Written Discharge application

This is a detailed summary of the written application seeking discharge from the charges. Pages 4-25 is a long “Historical” section. The next section deals with the “Quota Protest Movement”

“In July and August 2024, Bangladesh witnessed a violent uprising against the country’s long-time leadership of the Awami League. A movement demanding for abolition of the quota in 9th grade government services ultimately turned into a violent uprising against the Government which caused the death of many innocent civilians, members of police force, physical attacks on members of disciplined forces, police stations, State establishments etc.

Article 29 (1) of Part III of the Constitution of Bangladesh states that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in the employment or promotion of the service of the Republic, i.e. Government jobs. Clause (a) of Article 29 (3) says as follows

“Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making special provision in favour of any backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service of the republic.”

In pursuance to the said provision of the Constitution, the Government introduced different categories of quota in 9th grade government jobs from time to time since the independence of Bangladesh. As of 2018, there was a 56% quota for the government jobs in the Of this, 30% of seats were reserved for descendants of freedom fighters, 10% for women, 10% for residents of backward districts, 5% for people from minority groups, and 1% for people with disabilities. However, if no candidate from the relevant quota is found, those positions were filled from the merit list of general candidates.

Previously in 2018, protests were held at various educational institutions across the country demanding quota reforms. The then Government, in the wake of the student movement, eliminated all forms of quotas vide a Circular as contained in Memo No. 05.00.0000.170.11.07.18.276 dated 4^th October, 2018 issued by the Ministry of Public Administration to ensure the recruitment of meritorious and qualified individuals for positions in grades 9 to 13 (formerly known as first and second-class jobs) in government employment. However, quotas for third and fourth-class posts (grades 14 to 20) remained in effect.

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid Circular dated 4^th October, 2018, one Mr. Ohidul Islam and others, children of nationally recognized valiant freedom fighters, as petitioners filed a Writ Petition being No. 6063 of 2021 before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh under Article 102 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh challenging the legality of the said Circular.

On 5^th June 2024, one Divisional Bench of the Hon’ble High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh by a Judgment passed in the said Writ Petition 6063 of 2021 declared the aforesaid Circular to be illegal, to have been issued without lawful authority and is of no legal effect.

On the next day students came to the streets and brought out protest marches at different universities across the country demanding the cancellation of the quota system. On 9^th June 2024, a student delegation submitted a memorandum to the Attorney General urging the retraction of the High Court’s decision and the reintroduction of the Government’s circular of 2018. Meanwhile, the Government, on the same day at the earliest opportunity, filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition to the Appellate Division seeking stay operation of the High Court’s Judgment and the Judge-in-Chamber of the Appellate Division fixed 4th July for hearing the said Petition by the full Court of the Appellate

On 4^th July the Advocate for the respondent sought time due to personal reasons and the Appellate Division adjourned the hearing. Since the matter was sub judice before the Apex Court of the Country, the Government had no option but to wait for the outcome of the legal proceeding and the Government repeatedly urged the students to wait till disposal of the matter by the Appellate Division.

On the next day of hearing, i.e. 10^th July, 2024, the Appellate Division directed the parties to maintain the status quo in respect of the subject matter and asked the Government to file a regular Leave-To-Appeal. But the organizers of the student movement, by shifting their position, came up with a new demand asking the Government to abolish the quota system while the matter was already subjudice before the highest Court of the country.

Thereafter, the full text of the Judgment of the High Court Division was released on 14^th July On the same day, a delegation of quota reform protesters presented their memorandum to President Mohammed Shahabuddin at Bangabhaban, i.e. the Official Residence of the President, giving an ultimatum of 24 (Twenty Four) hours to reinstate the Government circular of 2018. On the other hand, upon receipt of the full Judgment of the High Court Division the Government filed Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal on 16^th July, 2024 and the Hon’ble Appellate Division was kind enough to fix 7^th August 2024 for hearing of the said Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal.

On 14^th July 2024, at a press conference the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, while responding to a question put to her by a journalist concerning such behavior of the student, said “Why do they have so much resentment towards freedom fighters?” If the grandchildren of the freedom fighters don’t get quota benefits, should the grandchildren of Razakars [who collaborated with Pakistan Army in commission of atrocities during the struggle for independence in 1971] get the benefit?”. The statement of the Prime Minister was misinterpreted and taken negatively among student protesters, and they came to the streets at midnight. At this point, Bangladesh Chhatro League (BCL), the student wing of the ruling party Awami League, separated itself from the protests and a confrontation began between the BCL and the protesters. On 15^th July a rumor spread out in social media that two student protesters were killed by This rumor also got public attention when the US Department of State also made a similar status on their social media pages, even though there was no report either in Bangladeshi media or from law enforcement agencies regarding any death during the student protests till that time. But such false claims fueled agitation among student protesters, and the movement turned out to be violently orchestrated by Jamaat-Shibir-BNP and like-minded activists. The camouflaged activists got involved in violent clashes with members of the law enforcement forces.

On 18^th July 2024, the Government formed a one-member judicial commission of inquiry comprising of a judge of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. On the same day, the Judge-in-Chamber of the Appellate Division on the prayer of the Attorney General rescheduled the hearing of the aforementioned Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal and fixed 21^st July for hearing following a special arrangement as the Supreme Court remained on a vacation at that time. By this time due to widespread misinformation and disinformation on social media, nothing could calm down the protesters, different public establishments and infrastructures were attacked and vandalized in different places of the country. In such a situation, finding no other alternative to protect the lives of civilians and the public infrastructures, the Government had to impose a nationwide curfew from 20^th July 2024.

On 21^st July 2024, the full bench of the Appellate Division led by the then Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan set aside the High Court’s Judgment dated 5^th June However, the Apex Court recommended to curtail quotas to only seven percent from the previous 56 percent, particularly five percent quota for children of freedom fighters, martyred freedom fighters and Biranganas (victims of sexual offences during 1971 struggle for liberation), one percent quota for ethnic minorities and another one percent for persons with disability and people of third gender.

After the disposal of the quota issue by the Apex Court, the organizers of the movement came up with a new demand seeking justice for killing of students immediately. On the other hand, Mr. Manzur Al Matin, an Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh along with others filed a Writ Petition being No. 9610 of 2024 before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh seeking directions upon the law enforcement agencies not to shoot at quota reform protesters during their programs. The Division Bench of the High Court Division comprising of Mr. Justice Mustafa Zaman Islam and Mr. Justice S M Masud Hossain Dolon after hearing the parties rejected the said Writ Petition summarily vide order dated 4^th August, 2024. However, the Court observed that all citizens have the right to participate in peaceful assemblies and emphasized that the police must follow legal directives.

Meanwhile on 1^st August, 2024 the Government increased the number of members of the judicial commission of inquiry by adding two more High Court judges, but nothing could calm the protesters down. On 3^rd August, 2024 the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called upon student protesters to meet her at Gonobhaban (the official residence of the Prime Minister) to discuss about their demands, but the organizers/coordinators of the protest demanded resignation of the Prime Minister which ultimately led the Bangladesh Army to shift the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from the country on 5^th August 2024.

During the course of horror of terror throughout the country facilitated by the camouflaged activists of Jamaat-BNP and allies an unconstitutional interim government was formed on 8 August.

Hasanul Haq Inu was arrested on 26 August 2024. Since his arrest, more than a hundred murder cases have been filed against him from various corners of the country. He has been shown to be arrested in 92 of these cases. On 25 September 2025, the prosecution of the ICT pressed formal charges against him for crimes against humanity, including murder. ICT-2 took cognizance of the charges.

The next section of the application deals with the “Actual nature of the July 2024 Movement: From Protest to Violent Insurrection”. The following is sted

That it is submitted that the so-called “Quota Reform Movement” of July–August 2024, which the prosecution characterises as a peaceful student protest, had by around mid-July degenerated into an armed and extremist uprising. The materials available in the public domain demonstrate that the movement, infiltrated by militant and opposition elements, engaged in systematic violence, arson, killings, and attacks on State institutions, which is not considered in the formal charge and as such, the same is liable to be rejected.

That it is further submitted that the investigation agency along with the learned prosecution has measurably failed to consider that any responsible government, under both domestic constitutional obligations and international law, would have been duty-bound to protect life and property and to use necessary and proportionate means to restore order. The same obligation would rest upon any government in the world faced with such acts of mass violence. A few illustrative examples are:

1. 1. on 19 July 2024, a violent attack on Narsingdi District Jail led to a major jailbreak in which 826 prisoners, including nine convicted militants, escaped after armed assailants stormed the facility, set fire to prison buildings, and looted weapons and supplies. These events are consistent with an organised armed uprising rather than a student demonstration and
   2. on 4 August 2024, thirteen policemen were burnt to death in the attack on Nayetpur Police Station in Sirajganj District, while another was killed at Eliotganj Highway Police Station in Comilla. Multiple police stations and government establishments across the country were also attacked and vandalised in coordinated assaults
   3. According to initial media estimates published in the immediate aftermath of the July uprising, more than 500 police stations were attacked, looted and arsoned. So far, no follow up investigations have been reportedly carried out to determine the actual number of looted arms and the casualty figures among police personnel resulting from such  attacks

That it is most respectfully submitted that the learned prosecution has completely failed to consider the infiltration of terrorists in the movement. For example, on 18 July 2024, before the death of Mir Mahfuzur Rahman Mugdho posted on his verified Facebook account [Source: Facebook post of “Mir Mugdho”, 18 July 2024] alleging infiltration of Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, and Chhatra Dal into the protest and warning against its politicisation and right after his posting he was shot during clashes at Uttara, Dhaka, which became a flashpoint on social media owing to the viral video of his last words, “Water Needed, Water.” Another crucial example is – on 12 August 2024, the then Home Affairs Adviser, Brigadier General (Retd.) Sakhawat Hossain,   publicly   stated   after   visiting   injured   Ansar personnel at the hospital, Dhaka, that a major investigation was needed to identify armed youths seen carrying weapons that used ammunition of 62 mm calibre. He further confirmed that the Ansar members were wounded primarily by fire from civilians using 7.62 mm rifles, not by police bullets. This demonstrates the presence of trained, armed elements within the protest.  Such omissions of the learned prosecution along with subjective presentation of evidence reveal the mala fide intention of the prosecution and as such, the accused petitioner is liable to be discharged.

That it is respectfully submitted that the learned prosecution also failed to consider the admission of prominent organisers which proves that the movement was infiltrated by terrorists who had both intention and knowledge to kill law enforcement agency officials, vandalise and burn police stations and government offices and destroy mega public structures. The prosecution has wilfully disregarded the following statements:

1. 1. Hasib Al-Islam, a coordinator of the quota reform movement, stated in a televised interview on DBC News (26 October 2024) that: “If the fire had not been set to the metro rail, if police officers had not been killed, then this revolution would not have been achieved so easily. The downfall of fascism could not have been ensured.” Such an admission establishes that the violence was pre-planned and instrumentalised as a political weapon.
   2. On 13 November 2024, Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain, now an Adviser in the present interim administration and a principal coordinator of the 2024 movement, publicly declared on his verified Facebook account that the organisers were “fully prepared to call for an armed resistance.” He reaffirmed this statement in a subsequent interview with Jamuna TV on 21 March 2025, thereby confirming that the leadership of the movement had intended violence from the outset.
   3. Barrister Asaduzzaman Fuaad, General Secretary of the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party, stated in a Jamuna TV talk-show that hundreds of police personnel were slaughtered during the quota reform protest. It is relevant to note that the current Chief Prosecutor, Advocate Tajul Islam, was a member and Joint Convenor of the same AB Party, raising serious questions about prosecutorial impartiality in view of his party’s public justification of such violence.
   4. Sadiq Kayem, former President of the Dhaka University Islami Chhatra Shibir, has admitted publicly that he played a key operational role during the July uprising while concealing his real political identity, later revealing it in media appearances. This underscores the deliberate infiltration of violent Islamist networks into the student movement.
   5. Md Saidur Rahman Bachchu, a senior BNP leader of Sirajganj District, boasted in a local address that the “backbone of the police broke after killing fifteen policemen at Enayetpur Police Station,” and that this had accelerated the 2024 movement. Such statements amount to open confessions of acts of murder of law-enforcement personnel.

That it is submitted that one of the most revealing expose as regards the true nature of the quota-protest movement came from Brig Shakhawat who briefly served as the Home Advisor of the Interim administration. In his speech at a public event he referred to the nature of injuries of the victims. According to him, a significant number of victims bore gunshots in the head which looked like kill-shots made by professional snipers. The bullet injuries were made by 7.62mm ammunition which were not used by the law enforcement personnel, asserting that such weapons and munitions were in the hands of civilians leading to more deaths and further escalation of Such casualties fueled the anti-government movement to which the quota movement morphed into. Brig Shakhawat Hossain’s findings were consistent with the suspicion that at some point the quota movement was taken over by armed extremist actors who operated with a different agenda. Here is the full text of his speech:

5th August maximum snipers killed the leaders of the student leaders. They were all shot here. What it seemed, they were totally professional snipers, could not have been only the Bangladeshi police.  And on 5th of August, maximum snipers killed the leaders, or the student leaders. You see the document, you will see that on 5th, I attended many of their funerals. They were all shot here (pointing at his own forehead). What it seemed, they were totally professional snipers, could not have been only Bangladeshi police. And this is what I said, in my first instances, that how the rifle, prohibited rifle, went into the hand of the civilians. Many people didn’t like it. Anyway, that is what it is. We are yet to have an enquiry on this particular issue. [sic].19 Aug 2025 ]

The above examples, drawn from contemporaneous reports, public admissions, and statements of movement leaders, show that the July 2024 events constituted a violent and extremist insurrection, not a civil protest. The learned prosecution should have taken into consideration the movement’s transformation into an armed uprising involving killings, arson, and coordinated attacks on State institutions imposed upon the Government, a constitutional and moral duty to protect the lives of citizens and preserve public order and as such, the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.

There is then a long section about the political life of Inu

Joined Bangladesh Chatra League in 1968. Chatra League was the key organization of student and youth radical forces in the

Bengali Nationalist Movement and struggle for national liberation and independence.

Elected as General Secretary of Bangladesh Chatra League of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology Unit (BUET) in 1969.

Played an Important Role to organize students in field levels in historical mass upsurge against Pakistan military junta in 1969.

In 1969, recruited as a member of ‘Shwadin Bangla Biplobi Parishad’ popularly known as ‘Nucleus’ and of its ‘Bangladesh Liberation Front-BLF’, the secret and key process for organizing armed war for national liberation and independence.

Lead open military march past under the banner of ‘Martyr Sergeant Jahur Brigade’ on 14th February 1970.

Lead open military march past under the banner of ‘Joi Bangla Bahini’ on 7th June 1970 at historical Paltan Maidan of Dhaka.

Hoisted the Flag of independent Bangladesh formally on behalf of ‘United Students Action Council’ for independence on 23rd March 1971 at historical Paltan Maidan of Dhaka.

During the War of Independence, “he performed as the Camp Commandant and Instructor of Guerrilla Warfare Training Camp of Bangladesh Liberation Front-BLF in exile at Tandua-Deraduhn of India. Trained 10,000 Guerilla Fighters who played a key role in liberating occupied Bangladesh from Pakistan forces.”

In the post-Independence period:

“Nominated and assigned for the post of Founding General Secretary of Jatiya Krishok League by the founder President of Bangladesh Bangabandhu Sheikh Muzibur Rahman on 19 of May 1972.

Played important role in building the first opposition political party Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal-Jasod and was elected as a member of the Central Executive Committee of Jasod on 31 October

Played key role in organizing the historical soldiers’ revolt and mass upsurge against the military junta on 7 November But after the initial Victory of this attempt was finally defeated and subjugated by the lackeys of US imperialism and their reactionary allies in Bangladesh. Many soldiers were killed. Leaders of the historical soldiers’ revolt and mass upsurge Retd. Colonel Abu Taher Biruttam was hanged.

Sentenced for 12 years imprisonment in a secret trial by the military junta in 1976.

Released from Jail on 13 June 1980 and thereafter started to rebuild the United Democratic Movement against the military

Played key role in building up a united front of democratic and left parties and united democratic movement against military Junta from 1982 to victorious mass upsurge of 1990.

Arrested twice and imprisoned for months without any trial under Special Security Acts. Went underground and from hideout organized the democratic movement against military junta all the time from 1982 to 1990.

Formed a core group of left parties within the United Front under the banner of Five Party Alliance in 1986 and succeeded to steer the united democratic movement to Elected as founding Convener of Five Party Alliance.

Elected as founder Convener of ‘Left Democratic Front’ in

Elected as General Secretary of Jasod in 1986 and re-elected in

Elected as President of Jasod in 2002 and re-elected in 2005 and

From 2001 Forged United Democratic Movement to establish a National Government on the basis of a ‘Minimum National Program’ to combat Islamic fundamentalist, corporate globalization, safeguard national interest and national resources and for political and economic reforms to empower the general

Played key role in advancing the united democratic movement under the banner of ‘14 Party Alliance’.

After the political change 1/11 of 2006 raised voice for electoral and political reforms for the trial of state power abusers, corrupts, plunderers and Islamic armed militants and for holding a free and fair election for handing over power from Interim Caretaker Government to an elected government.

Elected as Member of Bangladesh National Parliament in 2009, 1014 and 2018.

That the accused-petitioner, Mr Hasanul Haq Inu, as mentioned above, served valiantly as a freedom fighter Bangladesh’s War of Liberation in 1971, risking his life for the independence of From the very inception of the Republic, he has stood for the values of secularism, democracy, social justice, and equality—principles enshrined in the Constitution of 1972 and born of the Liberation War’s ideals.

That after independence, the accused-petitioner became one of the founding leaders of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod), a progressive political force that emerged from the student movement. His political activism has always centred on anti-authoritarianism and people’s welfare, and he has consistently spoken against religious fundamentalism, communal hatred, and the politics of violence and

That throughout his long and distinguished public life, the accused-petitioner has been an unflinching critic of Jamaat-e-Islami and its affiliates, including Islami Chhatra Shibir (formerly, Islami Chatra Sangha), both of which were directly involved in the atrocities of Long before the war crimes trials began, Mr Hasanul Haq Inu was among the first political figures to demand accountability for the collaborators and war criminals of 1971 and to campaign for the reinstatement of secular principles in the Constitution. His stance against Jamaat-e-Islami and all forms of Islamist militancy has been unwavering, well-documented, and consistent over five decades.

That the accused-petitioner’s integrity and political credentials have remained beyond reproach. He has served with distinction as a Member of Parliament for multiple terms and as the Minister for Information in an earlier tenure of the Awami League–led Notably, despite being the leader of a different political party, i.e., the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod), he was invited to join the Awami League Cabinet, a step in recognition of his clean image, political integrity, and cross-party respect. His appointment symbolised a rare instance of cooperation across political lines, reflecting his reputation as a principled and non-partisan statesman devoted to the national interest.

That it must be clearly stated, however, that the accused-petitioner was not a Minister, Member of Parliament, or officeholder during the material time of the alleged incidents in July–August 2024. The prosecution’s repeated description of him as a “former Minister,” though technically true, is misleading in context, as it conveys the false impression that he retained executive power, influence, or control during the relevant period. In reality, Mr Hasanul Haq Inu had no administrative authority and no formal or informal role in any government institution at the The insinuation that he exercised “command responsibility” over any law enforcement or policy action is therefore factually baseless and legally untenable.

That during the July–August 2024 incidents, the accused-petitioner acted with prudence, moderation, and deep concern for the welfare of citizens and the protection of life and His conduct, as evidenced by the recorded telephone conversations with the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, shows that he consistently advised restraint, urged that arrested protesters be released within hours, and advocated for proportionate use of force while emphasising dialogue and reconciliation. His role was therefore that of a responsible statesman seeking to de-escalate conflict, not one of an instigator or abettor of any crime.

That his approach during the crisis was entirely consistent with his lifelong political philosophy and outlook: maintaining public order through lawful means, avoiding excess, and promoting dialogue over confrontation. His advice sought to strike a balance between demonstrating firmness in restoring order and exercising leniency to prevent further bloodshed. Far from amounting to incitement, this reflects a commitment to the principles of the rule of law and democratic accountability.

That the accused-petitioner’s record of public service, his steadfast opposition to extremism, and his absence from any position of power during the relevant time together make it inconceivable that he could have participated in, abetted, or encouraged crimes against humanity. His life and career embody the very antithesis of the conduct alleged in the Formal Charge. The attempt to implicate him in such offences, in disregard of his long record of patriotic and democratic service, is not only unjust but also inconsistent with the historical and factual realities of his public life.”

The application then contained a section setting out various statements given by Inu and his party between 16 July to 5 August, as well as interviews given by Inu which the defence argued “urged all the parties for a peaceful resolution of the problems.” Below are the English translations, as set out in the application.

On 12 July 2024 Jasod’s official statement reads as follows:

“Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod) calls on the government to immediately form a commission to reform the quota system following the High Court verdict.

In a joint statement issued on the afternoon of 11 April 2024, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod) President Hasanul Haq Inu and General Secretary Shirin Akhter urged the government to form a commission without further delay or procrastination in order to reform and rationalise the existing quota system, in line with the clear directives of the High Court’s judgment. They also called upon the students who have been demonstrating for quota reform to return to their classrooms, halls, and homes, and to patiently await the publication of the commission’s report.”

On 16 July 2024, Jasod issued another statement expressing urgent concern about the deaths of the protesters including students and called for dialogue to de-escalate the violence, to stay alert against vested quarters who were trying to benefit from the unrest:

“Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod) expresses sorrow over the deaths and injuries, including those of students, during the violence surrounding the quota movement.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, 16 July 2024, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod) President Hasanul Haq Inu and General Secretary Shirin Akhter expressed deep grief and sorrow over the deaths of six people—including one student in Rangpur, three students in Chattogram, and two unidentified persons in front of Dhaka College—and the injuries of many others during day-long clashes among police, protesters, and members of the Chhatra League across the country in connection with the quota reform movement. They said, “We are deeply concerned that what began as a peaceful student movement has suddenly turned violent.” They recalled that the party had earlier, through official statements and briefings, urged the formation of a “Quota Reform Commission” to review and rationalise the quota system. “Had such a commission been formally announced earlier, today’s tragic deaths and violence could have been avoided,” they added. Inu and Shirin further said, “There is still time—set aside stubbornness, confrontation, and violence. Send an appropriate delegation to hold discussions with the protesters and work out a rational solution to the quota issue.” They warned that a vested quarter had long been conspiring to exploit the quota movement for its own political ends and that, judging by recent events, that group now appears to be active nationwide. The Jasod leaders urged the protesting students to remain vigilant so that no malicious or opportunistic forces could misuse their movement. “Identify and remove any infiltrators and saboteurs from within your ranks,” they said, “and engage in dialogue with the government to find a peaceful and reasonable resolution.”

On the same evening, Hasanul Haq Inu, through a video-message released from his personal Facebook account, where he expressed that as a freedom fighter, he also wants quota reform and said that,

“Quota should not be retained or abolished, but reformed.

I am a freedom fighter (Muktijoddha). I want the quota system to be reformed. The path students have taken to the streets to protest for quota reform is solvable. Therefore, I believe the government can send a responsible representative delegation to discuss with the students, form a commission, and move towards a solution for quota reform. Razakars are always despicable. Whatever the reason may be, students could have protested in a different way instead of using slogans like ‘I am a Razakar,’ ‘I am a Razakar.’ Nevertheless, even if the students have made a mistake, I do not want any organization or any political faction to get involved in conflict and cause loss of life. Let no more bullets be fired at the students. Let there be no more baton charges. Let there be a beautiful solution from the government. I believe that the ongoing movement could be used by a specific quarter to achieve their own particular interests. Therefore, I will call upon the students to be aware, to be cautious, and to ensure that under no circumstances are you used by anyone. Joy Bangla.”

On 24 July 2024, in an interview with Independent Television, Hasanul Haq Inu said that:

“At the beginning of the quota movement, I clearly told the nation that it should neither be a re-establishment nor an abolition of the quota system; what is needed is reform of the quota system. After saying this, I realized that the students’ proposal, the government’s position, and the court’s position on the quota issue are very close; there is no huge, ‘sky and earth’ difference. It is solvable. It could be solved in 2/5 days. This solution did not happen. Here, I believe, there is a failure on the part of the government and the administration. Similarly, those who carried out armed violence and terrorist acts centered around the quota movement also bear a responsibility. All in all, a solvable issue has turned into a conflict. The hearing in the judicial division has been moved up recently—if this was possible, why was it not moved up earlier? This is an example of thoughtlessness. I believe that students will protest inside the campus—there was no need for police violence here; there was no necessity. All things considered, what was solvable has gone out of hand. The waiting terrorists launched a militant rampage in Dhaka city and caused a terrible incident. The students believe they have no connection with these acts of terrorism. I also believe the same.

(Slightly shortened) As a student of the movement, I believe that some immediate incidents can happen during a movement—such as burning a passing bus. But to burn the bridge building, BTV, the revenue building, or any establishment, or to break a jail and bring out militants—one has to pass six more locks after the main gate to reach them—they were in various jails, where they are taken—these are organized attacks carried out after doing homework.

(Slightly shortened) The administration has completely messed up the entire situation. The administration was late, and there are intelligence gaps and failures. Thousands of people came from outside Dhaka, stayed, and carried out a planned attack. A more terrible situation was in ’14, in ’15 at Shapla Chattar—the whole of Bangladesh was brought to a standstill—at that time, the civil administration handled it. Six months. We handled it.

(Slightly shortened) The 14-party meeting did not happen. Ten heads are needed instead of one head. Now they have called, and we have immediately appeared. It could have been met 10 days earlier. I told the Law Minister as well. The government could not clarify its position to the public and the students. There should not have been any conflict with the students—it is solvable. We could have solved it.”

Hasanul haq Inu, while being interviewed by Desh TV on 25 July 2024, said:

“The violence I saw, the destruction I saw, the loss of life that occurred around the quota movement, as a freedom fighter, as a citizen, I am disappointed. I express my regret. But you cannot sit around and express regret, you have to come out of this and look ahead

(Slightly abbreviated) The government, students, the court — all want reform of the quota system. There is no difference between heaven and earth. This is a socio-political issue, it should be resolved socio-politically. It should not be resolved through administration or any other means.

(Regarding rumors; slightly abbreviated) Where there is conflict, there will be lies and rumors. This has to be dealt with with truth. For example—press notes. When no press notes are given, rumors will spread. There is no press note from the Home Ministry. The number of shots fired, the number of deaths, how many people were injured—these have to be reported. Politicians, administration, and the Home Minister are not talking. … The way to deal with rumors is to provide accurate information. They (the students) have done nothing wrong. They have asked for reform of the quota system. It is a matter of thinking as a political worker (that) 56 percent quota out of 100 percent. So it has sometimes increased, sometimes decreased in 50 years. So when the boys raised this issue, we should have thought about it; we should not have left it hanging. There is no need to settle it through the court—I am a political worker—I can settle it by talking directly.

(A little abbreviated) Why did the police attack on the campus? The damage to property—I will try to make up for it; but how can I fix the wounds, the scars, that are in my mind? As I am saying something like this, I have seen, as per official report, that 197 people have died so far. Many students! Today I saw the Home Minister or someone, some big minister, giving Taka 2 lakh or 5 lakh or 15 lakh to the deceased police. What happened to the remaining 190 people? You haven’t even been able to go to the student’s house yet. Start the work for all those who have died together! The police are dead, the journalists are dead; a student died, a pedestrian also died. So, is a street child’s life a meaningless life? … These issues raise questions. I had hoped that everyone from the administration would look at him with the same eyes. I should have first gone to the student’s house. I should have first gone to the hospital and gone to the injured, to those there. You see the police members, you see the party boys; but you did not see the ordinary boys lying injured in the hospital…. So if you go to bring back the normal situation, we will have to remove the wounds and sorrow in the minds of the students! And it is very easy. The child! He is dead! He is dead! So, did anyone from the administration go to the boy’s house who died in Rangpur? No one went! “

On 4 August 2024, under the signature of Hasanul Haq Inu, Jasod issued its official statement: “Hasanul Huq Inu Appeals: “Not to miss the last opportunity for discussion and Join Prime Minister’s call for dialogue and to avoid indefinite conflict, violence, bloodshed, and political uncertainty”

“Hasanul Huq Inu Appeals: “Not to miss the last opportunity for discussion and Join Prime Minister’s call for dialogue and to avoid indefinite conflict, violence, bloodshed, and political uncertainty”

JSD President Hasanul Huq Inu has expressed deep concern over new incidents of loss of life, bloodshed, conflict, clashes, and well-planned, well-organized sabotage, militant attacks, and destructive events in various parts of the country. Even after the rejection of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s proposal for dialogue and discussion, he has appealed to all parties, including the government, to exercise patience and urged everyone, including the leaders of the anti-discrimination student movement, not to miss the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s call for dialogue and the last opportunity for discussion, in order to avoid conflict, violence, bloodshed, and political uncertainty.”

The application then contains a critique of the amendments to the ICT Act

“That it is noted that the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2024 (Ordinance No. XIV of 2024), promulgated in September 2024 and given retrospective effect from 6 January 2009, introduced significant amendments to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. These amendments substantially altered the definitions of core crimes under section 3(2), including the expansion of crimes against humanity and the modification of the definition of genocide by omitting “political group” from the list of protected categories, and the insertion of a new section 3(3) importing, in part, the Elements of Crimes adopted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) pursuant to Article 9 of the Rome Statute. The section of Liability of Crimes has also been heavily amended.

That it is noted that section 3(3) [of the ICT Act 1973] on ICC’s Elements of Crimes, as inserted, reads as follows:

“For the purpose of determining liability under sub-section (2), a Tribunal shall have regard to the Elements of Crime of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as adopted pursuant to Article 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”

This conditional incorporation clause represents a fundamental inconsistency in legislative design. It purports to import international standards of criminal liability while simultaneously subordinating them to the Tribunal’s domestic provisions “where inconsistent,” thereby nullifying the very harmonisation it claims to achieve.

That it is submitted that such partial and conditional adoption of the ICC’s Elements of Crimes is internally contradictory and jurisprudentially unsound. The Elements of Crimes of the ICC are not a menu of options. They form an integrated and coherent interpretative framework inseparable from the procedural and evidentiary guarantees of the Rome Statute. To “adopt” them only insofar as they do not contradict the 1973 Act results in an incoherent hybrid regime — a legislative camouflage designed to create an appearance of compliance with international standards without actually ensuring substantive or procedural parity.

That it is further submitted that the 2024 Amendment’s retroactive application from 6 January 2009 directly offends the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege) recognised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Bangladesh is a State Party, and the Constitution of Bangladesh. Retroactive criminal legislation, particularly when it expands the scope of criminal responsibility or redefines the elements of the crimes, could potentially undermine the accused’s fundamental right to fair notice and the ability to prepare an effective defence.

That it is stated that section 4 of the Act, as amended, continues to impose individual and superior responsibility retrospectively, extending liability to acts, omissions, and relationships that did not exist, or could not have been known to attract criminal sanction, at the material time. Such retroactivity goes to the root of legality, rendering the amendments ultra vires both the Constitution and Bangladesh’s international obligations.

That it is further submitted that the mode of enactment of these amendments — by Ordinance rather than by parliamentary process — raises serious constitutional and institutional concerns. The Ordinance was promulgated during a period when Bangladesh was under the authority of an Interim Government led by a body of Advisers exercising limited executive functions under the President.

That it is noted that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in its advisory opinion under Article 106 of the Constitution following the events of August 2024, explicitly held that the President, in the absence of Parliament, may appoint Advisers only to discharge “essential executive functions” of an interim nature, in order to maintain administrative continuity. Legislative functions involving substantive policy changes, particularly those with far-reaching implications for criminal liability and international obligations, fall outside such interim competence. Accordingly, the promulgation of Ordinance No. XIV of 2024 exceeds the permissible constitutional authority of the Interim administration and is liable to challenge.

That it is submitted that the selective incorporation of the ICC’s Elements of Crimes under section 3(3), without corresponding adoption of the ICC’s procedural safeguards, renders the Tribunal’s legal framework internally inconsistent and misleading. The ICC’s substantive definitions operate within a procedural regime of the highest standard, encompassing disclosure obligations, presumption of innocence, right to counsel, equality of arms, protection of the accused’s rights, and the strict exclusion of tainted evidence under Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute. By importing substantive definitions alone, while ignoring the procedural foundations that make those definitions workable, the 2024 Amendment creates a façade of internationalisation without actual conformity.

That it is stated that this asymmetry between substance and procedure is not merely academic but has practical consequences. It allows the prosecution to invoke the language of international law (e.g., “enforced disappearance,” “widespread or systematic attack”) without adhering to the international evidentiary and procedural disciplines that define and limit their application. This creates a structural imbalance between accusation and defence, and erodes the fairness of proceedings.

That it is further submitted that the legislative inconsistency introduced by section 3(3) also undermines the interpretative coherence of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. If, as the section states, the Tribunal is to have regard to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes “to the extent not inconsistent,” then the Tribunal is placed in the untenable position of having to determine, case by case, the hierarchy of norms between the 1973 Act and the ICC framework — an exercise neither anticipated by Parliament nor guided by any clear rule of conflict resolution.

That it is noted that this legal uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the Ordinance was promulgated not by a democratically constituted Parliament but by an Interim administration, thereby lacking the deliberative legitimacy necessary for such a fundamental revision of criminal law. The resulting framework is a hybrid of domestic opportunism and selective internationalism, incapable of providing a stable or credible basis for criminal adjudication of the gravity contemplated under the Act.

That it is therefore respectfully submitted that the 2024 amendments, being retroactive, substantively inconsistent, procedurally incomplete, and constitutionally unauthorised, cannot lawfully form the basis of any criminal prosecution under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. The accused-petitioner’s right to a fair, predictable, and legally certain trial has been materially prejudiced thereby, and any charges relying upon such amended provisions are liable to be rejected are bound to be legally unsafe in the long run.”

The application then contained a section on procedural and institutional defects of the ICT

“That it is submitted that despite the concern raised by the OHCHR, the Prosecution hurriedly submitted the Formal Charge in the instant case against the accused-petitioner and others which created a serious risk of miscarriage of justice. The OHCHR in its fact-finding report also raised concern in this regard as follows:

‘A number of interlocutors, including some public interest lawyers and human rights defenders, have expressed concern about these proceedings based on the ICT’s controversial legacy, its legal framework and continuing doubts, notwithstanding the change of government, as to its capacity to conduct genuinely independent, fair and effective proceedings. OHCHR was informed that ICT prosecutors are under pressure to move complex cases forward quickly to respond to public demands for justice, while lacking the capacity and resources to investigate, gather evidence, protect witnesses and conduct fair prosecutions through to judgment. Some interlocutors advanced that a State referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague would be preferable to avoid perceptions of partiality and ensure independent and impartial justice.’ (Para 245)

That it is stated that the OHCHR in its fact-finding report categorically recommended to consider referring the situation described in the said report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for investigation, in line with Article 14 of the Rome Statute (Para AAAA349). On March 6, 2025 Mr. Toby Cadman, Special Advisor to the learned Chief Prosecutor also urged the Interim Government of Bangladesh to refer the cases of the July-August massacres to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. But the Prosecution without considering the aforementioned recommendations hurriedly submitted the Formal Charge which manifestly shows that the Prosecution is being driven by pressure to conclude the trial by whatever means. In fact, OHCHR was informed that learned prosecutors are under pressure to move complex cases forward quickly to respond to public demands for justice, while lacking the capacity and resources to investigate, gather evidence, protect witnesses and conduct fair prosecutions through to judgment as evident from Para 254 of the fact-finding report.

That it is further submitted that the present proceedings are before a Tribunal widely perceived as politicised; the selection and conduct of prosecution reflect lack of impartiality. The Chief Prosecutor and members of his team suffer conflicts of interest, having previously represented/supported the 2024 quota protesters, the very constituency now posited as persecuted, vitiating prosecutorial independence. This is analogous to the ICC’s Duterte matter where Prosecutor Karim Khan KC was disqualified due to prior involvement with victims; mutatis mutandis, a like conflict taints the instant prosecution. and as such the formal charge is liable to be rejected.

That it is further submitted that Prosecution Witness No. 15, Mr Tanveer Hassan Zoha alias Tanvir Hasan Joha, who has been described as a digital forensic expert and a member of the prosecution team, suffers from a serious conflict of interest in both capacities that renders his participation in the investigation and trial process highly prejudicial to the accused-petitioner. It has been publicly reported that Mr Zoha himself was an alleged victim of alleged enforced disappearance in March 2016. This material fact, relevant to his professional credibility and potential bias, was entirely suppressed by the prosecution. The inclusion of such a witness, who has a personal history of grievance involving state agencies, compromises the impartiality and objectivity of the forensic investigation. The reliance on his testimony and analysis therefore taints the integrity of the prosecution’s case, and on this ground alone, the accused-petitioner is entitled to be discharged from the proceedings.

That it is further submitted that the investigation underpinning the Formal Charge lacks independence. The OHCHR Fact-Finding Report (2025) recorded systemic concerns about ICT investigations being conducted by serving/former police implicated in the events. The same report notes pressure to rush complex cases absent capacity for proper investigation, evidence-gathering and witness protection, corroborated by public statements setting arbitrary case-disposal timelines. The OHCHR further suggested, including the Prosecutorial Advisor Mr Toby Cadman to consider referral to the ICC Prosecutor under Article 14. Notwithstanding, the Prosecution hurried the filing—signalling mala fides and risking miscarriage of justice. Also, the Chief Prosecutor himself admitted in one of his public speeches how he had to rush the proceedings and as such due to lack of independence and systematic concerns the accused petitioner is liable to be discharged.”

The most significant section in the application is the next one which involves an attempt to rebut the specific allegations made by the prosecution. 

Charge no 1: alleged interview to “Mirror Now” on 18 July 2024

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 18 July 2024 the accused-petitioner gave an interview to the Indian media outlet Mirror Now, wherein, allegedly to divert the ongoing student protest movement, he described the protesters as “Jamaat-e-Islami members,” “terrorists,” “sectarian,” and “communal elements,” thereby inciting excessive force against them and abetting or participating in acts of murder and other crimes against The Prosecution asserts that such conduct falls within sections 3(2)(a), (g) and (h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (“the Act”) and attracts liability under sections 4(1), 4(2) and 4(3).

That it is submitted that the allegations under Charge No. 1 are factually untrue, legally untenable, and unsupported by documents and materials submitted by the prosecution. The Mirror Now interview contains no directive, exhortation, or call to violence, and on its face cannot constitute incitement, abetment, or participation in any offence within section 3(2) of the Act.

That it is stated that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder as a crime against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.” The accused-petitioner neither committed, ordered, nor directed any such act. His televised remarks amounted solely to political commentary on the deteriorating situation which, by that time, had involved killings of police personnel, arson, and destruction of public property.

That it is further submitted that section 3(2)(g) punishes “attempt, abetment, conspiracy or incitement to commit” such crimes. The Prosecution has produced no document or material of any actus reus or mens rea demonstrating that the accused intended or attempted to facilitate the crimes alleged. A short and spontaneous media interview cannot, in law or fact, amount to abetment or incitement.

That it is asserted that section 3(2)(h) addresses “complicity in or failure to prevent the commission” of such crimes. The accused-petitioner, not holding any position of authority at the material time, was incapable of directing, supervising, or preventing any law-enforcement No evidence shows that he had “effective control” over any armed, disciplined, or administrative body, as required for a finding of responsibility.

That it is submitted that section 4(3) of the Act—on superior or command responsibility—applies only to those “commanders, superior officers or leaders” who order, permit, acquiesce, incite or participate in the commission of such crimes, or who fail to prevent or punish their subordinates despite having knowledge or reason to know of the During the period of the alleged incidents, the accused-petitioner was neither a Minister nor a Member of Parliament, nor did he hold any governmental, military, or administrative office. Hence, no liability under section 4(3) arises in law.

That it is submitted that the Prosecution has further alleged that the accused-petitioner acted with the intent “to make the Government’s power absolute, unfettered, and permanent.” This is a specific and serious allegation, yet the Prosecution has produced no documentary, testimonial, or circumstantial materials to substantiate such an objective. On the contrary, the accused-petitioner is widely recognised as a democratically minded statesman and a valiant freedom fighter who has, throughout his public life, spoken and acted against authoritarianism in all its forms. His long-standing record in Parliament, in cabinet, and in political discourse bears testimony to his consistent commitment to democracy, constitutionalism, and

That it is further noted that section 4(2) of the Act provides that a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if he “orders, solicits, incites or induces the commission of such a crime,” or “aids, abets or otherwise assists” in its commission, or “in any other way contributes” to its commission by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, provided that such contribution shall be intentional and made either “with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of the group” or “in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the ” The Prosecution has neither alleged nor proved any such act, contribution, or intention on the part of the accused-petitioner. No material submitted by the prosecution demonstrates that he participated in, facilitated, or possessed any mens rea to further a criminal design. Accordingly, the essential element of intention under section 4(2) remains wholly unproven, and the allegation fails both in fact and in law.

That it is noted that the only document/material submitted by the prosecution is the Mirror Now interview itself. Of the 20 prosecution witnesses named, statements of only 12 have been supplied; the remaining eight remain undisclosed, contrary to Rule 18(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which requires disclosure of both incriminating and exculpatory materials.

That it is submitted that none of the twelve witness statements establishes any causal nexus between the interview and the alleged killings or other crimes against humanity. None asserts that the accused’s remarks caused, encouraged, or materially contributed to any act of violence.

That it is asserted that the Prosecution’s claim of “incitement” disregards the factual context. By 18 July 2024, the so-called student movement had been hijacked by extremist and opposition elements, as evidenced by attacks on police stations, killings of law-enforcement officers, and the Narsingdi The accused-petitioner’s remarks accurately described that reality — a legitimate factual assessment, not a call to violence.

That it is further submitted that truthful or fact-based commentary, even if politically contentious, cannot constitute incitement. The accused’s references to “Jamaat-e-Islami” and “terrorist elements” were consistent with contemporaneous public admissions by movement leaders — Hasib Al-Islam, Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain, and Barrister Asaduzzaman Fuaad — who themselves acknowledged the presence of armed resistance and extremist

That it is stated that section 4(1) of the Act provides that any individual who commits or abets a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal “shall be responsible and liable for punishment.” The Prosecution has failed to demonstrate any individual act, intent, or participation by the accused-petitioner capable of attracting such

That it is submitted that the Prosecution’s theory of “mischaracterisation equals incitement” is repugnant to both fact and law. To equate a political description of violent unrest with an “order to kill” would criminalise legitimate speech, violating the principles of legality and fair trial protected under the Act and the Constitution.

That it is further asserted that, absent any proof of direct communication between the accused and alleged perpetrators, or any contemporaneous act linking the interview to specific offences, no prima facie nexus exists. The case rests on conjecture rather than evidence, falling short of the standard required by section 9(1) of the Act and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure.

That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 1 is liable to be summarily rejected as disclosing no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

Charge no 2: Involvement in alleged “Shoot at Sight” order

 That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 19 July 2024, the accused-petitioner participated in a meeting held at Gonobhaban, the official residence of the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, attended by members of the 14-Party It is alleged that, in that meeting, a decision was taken to impose a nationwide curfew, apply the “highest possible force” against protesters, and implement a so-called “shoot-at-sight” policy. It is further alleged that, by virtue of being present in that meeting as a leader of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod), the accused-petitioner became criminally liable for murder, abetment, and complicity in crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and that his presence attracted superior responsibility under section 4(1)–(3) of the same Act.

That it is submitted that the allegation rests on speculative assumptions rather than legal documents and materials. The Prosecution has not produced any minutes, recordings, or corroborating testimony confirming that any such decision to impose a “shoot-at-sight” policy was made, discussed, or adopted at the meeting of 19 July 2024. No document, communication, or witness statement has been disclosed that connects the accused-petitioner to any such directive or

That it is further noted that the sole piece of material relied upon by the Prosecution is a media statement attributed to Mr Obaidul Quader, General Secretary of the Bangladesh Awami League, wherein he expressed his personal position on “shoot at sight.” It is undisputed that this was a statement of Mr Quader himself and not of the meeting, nor is there any material to suggest that he spoke on behalf of all those present, including the accused-petitioner. The Prosecution has not produced any material showing that Mr Quader’s comment reflected the collective decision of the meeting or even the formal stance of the Awami League.

That it is asserted that the allegation that the accused-petitioner was “present and thereby automatically liable” is contrary to settled principles of criminal responsibility. Presence alone does not create culpability under section 3(2). Section 4(2) of the Act requires proof that an individual “ordered, solicited, incited, or induced the commission of such a crime” or “in any other way contributed” to its commission “intentionally” or “in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.” The Prosecution has failed to allege, let alone prove, any such intentional contribution, knowledge, or common purpose.

That it is submitted that the alleged meeting of 19 July 2024 was a political coordination meeting of the 14-Party Alliance — a broad coalition comprising multiple political parties with differing levels of influence and responsibility. The accused-petitioner, as President of Jasod, attended the meeting merely as a stakeholder and had no executive power, control, or decision-making authority within the Government or the Awami League. Accordingly, he could not have taken part in, or consented to, any governmental directive, let alone one as serious as a “shoot-at-sight” order.

That it is further submitted that the inherent improbability of the allegation undermines its It defies logic and common sense to suggest that numerous senior political figures, meeting openly in a well-known government venue, would collectively agree to an unlawful policy of extrajudicial killing — a policy that, if ever adopted, would be an explicit self-incrimination. The Prosecution’s theory lacks any basis in reason, practice, or political reality.

That it is stated that the imposition of curfew, as a measure to preserve public safety during widespread violence, cannot by itself constitute a crime under section 3(2) of the Act. Curfews are lawful administrative tools used worldwide during violent civil unrest. The Prosecution has produced no legal and factual material that the accused-petitioner either recommended or supported the use of excessive force or that any such force was applied pursuant to a directive he endorsed.

That it is asserted that no legal and factual material submitted by the prosecution exists that the accused-petitioner exercised “effective control” over any military, paramilitary, or police unit, as would be required for command responsibility under section 4(3) of the Act. The Prosecution has not demonstrated that he had any capacity to order, permit, or acquiesce in the conduct of law-enforcement agencies, nor that he had any duty to supervise or prevent the alleged acts.

That it is further noted that section 4(1) of the Act provides that “any individual who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be responsible and liable for punishment.” The Prosecution has not identified any individual act or omission by the accused-petitioner amounting to participation in, or contribution to, any of the alleged crimes. The requirement of individual responsibility is wholly unfulfilled.

That it is submitted that section 4(2) further provides that criminal liability arises only where a person “orders, solicits, incites or induces the commission of such a crime” or “aids, abets or otherwise assists in its ” The Prosecution has failed to present any act or statement by the accused-petitioner meeting these statutory criteria. There is no proof of order, solicitation, inducement, or aid, nor any intentional contribution as envisaged under section 4(2)(d).

That it is stated that the claim of “superior responsibility” misconceives the Section 4(3) imposes liability on commanders or superiors who “fail to prevent or punish” their subordinates for crimes committed under their effective control. The accused-petitioner, being a civilian political leader outside government, had no subordinates, no chain of command, and no operational control. Consequently, section 4(3) cannot apply to him in any manner.

That it is submitted that, as in Charge No. 1, the Prosecution’s reliance on conjecture and media snippets rather than primary evidence falls below the threshold of a prima facie case as required by section 9(1) of the Act and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure.

That it is asserted that the accused-petitioner’s attendance at the meeting, far from indicating criminal complicity, was motivated by a genuine effort to seek a political solution to the national crisis. His consistent public statements during that period, including the call for restraint and lawful response, stand in direct contradiction to the Prosecution’s portrayal.

That it is further submitted that the Prosecution has failed to establish actus reus, mens rea, or causation linking the accused-petitioner to any of the alleged crimes. The alleged “decision” of 19 July 2024 is unsupported by prosecution documents and materials, uncorroborated by purported witnesses, and contradicted by logic and

That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 2, premised on conjecture and devoid of evidentiary support, is liable to be summarily rejected as disclosing no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

Charge 3: Alleged phone call to the police superintendent of Kushtia on 20 July 2024

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 20 July 2024, at 12:14:57 hours, the accused-petitioner telephoned the Superintendent of Police (SP) of Kushtia and ordered him to identify protesters from video footage and to “arrest, torture, and kill” those protesters, purportedly to suppress the The Prosecution claims that, as a result of this call, the SP and alleged “armed political cadres of the 14-Party Alliance” fired on protesters in Kushtia city, causing the deaths of several individuals, including Ashraful Islam, Suruj Ali Babu, Abdullah Al Mustakin, Md Usama, Bablu Faraji, Yusuf Sheikh, Raisul

Hoque, and others. It is alleged that such acts constitute murder, abetment, and complicity in crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2), and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that the entire allegation is wholly unsubstantiated by documents and materials submitted by the prosecution. The Prosecution has produced no audio recording, transcript, or authenticated documentation of the alleged phone call, nor has it tendered any witness statement confirming the existence or content of such a conversation. The Superintendent of Police—allegedly the recipient of the call—has not been made a witness or a co-accused as evident from the prosecution documents which demonstrates that he did not act upon any such alleged instruction.

That it is further noted that the Prosecution’s claim relies solely on a call log entry purporting to show that a call occurred at 12:14:57 on 20 July The existence of a call, however, cannot by itself prove the content, context, or intent of the communication. It is legally impermissible to infer a criminal purpose merely from a record of telephonic contact, without proof of what was said or intended.

That it is submitted that the UC Berkeley Law Salzburg Working Paper (“An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Courts,” 2015,         available   at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/An-Overview-of-the-Use-of-Digital-Evidence-in-International-Criminal-Courts-Salzburg-Working-Paper.pdf)         sets out           the      international evidentiary standards for digital materials, including authentication, hearsay safeguards, provenance, and Before admitting such evidence, international courts must ensure: Authentication (the method of collection and verification of the digital material), Chain of custody (an unbroken record of how the evidence was obtained and preserved), Provenance and authorship (confirmation of the origin, authorship, and integrity of the data), and Preservation (assurance that the evidence was maintained without alteration). The Prosecution has not met any of these basic standards. The alleged call was never authenticated, no chain of custody has been established, and there is no independent verification that the data was preserved or unaltered.

That it is asserted that even if the existence of a call were assumed, the content and intent remain entirely It is equally plausible—and far more consistent with the accused-petitioner’s public role—that such a call, if made, concerned lawful inquiries into the local situation in his home district of Kushtia during a period of escalating unrest. To construe such a call as a directive to “kill protesters” is not only unproven but contrary to logic, proportionality, and the presumption of innocence.

That it is submitted that the construction of the allegations are vague and poorly drafted. For example, Formal Charge stated in allegation No. 3 that several people were killed by the Police between July 18, 2024 to August 5, 2024 at Kushtia as a result of a phone call made by the accused – petitioner on July 20, 2024, but the Formal Charge could not place anything as to which of the alleged victims were killed by the accused-petitioner, which is a mandatory requirement under section 16 of the 1973 Act. Hence, such vague allegation against the accused-petitioner creates serious doubt about the prosecution case for which the Formal Charge is liable to be rejected

That it is further submitted that the alleged causal link between the supposed phone call and the violent incidents in Kushtia is chronologically impossible and factually According to the First Information Reports (FIRs) cited by the Prosecution, at least one of the listed deaths occurred on 18 July 2024, two days prior to the alleged phone call on 20 July 2024. It is inconceivable that the accused-petitioner could have ordered an act that had already occurred. The lack of temporal coherence itself discredits the entire charge.

That it is noted that no chain of causation has been demonstrated linking the alleged call to any subsequent act of violence. The Prosecution failed to provide any legal or factual material which shows that the Superintendent of Police in Kushtia acted on the alleged instructions, or that the alleged “armed political cadres” were even associated with the accused-petitioner’s party (the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal), or that any violence occurred pursuant to a coordinated plan involving The reference to “armed political cadres of the 14-Party Alliance” is vague, speculative, and overbroad.

That it is submitted that under section 4(2) of the Act, criminal liability attaches only if an individual “orders, solicits, incites or induces” the commission of a crime, or “aids, abets or otherwise assists” in its commission, and that such contribution must be intentional and made “with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose” or “in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the ” The Prosecution has failed to show any such act or intent. There is no legal or factual material that the accused-petitioner ordered, solicited, aided, or abetted any crime, or that he possessed knowledge of, or shared intent with, any alleged perpetrators.

That it is further noted that section 4(3) of the Act applies only to commanders, superior officers, or leaders who exercise effective control over subordinates. The accused-petitioner was, at the relevant time, a civilian political leader without any command authority over the police or law-enforcement agencies. He could not have “ordered, permitted, acquiesced in, or failed to prevent” any alleged acts by the police, as he had no legal or administrative relationship with them.

That it is asserted that, even on its face, the allegation fails to meet the threshold of section 9(1) of the Act and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure, which require a prima facie case supported by credible evidence. The Prosecution’s reliance on a mere call log—unsupported by recordings, transcripts, or witnesses—falls far short of the evidentiary standard required in international criminal proceedings.

That it is submitted that the alleged conduct does not fulfil the actus reus or mens rea required under sections 3(2)(a), (g), or (h). There is no act of commission, order, or contribution to any alleged crime, nor any mental element evidencing intent or knowledge of a criminal

That it is further asserted that, even assuming the call occurred, innocent communication cannot be criminalised merely because subsequent unrelated events took place in the same district. Without evidence of content, direction, or consequence, the alleged act cannot satisfy any of the constituent elements of the offences under section 3(2).

That it is noted that the Prosecution’s own evidentiary omissions—failure to produce the SP as a witness, absence of contemporaneous corroboration, and chronological inconsistencies—render this charge manifestly unreliable and inherently defective.

That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 3 is devoid of evidentiary foundation, fails to disclose any prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and is accordingly liable to be summarily rejected in the interests of justice.

Charge no 4: Alleged phone conversation with Sheikh Hasina on 20 July 2024

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 20 July 2024, at 14:02:56 hours, the accused-petitioner telephoned the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and that during this call he discussed the use of lethal weapons, surrounding protesters, deploying paratroopers, and “bombing from helicopters” in order to suppress the movement through killing, torture, and It is further alleged that such acts amount to murder, incitement, complicity, facilitation, aiding, abetting, and ordering crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2), and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that this charge is factually unsubstantiated, procedurally defective, and legally unsustainable. The allegations are based solely on unverified and incomplete digital materials that fail to meet basic evidentiary and procedural safeguards.

That it is further noted that the Prosecution has not disclosed how or through what lawful means the alleged call record was obtained, nor has it produced any authentication certificate, chain of custody, or verification The Defence has not been informed of whether the material was intercepted, seized, or supplied, or if it was ever forensically examined by an independent expert.

That it is submitted that, as discussed in the rebuttal to Charge No. 3, the standards for admissibility of digital evidence—particularly regarding authentication, provenance, and preservation—outlined in the UC Berkeley Law Salzburg Working Paper on “An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Courts” (2015) apply equally Those standards have not been met in this instance.

That it is stated that no independent or reliable verification of the alleged recording has been provided. The Prosecution’s own documents contain visible ink blots and smudges in crucial portions of the supposed transcript, casting serious doubt on its accuracy and integrity. The verification, if any, was conducted by individuals not independent of the Prosecution, thereby lacking credibility.

That it is further submitted that witnesses numbered 13 to 20 –have not provided any statements. The absence of their statements has deprived the Defence of any opportunity to understand or challenge how the prosecution document and materials were obtained or This omission has materially prejudiced the accused’s right to prepare his case.

That it is asserted that the Defence was denied a fair opportunity to properly assess the materials provided by the Although the Tribunal permitted counsel to meet the accused in jail, it did not allow digital devices to be taken into the facility. Consequently, the accused could not listen to the alleged recordings or provide his instructions.

That it is noted that a subsequent application for review of this order was rejected, even though the Defence had reasonably requested the use of a device solely to consult the accused on the alleged materials. This refusal effectively prevented the accused from knowing or responding to the documents and materials relied upon by the Prosecution for framing of charges against him.

That it is submitted that the accused-petitioner has therefore been denied meaningful access to the very material forming the basis of this charge. He has neither heard the alleged audio file nor been provided with a clear, legible transcript, resulting in a fundamental breach of due process and equality of arms.

That it is stated that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a conversation occurred, the Prosecution’s interpretation of its content is plainly References to “sound devices” or “aerial measures” could plausibly relate to non-lethal security operations—such as sound grenades or surveillance—not to bombings or paratrooper deployment. The Prosecution’s reading is exaggerated and unsupported by context or  evidence.

That it is further submitted that even a plain reading of the transcript provided by the Prosecution reveals several exculpatory portions which have been deliberately ignored. The accused-petitioner is clearly heard urging restraint, emphasising that arrested individuals should be released promptly, and cautioning against excessive use of force. His remarks consistently advocate a balanced and proportionate response by law enforcement—firm in maintaining order, yet mindful of the need to prevent unnecessary suffering. The tone and content of the conversation reflect the concern of a responsible statesman seeking to contain escalating violence and loss of life, not to incite or direct it. Far from being incriminating, the transcript is exonerative in substance, and its selective interpretation by the Prosecution is misleading and prejudicial.

That it is further asserted that the Prosecution’s claim that the accused “planned killings” through this call lacks any temporal, factual, or causal nexus with any specific criminal act. No materials and documents submitted by the prosecution link the alleged conversation to any of the deaths or incidents cited elsewhere in the charge.

That it is submitted that under section 4(2) of the Act, liability arises only when an individual “orders, solicits, incites, induces, aids, or abets” a crime and does so intentionally and for the purpose of furthering a criminal plan or activity. No such intent or participation has been established in this case.

That it is stated that the alleged conversation—assuming it occurred—was between  two  political  figures,  and  the  accused-petitioner was one of them who had no command or control over any armed force as contemplated by section 4(3) of the Act. Accordingly, command or superior responsibility cannot arise in law.

That it is submitted that the Prosecution’s failure to ensure proper authentication, chain of custody, and full disclosure, combined with the Defence’s inability to access or review the alleged evidence, renders this charge procedurally defective and substantively baseless.

That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 4 discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and that the accused-petitioner is accordingly entitled to be discharged from the said charge in the interests of justice.

Charge no 5: Alleged Interview on “News 24” on 7 July 2024. 

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 27 July 2024 the accused-petitioner gave an interview to the Bangladeshi television channel News 24, during which he allegedly portrayed the ongoing student-protest movement as comprising “terrorists,” “communal elements,” and “Jamaat-e-Islami supporters.” It is further alleged that, through this broadcast, the accused incited or abetted acts of violence and thereby participated in murders and other crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2), and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that the allegations under Charge No. 5 are factually incorrect, legally misconceived, and not supported by evidence. The News 24 interview, on its face, contains no statement that can reasonably be construed as an order, incitement, or call to violence. It was an analytical political comment on a rapidly deteriorating public-order situation.

That it is stated that the Prosecution has produced no material to demonstrate any nexus between the accused’s televised remarks and any subsequent unlawful act. No statement of the purported witnesses proves that violence occurred as a result of, or was encouraged by, the broadcast. The allegation therefore fails to satisfy even the threshold of a prima facie case under section 9(1) of the Act and Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure.

That it is further noted that the evidentiary and legal deficiencies discussed in relation to Charge No. 1 apply mutatis mutandis to the present charge. In particular, the absence of any causal nexus between the accused’s remarks and the alleged offences, the lack of intent (mens rea) or direct participation (actus reus), and the failure of the Prosecution to demonstrate any plan, policy, or conspiracy under section 4(2) are equally relevant The present charge is, in essence, a repetition of the earlier unfounded allegation, without any new evidence or material to justify its inclusion.

That it is further stated that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against The accused neither committed nor directed any such act. His statements were confined to commentary on public disorder and contained no language advocating harm or persecution.

That it is submitted that section 3(2)(g) punishes abetment, conspiracy, or incitement to commit crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Prosecution failed to provide any legal or factual showing the requisite actus reus or mens rea—namely, a deliberate intent to provoke or facilitate the commission of any offence. Mere expression of political opinion cannot constitute abetment in law.

That it is asserted that section 3(2)(h) concerns complicity or failure to prevent crimes. The accused-petitioner was not in any position of authority—political, administrative, or military—capable of directing or preventing law-enforcement actions. Hence, the necessary element of “effective control” under section 4(3) is wholly absent.

That it is further submitted that, during the alleged period, the accused was not a Minister, nor did he hold any executive or command position. The Prosecution’s attempt to attribute “superior responsibility” is therefore misplaced and contrary to section 4(3) of the Act, which limits such liability to persons exercising control over subordinates or operations.

That it is stated that section 4(2) requires proof that any contribution to a crime was intentional and made either with the aim of furthering a criminal purpose or in the knowledge that a group intended to commit such crimes. The Prosecution has failed to demonstrate any such intention on the part of the accused; none can be inferred from a brief television interview.

That it is noted that the Prosecution relies primarily on the broadcast itself and a handful of witness statements. Out of twenty witnesses named, only twelve statements have been supplied; none establish any causal connection between the interview and the alleged offences. The remaining eight witnesses have not been produced or disclosed, contrary to Rule 18(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which requires full disclosure of both inculpatory and exculpatory materials.

That it is further stated that, at the time of the News 24 interview, public violence had already reached grave proportions—police killings, arson, and destruction of state property had been widely reported. The accused-petitioner’s comments acknowledging infiltration of extremist and opposition elements were consistent with facts then publicly known. Describing those realities cannot be equated with an intent to dehumanise or incite.

That it is submitted that, viewed in context, the accused’s statements were a warning against escalation, not a call for He urged that law enforcement act proportionately and protect life and property. Such expressions of concern fall squarely within the bounds of legitimate political speech and cannot, by any reasonable interpretation, satisfy the actus reus or mens rea required for crimes under section 3(2).

That it is further asserted that the Prosecution’s characterisation of the accused’s remarks as “incitement” is a misreading of language and intent. Incitement under international criminal law demands a direct call to imminent unlawful action, which is entirely absent here. The alleged broadcast lacks both the content and context necessary to establish such liability.

That it is stated that, in light of the foregoing, no plan, policy, or conspiracy—as contemplated by section 4(2)—has been established. The Prosecution’s claim rests on speculation and political inference rather than evidence admissible under the Act.

That it is submitted that the attempt to criminalise a televised comment undermines the principle of legality and the right to freedom of expression protected by law. Legitimate political analysis, however disagreeable to some, cannot in law constitute a crime against

That it is therefore respectfully submitted that in the interest of justice Charge No. 5 is liable to be summarily rejected, as it discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

Charge no 6: Alleged remarks against Jamaat-e-Islami at 14-Party Alliance meeting on 29 July 2024

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 29 July 2024, during a meeting of the 14-Party Alliance, the accused-petitioner described the political party Jamaat-e-Islami as “terrorist,” “sectarian,” and “communal,” and that in so doing he sought to divert the student protest movement, thereby inciting violence and It is further alleged that these remarks amount to incitement, facilitation, abetment, and participation in crimes against humanity under sections 3(2)(a), (g) and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2) and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that the allegation is legally unfounded, factually misconceived, and politically motivated. The charge mischaracterises a factual statement of historical truth as “incitement.” Calling Jamaat-e-Islami a terrorist and communal organisation does not constitute a crime under any provision of the Act, nor under any recognised principle of international criminal law.

That it is further noted that the allegation itself implicitly concedes that Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing had become deeply involved in the violent phase of the 2024 movement. Otherwise, criticism of Jamaat-e-Islami could not logically be equated with criticism of the movement itself. The Prosecution’s own framing thereby corroborates the Defence’s case that extremist infiltration had occured.

That it is stated that Jamaat-e-Islami’s long record of sectarian and violent activity is a matter of judicially recognised fact, not political opinion. This very International Crimes Tribunal has in several judgments—Chief Prosecutor v. Ghulam Azam (para 375), Chief Prosecutor v. Motiur Rahman Nizami (para 416), and Chief Prosecutor

Maulana Abdus Sobhan (para 578)—described Jamaat-e-Islami as a “criminal enterprise” and a “communal as well as criminal organisation.” The party’s culpability for crimes against humanity and genocide committed during the 1971 Liberation War has thus been conclusively established in this Tribunal’s own jurisprudence.

That it is submitted that even after independence, Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have continued a pattern of extremist activity. For instance, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)  lists      numerous   violent   acts   attributed   to   Shibir. The IHS Jane’s Global Terrorism and Insurgency Attack Index 2013 ranked Islami Chhatra Shibir as the third most active non-state armed group in the world, just one rank below the Taliban of Afghanistan  [Economic Times]. The European Parliament has likewise urged that political parties “associated with terrorist acts” in Bangladesh, including Jamaat-e-Islami, should be banned and urged Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to distance itself from Jamaat [The Daily Star], Jamaat-e-Islami is the party the top leadership of which has continued to espouse dangerous sectarian rhetoric, including a recent public call for a “final resolution” of the Ahmadiyya community [Dhaka Tribune], a chilling echo of the Nazi-era calls for “final solution” that led to the Holocaust during the Second World War. Describing such conduct as communal or terrorist is therefore a statement of fact, not an act of hate speech. There are numerous examples like these.

That it is submitted that truth, in particular historical truth, cannot constitute incitement. Under international jurisprudence, incitement requires a direct call to commit an imminent unlawful The accused-petitioner’s remarks lacked both the intent and the direction necessary to meet that standard. They were analytical and factual, not exhortatory.

That it is asserted that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder as a crime against humanity; section 3(2)(g) criminalises abetment, conspiracy, or incitement; and section 3(2)(h) covers complicity or failure to prevent. The Prosecution has failed to show any actus reus linking the accused to an actual offence, or any mens rea demonstrating intent to commit or facilitate such acts. None of the statutory elements are satisfied.

That it is further noted that the accused-petitioner had no position of authority or control over any enforcement agency or armed group at the material time. His presence in a political alliance meeting does not in law give rise to “command responsibility” under section 4(3). The Prosecution has not alleged, let alone proved, that he issued any order or had any capacity to prevent or punish alleged crimes.

That it is stated that the charge fails to meet the gravity threshold of an international crime. Labelling a political organisation “terrorist” cannot reasonably be compared to genocidal or dehumanising rhetoric seen in Rwanda or Nazi Germany. The accused’s remarks were grounded in well-documented fact, not prejudice or falsehood. To equate them with incitement to mass atrocity trivialises the very notion of crimes against humanity. That it is submitted that the Prosecution’s evident offence at criticism of Jamaat-e-Islami reveals a lack of neutrality. The Chief Prosecutor himself, Advocate Tajul Islam, previously acted as defence counsel for senior Jamaat leaders convicted by this Tribunal and has long been politically aligned with Jamaat-linked entities, including the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party. His inclusion of this allegation reflects a conflict of interest and a political bias rather than a genuine prosecutorial purpose.

That it is further asserted that the accused-petitioner, a valiant freedom fighter and lifelong advocate of secular, democratic values, has consistently opposed Jamaat-e-Islami’s communal ideology. The present charge appears to be a politically motivated reprisal against him precisely because of his historic stance against Jamaat and its collaborators in 1971.

That it is submitted that under section 4(2) of the Act, liability requires that any contribution to a crime be intentional and made with the aim of furthering a criminal purpose. The Prosecution has failed to provide any evidence of any such intention. The accused-petitioner’s remarks merely sought to highlight extremist infiltration and protect civic peace, not to provoke His remarks were consistent with the political vision to uphold secularism and resist communalism in all its forms. As such, his statements served a legitimate public interest in warning against forces historically linked to terror and intolerance.

That it is therefore submitted that Charge No. 6 discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. The Prosecution has failed to demonstrate any act, intent, or consequence connecting the accused to the alleged crimes.

That it is respectfully prayed that the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged from Charge 6 in its entirety, the same being baseless in fact, unsupported in law, and inimical to the principles of justice on which this Tribunal was founded.

Charge no 7: Alleged Telephone Conversation with Sheikh Hasina on 4 August 2024

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 4 August 2024, at 16:29:07 hours, the accused-petitioner engaged in a telephone conversation with the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, during which he allegedly described the protest movement as “terrorist” and “extremist,” and consulted with her to curb the protest by means of firing, killing, torture, and arrest. The Prosecution contends that these alleged remarks constitute crimes of murder, incitement, complicity, facilitation, and abetment under sections 3(2)(a), (g), and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2), and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that this charge is a replication of the earlier allegations concerning the purported telephone calls of 20 July 2024, and suffers from identical legal and evidentiary infirmities. The Prosecution has not disclosed how this alleged recording was obtained, authenticated, or preserved; nor has it provided any transcript that meets the requirements of reliability or accuracy under the Tribunal’s rules that govern evidence.

That it is stated that the documents and materials submitted by the prosecution are self-contradictory and incomplete. No lawful interception order or certification of chain of custody has been produced. The alleged audio file has not been independently verified, and the Defence has been denied access to play or review it with the accused. As established in Prosecutor Lubanga and Prosecutor v Bemba, the integrity and authenticity of digital evidence are preconditions to admissibility, as their absence renders such material unreliable.

That it is further submitted that the principles set out in the UC Berkeley Law Salzburg Working Paper on “An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Courts” (2015) apply mutatis mutandis to the present charge. The prosecution has failed to demonstrate any authentication, chain of custody, or preservation of the alleged recording, or to identify its These defects go to the heart of evidentiary reliability.

That it is asserted that the content of the alleged transcript, as disclosed, contains several exculpatory portions which the Prosecution has ignored. The accused is recorded as emphasising restraint and proportionality, expressing concern over escalating violence, and suggesting that arrested individuals be released promptly. His remarks reflect the outlook of a responsible statesman seeking balance, not of a person encouraging unlawful violence.

That it is submitted that truthful or fact-based descriptions, such as characterising extremist infiltration into the protest, do not constitute incitement. The Tribunal’s earlier findings and public domain materials confirm that the 2024 protest had by then descended into violent attacks on police, state property, and ordinary citizens. Acknowledging that reality cannot, by any legal standard, be equated with advocacy of violence.

That it is further stated that the Prosecution has failed to establish any causal nexus between this alleged call and any subsequent act of violence. No incident has been linked by date, location, or witness testimony to the supposed conversation. Absent such nexus, there can be no actus reus under section 3(2), nor any intent under section 4(2).

That it is submitted that the accused-petitioner had no command or supervisory authority at the time of the alleged acts. Section 4(3) of the Act confines “superior responsibility” to those exercising effective control over subordinates, which the accused did not. As such, the doctrine of command responsibility is wholly inapplicable.

That it is stated that the language of section 4(2)(d) requires any contribution to a crime to be intentional, and made with the purpose of furthering a criminal plan or in the knowledge of such a plan. No evidence has been offered that the accused shared any criminal intent or purpose with any alleged perpetrator. On the contrary, the evidence indicates his consistent advocacy of restraint and humanitarian considerations.

That it is submitted that, even taking the Prosecution’s claims at their highest, they amount only to a speculative interpretation of a partial and unverified recording. There is no proof that the accused ordered, abetted, or encouraged any unlawful act, or that any such act occurred as a consequence of his alleged words.

That it is further submitted that to equate analytical discussion or political characterisation with “planning or ordering crimes against humanity” is a distortion of both fact and The principles of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and fair trial prohibit expanding criminal liability to encompass lawful political expression.

That it is therefore respectfully prayed that Charge 7 is liable to be summarily rejected, as it discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. The allegations are speculative, unsupported, and legally untenable, and the accused-petitioner is accordingly entitled to be discharged in the interests of justice.

Charge no 8: Alleged Liability for Six Deaths in Kushtia

That it is noted that the Prosecution alleges that on 5 August 2024, between 13:30 and 14:00 hours, six persons — Abdullah Al Mustakin, Suruj Ali Babu, Md Ashraful Islam, Md Bablu Faraji, Md Yusuf Sheikh, and Md Usama — were killed, and that the accused-petitioner is criminally liable for their deaths. It is further alleged that the accused acted as a “link” between local leaders of the Awami League (AL), the district police administration, and AL cadres, thereby facilitating a “shoot-on-sight” policy and the use of lethal force. The Prosecution asserts liability under sections 3(2)(a), (g) and (h), read with sections 4(1), (2) and (3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973.

That it is submitted that the allegations are factually baseless, legally untenable, and internally inconsistent. No evidence—documentary, oral, or digital—connects the accused to the specific killings alleged. The charge relies entirely on conjecture and the repetition of unverified narratives already addressed under earlier charges concerning supposed “shoot-on-sight” orders.

That it is stated that the Prosecution has failed to produce any witness statement, communication record, or directive demonstrating that the accused issued, transmitted, or endorsed any instruction to use lethal No causal link has been established between any words or actions of the accused and the tragic deaths referred to in the charge, thereby failing to establish the actus reus or mens rea required under section 3(2) of the Act.

That it is further submitted that the allegation of the accused being a “link” between local Awami League leaders and police authorities is inherently implausible. The accused was at all material times the President of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod), a distinct political party within the 14-Party Alliance. He held no organisational post within the Awami League and had no authority—formal or informal—over its district-level structure, cadres, or decision-making.

That it is stated that the individuals named in the charge—Md Sadar Uddin Khan, Md Asgar Ali, Md Ataur Rahman, Ajoy Surekha, Manab Chaki, Atikur Rahman Anik, Sheikh Hafiz Challenge, Rashidul Islam Biplob, Tayyab Badsha, Taizal Ali Khan, and Swapan Kumar—are all identified in the Prosecution’s own materials as members or office-bearers of the Awami League’s Kushtia District unit. None belong to or operate under the Jasod hierarchy. It defies logic that Awami League cadres would take instructions from a leader of another party, when the Awami League has its own well-defined command structure and lines of communication.

That it is submitted that, even on the Prosecution’s own showing, the accused had no command, control, or supervisory authority over any of the persons allegedly involved in the Accordingly, the doctrine of “superior responsibility” under section 4(3) of the Act—requiring effective control and the ability to prevent or punish—has no application. The standards articulated in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (ICTY, 1998) make clear that mere political influence or presence at alliance meetings cannot establish command responsibility.

That it is further stated that the Prosecution has not submitted any credible legal or factual material of a plan, policy, or conspiracy as required by section 4(2)(d) of the Act. No minutes of meetings, communications, or contemporaneous documents have been produced to show that the accused shared any criminal purpose or intention with those who allegedly committed the killings. Absent proof of intent or knowledge, liability under section 4(2) cannot arise.

That it is submitted that the digital-evidence standards and admissibility principles discussed in relation to Charges 3 and 4 apply mutatis mutandis The Prosecution has failed to authenticate any electronic record or establish a chain of custody linking the accused to the alleged events of 5 August 2024. No lawful interception authorisation, forensic certification, or independent verification has been disclosed, contrary to the requirements recognised in Lubanga, Bemba, and the UC Berkeley Law Working Paper (2015).

That it is further noted that, according to the Prosecution’s own documentation, at least one of the victims named—Md Ashraful Islam—was reported dead on 18 July 2024, two weeks before the alleged call or events of 5 August. This temporal inconsistency alone demonstrates the factual impossibility of the Prosecution’s case and destroys any claimed causal nexus.

That it is stated that section 3(2)(a) of the Act criminalises murder when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. No evidence has been provided that the killings in Kushtia formed part of any such attack, let alone that the accused participated in or furthered Isolated incidents of violence—however regrettable—cannot satisfy the threshold of crimes against humanity.

That it is submitted that the absence of lawful authority, causal connection, and intention—combined with contradictions within the Prosecution’s own evidence—renders the allegation wholly speculative. To attribute liability to the accused on the basis of political association or alliance membership would offend the principles of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and individual criminal responsibility enshrined in section 4(1) of the Act.

That it is therefore respectfully submitted that Charge No. 8 is liable to be summarily rejected and the accused-petitioner is entitled to be discharged in the interests of justice, as it discloses no prima facie case under sections 3(2)(a), (g), (h) or 4(1)–(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. Because, the Prosecution’s theory is unsupported by evidence, contradicted by its own record, and legally unsustainable.

Following this, the written application had a section on “Evidentiary Defects and Lack of Prima Facie Evidence” 

That it is submitted that the failure of the Prosecution and the Investigation Agency to consider the prevailing situation of the country at the relevant time that the movement was peaceful up to a certain point, and suddenly it turned into a terrorist attack killing police officials, breaking prisons, burning police stations, destroying mega public infrastructures, like – Metro Rail, Mayor Hanif Flyover, BTV etc., which may have compelled the law enforcing agencies on duty under the relevant provisions of law permitting law enforcement officials to use firearms and such failure shows that the investigation carried out against the accused-petitioner is grossly flawed as such the Formal Charge submitted on the basis of the said investigation is liable to be rejected summarily.

That the accused-petitioner humbly submits that the prosecution’s case rests upon a handful of vague, repetitive, mechanical, and unreliable witness statements and three alleged audio recordings dated 20.07.2024, 20.07.2024, and 04.08.2024. None of these materials disclose any direct or indirect nexus between the accused and the incidents The prosecution has failed to produce a single credible item of evidence that attributes to the accused any act of order, incitement, facilitation, participation, or encouragement within the meaning of section 3(2) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and accordingly, the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.

That it is submitted that the audio recordings, far from being incriminating, are in fact exculpatory. Two of the calls—between the accused-petitioner and the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—clearly demonstrate that the accused advised restraint, urged that the arrested individuals be released within hours, and emphasised proportionality in the use of force. These conversations portray a statesman seeking to maintain balance between public order and humane treatment of protesters. The prosecution’s deliberate omission of these exculpatory portions violates its duty of candour under Rule 18(2) of the ICT Rules of Procedure, which requires disclosure of both incriminating and exonerating materials.

That it is further stated that the alleged call between the accused and the Superintendent of Police (SP) of Kushtia is unsupported by any transcript, audio file, or The said SP has not been named as a prosecution witness, nor has any corroborating evidence been produced. The allegation is wholly unsubstantiated and omnibus. At the relevant time, the accused was neither a Member of Parliament nor a government official, and had no authority to issue operational directives to a district police superintendent. His reference to Kushtia during a conversation with the Prime Minister, even if made, was contextual and incidental, not a command or order.

That it is submitted that the admissibility of secretly recorded or intercepted communications in international criminal proceedings is subject to strict Under Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, any evidence obtained in violation of internationally recognised human rights shall be inadmissible if it casts substantial doubt on its reliability or would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings. The same principle applies before this Tribunal pursuant to section 19 of the Act, which requires evidence to be relevant, reliable, and not contrary to the interests of justice.

That it is further submitted that in Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) and Prosecutor v. Bemba (No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 5 OA 6), the Court excluded evidence obtained through coercion and improper surveillance, respectively. Likewise, the UC Berkeley Law Salzburg Working Paper titled “An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Courts” (2015) recommended that before admitting digital evidence, the international criminal courts must concentrate on authentication (e.g. what procedures were followed during the collection of these phone conversations?), hearsay (e.g., what is the chain of custody? Do the recordings have a strong chain of custody?), provenance (e.g., authorship of the recordings, verification of electronic signature, etc.) and preservation (e.g., whether the recordings were properly preserved before the investigators collected them?). These aforesaid precedents and working paper affirm that the use of unlawfully obtained recordings undermines the fairness of the trial and must be excluded to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.

That it is stated that none of the alleged digital materials has been subjected to independent verification. The transcripts bear visible ink stains and smudges affecting readability in crucial portions, and there is no certification as to their The individuals who purportedly verified the recordings are themselves members of the prosecution team, thereby compromising neutrality. Moreover, witnesses numbered 13 to 20, who appear linked to the digital evidence, have not provided any statements, depriving the Defence of the opportunity to challenge or test the provenance of the recordings. As such, the defence invokes audi alteram partem and in dubio pro reo, asserting that the accused was denied the opportunity to contest the recordings, which were allegedly obtained without judicial authorization or the consent of the parties involved, thereby violating the right to privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR and as such, the accused – petitioner may kindly be discharged.

That it is submitted that the accused-petitioner has been denied meaningful access to the alleged evidence. Though the Tribunal allowed the Defence to meet the accused in custody, it did not permit digital devices to be taken into the facility, preventing counsel from playing the audio files to the accused. A subsequent application for review seeking limited permission for such access was rejected, thereby violating the accused’s right to prepare an effective defence and to know the evidence against him.

That it is further submitted that the witness statements relied upon by the prosecution appear to be mechanically reproduced and lack independence. The statements of witnesses Toukir Ahmed, Raisul Hoque, Md Joynal Abedin Joy, Md Forhad Hossain, and Sujan Mahmudn contain identical concluding paragraphs, including the same typographical errors. Likewise, the statements of Md Shakil Ahmed, Md Faysal, Sheikh Mohammad Ali, Tauhidul Siam, Russell Howladar, Md Liton Howladar, and Ripon Miah share verbatim identical last two paragraphs and cite identical “evidence” such as the Mirror Now and News 24 Such replication suggests fabrication and violates established rules of evidence, which mandates that witness statements must be individually recorded and voluntarily given. It is pertinent to mention that the prosecution has withheld statements from key prosecution witnesses, i.e., prosecution witnesses 13 to 20, who are Md Shahed Jobayer Lawrence, Md Shakhawat Hossain, Tanveer Hasan Zoha, Md Anisur Rahman, Md Masud Rana, Md Kamrul Hossain, Md Muhaiminul Hoque, and Abdullah Al Mamun. Such mechanical replication of content across multiple statements, and withholding of witness statements undermine their credibility and raise grave doubts about the integrity of the investigation, process of evidence collection, as well as the workings of the prosecutorial team.

That it is submitted that the doctrine of superior responsibility invoked by the prosecution is inapplicable. Section 4(3) of the Act makes a commander or superior criminally liable only where he “had effective control” over subordinates, knew or should have known that they were committing crimes, and failed to prevent or punish The accused, at the relevant time, was neither a commander nor a superior officer; he held no executive authority, and therefore could not exercise “effective control.” The elements of command responsibility articulated in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (ICTY, 1998) are absent in this case.

That it is stated that section 4(2) of the Act further provides that any contribution to a crime must be intentional, made either with the aim of furthering the criminal purpose of a group or in the knowledge of the group’s intention to commit the crime. No such intention or knowledge has been alleged, let alone proved, against the On the contrary, the available evidence—including the call transcripts—shows his consistent advocacy of moderation and restraint.

That it is further submitted that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Fact-Finding Report (2025) has been wrongly presented as evidence in the instant criminal proceedings. The said report itself categorically disclaims being a criminal investigation conducted under judicial standards. It expressly states that its findings were based on open-source and testimonial materials, and that it was not intended to determine individual criminal responsibility.

That it is submitted that one member of the OHCHR fact-finding team publicly clarified that the report was never meant to be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding, domestic or international. Nevertheless, the prosecution has misrepresented the report by submitting it as substantive evidence before this Tribunal—an attempt to borrow the institutional credibility of the OHCHR (and by extension, the United Nations) to lend false legitimacy to an otherwise deficient case. This is both misleading to the public and contrary to fair-trial

That it is further submitted that it is also important to note that the report in question was produced solely under the administrative authority of the OHCHR and not as a United Nations-mandated investigative mechanism—unlike the Independent International Fact-Finding Missions on Myanmar, Venezuela, or Palestine, which were established through formal resolutions of the Human Rights Council. The present report therefore carries no quasi-judicial or evidentiary status and cannot lawfully be used to sustain criminal charges before this Honourable Tribunal. The prosecution’s reliance upon it constitutes a “legitimacy grab” unsupported by any legal basis.

That it is most respectfully submitted that in the “Fact Finding Report” on the “Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh”, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) categorically raised serious concern about the investigation conducted by the investigation agency of the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh. In this regard, the said report stated:

“Public trust in the Police to conduct the effective investigations needed to sustain successful prosecutions remains low. As Bangladesh lacks an effective and independent mechanism to investigate criminal complaints involving police and other security forces, there is widespread concern that Police investigators will not duly investigate cases concerning their own current or former colleagues. Even the ICT’s investigation team reportedly relies entirely on serving or former police officers.” (Para 258)

That it is submitted that the prosecution has failed to assess any legal framework governing the use of force by law enforcement or how such framework was allegedly breached. Nor has it shown how the accused’s political position, without any executive role, related to the incidents complained of. In the absence of a demonstrated nexus between the accused’s conduct and any prohibited act under section 3(2) of the Act, the theory of the prosecution collapses.

That it is further submitted that materials not intended as prosecution evidence (including high-level situation reports) have been selectively invoked; indeed, even international reporting warned against treating such compilations as trial evidence while simultaneously criticising the ICT investigation’s lack of independence.

That it is further noted that section 3(2) of the Act defines crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but only when committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.” The prosecution has failed to establish that any such attack occurred pursuant to a policy, plan, or direction in which the accused participated. Isolated acts of violence by law enforcement or third parties, even if proved, cannot satisfy this threshold.

That it is stated that the cumulative defects—unreliable witness statements, unverified digital evidence, suppression of exculpatory material, misuse of the OHCHR report, and the absence of command authority or intent—render the prosecution’s case wholly unreliable. Even taking the evidence at its highest, it fails to establish any actus reus, mens rea, or causal nexus linking the accused to the alleged crimes under sections 3(2) or 4 of the Act.

That it is most respectfully submitted that there exists no sufficient ground to frame any charge against the accused-petitioner. The materials presented are speculative, derivative, and legally inadmissible, falling short of the prima facie standard required by section 9(1) of the The prosecution has therefore failed to establish even a triable issue, and the formal charge is liable to be rejected in its entirety.

There are then three final short sections:

Alleged “Mischaracterisation” and the Incitement tehory – no Actus Reus, no Mens Rea, no Knowledge and no Causation

That it is submitted that the Prosecution assertion that the accused-petitioner “mischaracterised” the 2024 quota reform movement as a “sectarian” or “terrorist” movement and thereby incited, abetted, or instigated repressive acts amounting to crimes against humanity. This allegation is factually misconceived, legally untenable, and devoid of any evidentiary foundation. It proceeds on the false assumption that the movement remained peaceful and democratic, whereas overwhelming contemporaneous evidence demonstrates that it degenerated into a violent, extremist, and insurrectionary campaign.

That it is submitted that the truth and factual basis of the accused-petitioner’s characterization of the protests is borne out by incontrovertible material in the public domain. The so-called “quota reform movement,” though starting as a student protest, was hijacked by militant and opposition elements and swiftly descended into organised violence, as evidenced by the Narsingdi Jail Break (where 826 inmates escaped), arson attacks on police stations and government offices, the killing of at least thirteen police officers at Enayetpur, the use of 7.62 mm military-grade weapons by civilian assailants, and the death of Mir Mahfuzur Rahman Mugdho after he himself warned of Jamaat–Shibir and Chhatra Dal infiltration. The public admissions of key figures—such as Barrister Asaduzzaman Fuad, Shadik Kayem, Hasib Al-Islam, and Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain—explicitly acknowledge that the movement’s leadership was prepared for armed resistance and that violence, including the killing of police officers and destruction of public property, was a deliberate strategy to bring down the government. These are not allegations but recorded statements of fact, supported by reports and broadcasts contemporaneous with the events themselves.

That it is further submitted that in the above context, the accused-petitioner’s remarks characterising the movement as “sectarian” and “terrorist” were not incitements to violence but factual descriptions of an ongoing violent campaign against the State and civilian His statements were grounded in evidence then publicly available and shared by multiple observers, including journalists and commentators sympathetic to the protesters themselves. To penalise such statements as “incitement” would be to criminalise truth-telling and responsible political assessment. The accused’s comments, properly understood, sought to caution against lawlessness and call for restoration of order, not to promote or legitimise any crime. Accordingly, the prosecution’s theory of “mischaracterisation equals incitement” fails for want of actus reus, mens rea, and causal nexus.

That it is stated that the accused-petitioner’s alleged statements were descriptive assessments of unfolding facts, not directives to commit unlawful There was no call to violence, no exhortation to commit any enumerated crime under section 3(2), and no instruction to target civilians or a protected group.

That it is also noted the Prosecution failed to identify any specific criminal act that was subsequently carried out as a result of any statement by the No chain of causation exists, nor is it pleaded by the Prosecution or evidenced linking any words of the accused to any particular offence, perpetrator, place, date or victim. Thus no action can be brought against the accused-petitioner which warrants charge as proposed by the learned Prosecution.

One-Sided Investigation followed by Blanket Indemnity

That it is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution’s investigation is fundamentally flawed, suffering from political bias and selectivity, having been conducted with the singular aim of targeting the Petitioner while intentionally disregarding overwhelming exculpatory evidence concerning the true perpetrators of the July 2024 atrocities. Specifically, the Prosecution has committed a dereliction of its statutory duty by consciously failing to investigate or acknowledge credible, publicly documented evidence of grave crimes committed by elements aligned with the protest movement, including confessions from key organisers, the Narsingdi Jail Break, police killings, and the use of military-grade weapons, which would have established that the violence was the product of a pre-planned armed conspiracy, and not of any incitement by the Petitioner. This deficiency is compounded by the subsequent actions of the Interim Government, which issued a blanket indemnity shielding the actual perpetrators from prosecution, thereby establishing a pattern of selective justice that violates the principle of equality before the law and compromises the bona fides and independence of the entire process, rendering the prosecution legally unsustainable before this Honourable Tribunal, and as such, the formal charge is liable to be rejected.

Positive Case: Consistent Advocacy for Lawful, Political Solutions and Accountability 

That it is further submitted that the accused-petitioner, like any concerned citizen and a bona fide politician, advocated a political solution and attended multi-party discussions with a view to de-escalating the situation in July – August 2024. He supported accountability initiatives commenced by the then government (e.g., judicial inquiry; internal/departmental actions including closure of officers facing misconduct allegations). He expected due process to run its course. Following change of government, those processes were halted; indemnities and one-sided measures were instead promoted—undercutting genuine accountability. The accused’s stance remained consistent: lawful accountability, restraint, and balance, not repression. The learned prosecution has measurably failed to consider the accused-petitioner’s endeavour and consistent advocacy for lawful and political solutions and accountability and as such, the accused-petitioner is liable to be discharged.

The application ends by saying:

That it is submitted that the Formal Charge submitted by the Prosecution does not disclose any prima-facie case against the accused-petitioner under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, and as such, the accused-petitioner may kindly be discharged from the instant case