadata
A fundamental defect in the Prosecution’s evidence is the  absence of author testimony to verify the content and context  of the digital communications. Without a witness to attest to  the creation and transmission of the files, the Defence is  deprived of its right to cross-examine the provenance of the  evidence. Furthermore, the total lack of metadata (such as  timestamps, GPS tags, Hash tags and device IDs) means the  Tribunal cannot verify whether the recordings are  contemporaneous with the events of July–August 2024 or  if they have been subjected to “deep-fake” synthesis or  selective editing. International standards require that digital  evidence be corroborated by independent logs from service  providers; however, the Prosecution has failed to produce  any such corroboration, relying instead on isolated files of  unknown origin.

Institutional Credibility and the Role of the CID
The Defence formally questions the reputation and authority of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) as the body  responsible for the forensic findings. There is no evidence  that the CID followed internationally accepted protocols,  such as ISO/IEC 27037 (Guidelines for identification,  collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence),  during the gathering of data from the Accused’s devices or  intercepted lines. Furthermore, the Defence challenges  whether the CID was the “authorized authority” to collect  this   data under the  Digital Security Act or the  Telecommunications Act. Evidence collected by an agency  acting outside its statutory mandate—or without specific   judicial warrants—is not only a violation of the Right to  Privacy (Art. 17 ICCPR) but also creates a “presumption of  bias” that compromises the integrity of the entire digital  chain of custody.

Broken Chain of Custody and the “Causal Link” to  Unreliability
The chain of custody for the alleged phone calls is non- existent which is clearly evident from the cross examination  of P.W. 2, 4, 5 and 9. The Prosecution has failed to  document who first intercepted the calls, how they were  stored, and what security measures were in place to prevent  unauthorized access. In digital forensics, an unbroken chain  of custody is the only guarantee of integrity. As argued  under Section 19(1F) of the Act, there is a direct causal link  between this forensic failure and the unreliability of the  evidence. When data is collected through unauthorized  surveillance and handled by an agency with no transparent  audit trail, the risk of “evidence planting” or “contextual  distortion” is substantial. Admitting such compromised  material would “seriously damage the integrity of the  proceedings” as it invites the Tribunal to base its judgment  on forensic conjecture rather than verified fact.

THE ACCUSED DID NOT HOLD A SUPERIOR POSITION    AND LACKED EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Analysis of the Standard in the Hasina Judgment and  International Conformity
The Defence notes that in its recent finding, this Hon’ble  Tribunal-1 articulated a four-pronged test for superior  responsibility [Chief Prosecutor v. Sheikh Hasina, Case No.  02 of 2025, p. 12, last para]. The elements identified are:  (1) a crime perpetrated by someone other than the accused,  (2) a superior-subordinate relationship, (3) the superior’s  actual or constructive knowledge, and (4) the failure to  prevent or punish. While these elements generally align with  the foundational jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Čelebići  Case (Delalić et al.) [Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16  November 1998, para 343], international law has since  refined the second element to require “Effective Control.” As  held in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the superior-subordinate  relationship is not established by mere formal rank but by  the “material ability to prevent or punish” criminal conduct  [Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para 67].  Furthermore, for civilian superiors, the ICC Rome Statute  (Article 28(b)) imposes a stricter mens rea, requiring that  the superior “consciously disregarded information which  clearly indicated” the crimes, and a “causal link” where the  crimes were a result of the superior’s failure to exercise  control properly. The Defence submits that the Hasina  Judgment standard must be interpreted through this lens of  “effective control” to remain consistent with global justice  standards.   (Reference:    Kai    Ambos, Treatise    on  International Criminal Law: Volume I (OUP 2013) 201–  205).

Absence of a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The Prosecution’s attempt to characterize Mr. Inu as a  “superior” to the law enforcement agencies is legally  untenable. A superior-subordinate relationship requires a  chain of command, whether formal or de facto. During the  events of July–August 2024, Mr. Inu held no official  position in the government; he was neither a Member of  Parliament nor a Minister. Jurisprudence from the ICTR in  Prosecutor v. Bagilishema clarifies that for a civilian to be a  superior, they must possess the power to issue binding  orders to the perpetrators [Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T,  Judgment, 7 June 2001, paras 45–46]. As the leader of a  minority coalition party (JaSoD) within the 14-party  alliance, Mr. Inu lacked any statutory or administrative  authority over the Police, RAB, or Armed Forces. He could  not hire, fire, promote, or discipline any officer involved in  the operations. Without the “material ability” to prevent the  alleged acts, the second element of the Tribunal’s own test  remains entirely unsatisfied. Moreover, there is no evidence  that any member of Mr. Inu’s party JaSoD committed any  offence under section 3(2)(a) of the Act, 1973.

Failure to Establish Knowledge and Necessary Measures
Even if the Tribunal were to assume a position of influence (which is denied), the Prosecution has failed to meet the third and fourth elements of the Hasina standard. The  “knowledge” element requires specific information regarding  the crimes of subordinates. As established in Prosecutor v.  Bemba, a superior cannot be held liable for a “general  situation of violence” but must have information indicating  that their subordinates were committing specific crimes      [Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, 21 March 2016,  paras 191, 194]. Since Mr. Inu was not part of the security  briefings or the National Security Council, he had no “reason  to know” of operational excesses. Consequently, he could not  have taken “necessary and reasonable measures” to prevent  acts over which he had no legal or operational oversight. The  Prosecution’s reliance on his political rhetoric is a flawed  substitute for the rigorous proof of a command-and-control  nexus.

Conclusion on the Prosecution’s Failure regarding  Command Responsibility
Even if there were crimes against humanity (for argument’s sake), the Prosecution failed to establish superior command responsibility. ICT1 in the SH verdict [Chief Prosecutor v.  Sheikh Hasina, Case No. 02 of 2025, p. 12] outlined and  acknowledged four key elements of command responsibility  as the Tribunal’s governing jurisprudence on the subject.  Even those are not met in the Prosecution’s case. There is a  total lack of evidence showing that Mr. Inu occupied a  position in the hierarchy of the state’s security apparatus.  The Prosecution invites this Tribunal to equate “political  alliance” with “superior command,” a leap that would  criminalize all coalition politics and subvert the principle of  individual responsibility as affirmed in Prosecutor v.  Nahimana et al. (Media Case) [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,  Judgment, 3 December 2003, para 976]. In the absence of  “effective control,” Mr. Inu cannot be held liable for the  conduct of state forces he did not, and could not, command

THE 14-PARTY ALLIANCE’S LACK OF EXECUTIVE AND    ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

To further strengthen the argument regarding the absence of a superior-subordinate relationship, the Defence submits that the Prosecution’s reliance on the Accused’s role within  the   “14-party    alliance” is   a   fundamental    legal  mischaracterization of how the State of Bangladesh is  governed.

The Extra-Constitutional Nature of the 14-Party Alliance   
The 14-party alliance is a purely political consultative  platform formed for electoral and ideological alignment; it  possesses no legal status, constitutional mandate, or  administrative authority under the laws of Bangladesh. The  governance of the Republic is strictly regulated by the Rules  of Business, 1996, which allocate the “business of the  Government” exclusively to Ministries and Divisions headed  by a Minister-in-charge and a Secretary (Rule 3 and 4). The  14-party alliance as a collective body is not mentioned in the  Rules of Business, nor does it have any role in the  “Allocation of Business” to the Ministry of Home Affairs or  the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, the alliance has no  “material ability” to issue operational orders to law  enforcement. As held in Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić  (Čelebići Case), a superior-subordinate relationship cannot  be inferred from a “position of general influence” but must  be rooted in the power to prevent or punish through a  recognized chain of authority [Case No. IT-96-21-T,  Judgment, 16 November 1998, paras 377–378].

Distinction Between Political Influence and Effective  Control
International jurisprudence consistently    distinguishes  between political influence and effective control. In  Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. (Media Case), the ICTR ruled  that even high-profile political leaders cannot be held liable  under superior responsibility if their influence does not  translate into the de facto ability to control the physical  perpetrators [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 3  December 2003, para 976]. Mr. Inu, as the leader of  JaSaD—a minority partner in the coalition—occupied a  peripheral position. He was not part of the Cabinet (the  highest executive body), nor was he a member of the  National Security Council. Therefore, he had no legal access  to the “command-and-control” infrastructure of the Police or  the RAB. Political rhetoric shared within an alliance meeting  does not constitute a “superior’s order” under international  law; it is merely the expression of political alignment, which  lacks the “proximity” and “substantiality” required for  criminal liability.

Summary of the Failure of the “Proximity” and “Control”  Tests
In summary, the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate how a non-MP and non-Minister, acting through a purely political coalition,   could    satisfy   the    “effective    control”   test  acknowledged by this Tribunal in the Sheikh Hasina verdict.  By failing to identify a single instance where Mr. Inu issued      a binding instruction to a law enforcement official, or  possessed the legal authority to disciplining one, the  Prosecution’s case for superior responsibility collapses. The  Accused was a political ally, not a military or administrative  commander, and under the standard of Prosecutor v. Blaškić,  “influence” without “command” is insufficient to trigger  liability for the acts of others [Case No. IT-95-14-A,  Judgment, 29 July 2004, para 69].

THE ACCUSED DID NOT COMMIT CRIMES UNDER    SECTION 4(2) OF THE IC(T) ACT, 1973

The Defence submits that the Prosecution has  fundamentally failed to establish the requisite subjective and  objective elements under Section 4(2) of the International  Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, thereby vitiating the  Accused’s criminal   liability.   Following    the    2024  Amendment, the legal standard of the 1973 Act has been  harmonized with Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute,  transitioning from the broad “Common Purpose” doctrine to  the more rigorous “Control over the Crime” theory of co-  perpetratorship. Under this standard, liability is restricted to  those who perform an essential task such that they have the  power to frustrate the commission of the crime by  withholding their contribution [The Prosecutor v. Thomas  Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN,  Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007,  paras 342–348].

The Prosecution failed to meet the Subjective Element  requirement
The Defence asserts that the Prosecution has not satisfied the three-pronged subjective test for co-perpetration as identified in international jurisprudence.

The Accused was not mutually aware and did not mutually  accept the fulfilment of the alleged crimes
Co-perpetratorship requires that participants be “mutually aware and mutually accept” that the implementation of their plan will result in the realization of the crime [Lubanga,  PTC Decision, para 361]. Mr. Inu’s participation in the 14-  party alliance was governed by a political objective: the  preservation of the Republic against an “armed attack.”  There is no evidence of a “meeting of minds” regarding the  targeting of civilians. Furthermore, as documented by Brig.  Gen. Sakhawat Hossain, the presence of an unidentified  “Third Force” (snipers using 7.62mm rifles) indicates that  the lethal violence was outside the scope of any political  consultation involving the Accused. He could not “mutually  accept” a criminal result executed by actors outside his  knowledge or control.

The Prosecution failed to establish the Subjective  Elements of the alleged crimes
The Prosecution must prove the Accused fulfilled the mens rea of the underlying crimes [Lubanga, PTC Decision, para 349]. As argued in Issue Nos. 1–6, Mr. Inu lacked the  “Intent and Knowledge” required under Article 30 of the   Rome Statute. His intent was state defense, not the  systematic persecution of a civilian population.

The Accused lacked awareness of factual circumstances  enabling a link
The Accused must have “awareness of the factual circumstances that enabled him to exercise joint control” [Lubanga, PTC Decision, para 366]. In Bangladesh, the  Rules of Business, 1996 allocate the management of law  enforcement exclusively to the Ministry of Home Affairs. As  a non-MP and non-Minister, Mr. Inu was legally and  operationally excluded from the “information flow” of the  security apparatus. He had no access to intelligence briefings  or operational orders. Absent this factual awareness, he  could not exercise “joint control” over the field-level conduct  of the police.

The Prosecution failed to meet the Objective Element  requirement – The Accused and the 14-party alliance  lacked a “Common Plan”
A common plan for co-perpetration must include an “element of criminality” [Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para 227]. The Defence highlights  a critical evidentiary gap: while the Prosecution alleges a  criminal plan involving the 14-party alliance, Mr. Inu is the  only leader from his party (JaSaD) being prosecuted. This  selective targeting confirms that the “Common Plan” is a  political construct rather than a criminal reality. As affirmed  by the UN WGAD, the detention of alliance leaders in this   context is based on Category V Discrimination (political  opinion) rather than concrete evidence of a criminal nexus  [UN WGAD Opinion No. 40/2025, paras 48, 52].

The Accused did not make an “Essential Contribution”  (The Counterfactual Test)
The hallmark of co-perpetratorship is the “Essential  Contribution.” Applying the Counterfactual Test adopted in  the Yekatom and Ngaïssona Judgment, a contribution is only  essential if the crime would not have been committed, or  would have been committed in a significantly different way,  without the Accused’s intervention [ICC-01/14-01/18,  Judgment, 24 July 2025, para 4038].

The Defence submits that even if Mr. Inu had not attended the July 29 meeting or appeared on television, the State’s security response—driven by the Ministry of Home Affairs  and the constitutional chain of command—would have  proceeded identically. Mr. Inu’s rhetoric provided neither the  “means” nor the “orders” for the alleged acts. As a civilian  leader with no executive power, his contribution was  ancillary at best and certainly not “essential” to the  commission of the alleged crimes.

In light of the “Control over the Crime” standard, the Prosecution has failed to prove that Mr. Inu was anything more than a political ally of the then-government. Because  he lacked the “material ability” to frustrate the crimes  (Objective Element) and the “mutual awareness” of the  operational excesses (Subjective Element), he cannot be held        liable as a co-perpetrator under Section 4(2) of the 1973  Act.

THE ACCUSED DID NOT CONSPIRE, COMPLICIT, PLAN    OR AIDED OR ABETTED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE    ALLEGED CRIMES

The Defence submits that the Prosecution has failed to establish any of the secondary modes of liability— conspiracy, planning, or aiding and abetting—against the  Accused. Under international criminal law, these modes  require distinct evidentiary thresholds for both actus reus  and mens rea, none of which have been satisfied by the  circumstantial evidence presented in this case.

The International Standards for Secondary Liability
International jurisprudence distinguishes between the various forms of participation to ensure that individuals are only held responsible for conduct that has a “substantial” link  to the crime.

• • Conspiracy: Requires an agreement between two or more persons to commit a specific crime, coupled with the intent  to facilitate that crime. The ICTY in Prosecutor v.  Milutinović et al. clarified that conspiracy is a distinct form  of liability requiring a “meeting of minds” specifically for  criminal purposes, rather than mere political alignment  [Case   No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision    on   Dragoljub  Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, 21 May 2003,  para 23].
  • Planning: Requires that one or more persons designed the  commission of a crime at both the preparatory and execution  phases. According to Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, the  “plan” must be a substantial factor in the later commission  of the crime [Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26  February 2001, para 386].
  • Aiding and Abetting: The actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. The ICTY  in Prosecutor v. Furundžija established that while the aider  and abettor need not be present at the crime scene, their  support must be a “condition precedent” to the crime’s  commission [Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10  December 1998, paras 235, 249]. The mens rea is the  knowledge that the acts assist the commission of the specific  crime [Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,  Judgment, 24 March 2000, para 162; cite: 1].

Comparison with the National Standard (ICTA 1973)
The national standard under Section 3(2)(g) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, as revised by the 2024 Amendment Ordinance, now explicitly includes  “conspiracy or incitement” alongside “abetment.” Crucially,  Section 3(3) of the amended Act mandates that the Tribunal  “shall have regard to the Elements of Crimes of the  International Criminal Court (ICC).” This amendment  effectively imports the rigorous international standards of  “substantiality”   and   “knowledge”   into   the   domestic  framework. Consequently, the Prosecution can no longer   rely on vague “political participation” to establish abetment;  it must prove that Mr. Inu’s specific actions provided the  material or moral support without which the crimes would  not have occurred.

Application to the Case of Mr. Inu
The Defence submits that none of these principles can be applied to the Accused’s conduct for the following reasons:

• • Failure to Establish Conspiracy and Planning: The Prosecution cites the 29 July meeting and phone logs with the then-Prime Minister as evidence of “conspiracy.”  However, as held in Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. (Media  Case), political consultation among coalition partners does  not constitute a criminal conspiracy unless the specific intent  to commit atrocities is proven [Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,  Judgment, 3 December 2003, para 1045; cite: 1]. Since Mr.  Inu held no ministerial portfolio and was not an MP, he was  physically and legally excluded from the state’s security  “planning” rooms. He did not design police operations, nor  did he possess the authority to “agree” to lethal field orders.
  • Failure to Establish    Aiding    and    Abetting    (The  “Substantial Effect” Test): The Prosecution’s claim of  “abetment through media statements” fails the Furundžija  test of “substantial effect.” There is no evidence that any  police officer or “third-force” sniper was aware of Mr. Inu’s  television interviews, let alone that these interviews  provided the “encouragement” or “moral support” necessary  to commit murder. The proximity vacuum between  political talk show and a field-level shooting is too vast to  satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
  • The UN Position on Political Reprisal: This failure of nexus is reinforced by the UN WGAD Opinion No. 40/2025, which characterized the prosecution of 14-party alliance  leaders as arbitrary. The WGAD noted that where the state  lacks “concrete evidence” of a criminal link, the detention is  deemed to be based on political opinion rather than legal  liability [para 48].

CONCLUSION

Because Mr. Inu’s actions were neither “essential” to the  crimes nor “specifically directed” to assist in their  commission, he cannot be held liable as a conspirator,  planner, or abettor. His involvement was purely political,  aimed at defending the State against an “armed attack”  (NIAC), and lacks the criminal proximity required by the  1973 Act and the ICC Elements of Crimes as such he had  no complicity in or failure to prevent commission of any  crime under section 3(2) of the Act, 1973. The accused is a  victim of ‘persecution’ and targeted by a biased and corrupt  prosecution (here the prosecution includes investigation  agency) as such the accused may kindly be acquitted for the  ends of justice.