Tribunal Order on Defence Application seeking review of charge framing order

This is the text of the order

Today is fixed for opening statement, examination of prosecution witnesses and further hearing of the application under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010 seeking review of Order No. 06 dated 02.11.2025, by which the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s application for discharge under Rule 37.

The sole accused, Hasanul Haq Inu has been produced before this Tribunal by the Jail Authority.

This is an application under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2)) Rules of Procedure, 2010 seeking review of Order No 06 dated 02.11.2055, by which the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s application for discharge under Rule 37.

We have heard Mr Muhammad Tajul Islam, the learned Chief Prosecutor, assisted by learned prosecutor Mr Md Abdus Sobhan Tarafder

We have also heard Mr Mansarul Haque Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner. The record has also been carefully perused.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mansurul Haque Chowdhury submits, in substance, that the impugned order suffers from material legal and factual errors warranting review under Rule 26(3). His submissions (grounds I–XXXII) may be summarised as follows:

1. 1. Superior responsibility not established: The Tribunal wrongly assumed the petitioner held superior or political authority, contrary to Article 28 of the Rome Statute and jurisprudence in Bemba, Delalić and other international tribunals requiring proof of “effective control.”
   2. Presumption of guilt: The impugned order allegedly shifted the burden of proof at the charge-framing stage, contrary to Articles 66–67 of the Rome Statute and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR.
   3. Failure to consider the nature of July 2024 events: The Tribunal is said to have overlooked bilateral and insurgent aspects of the July events, including extremist infiltration, arson, armed attacks, destruction of public installations and jailbreaks.
   4. Selective immunity: The interim administration’s immunity to certain protestors creates an appearance of selectivity inconsistent with section 3 of the ICT Act.
   5. Media comments cannot create liability: The Tribunal wrongly treated accused Hasanul Haq Inu’s televised remarks as incitement, contrary to the UN Working Group’s Opinion on the Shahriar Kabir matter.
   6. Non-application of judicial mind: The Tribunal relied on an incomplete factual record and ignored exculpatory materials.

Thus, the learned Senior Advocate urges that the charge-framing order is legally unsustainable and liable to be reviewed and set aside.

Submissions on behalf of the Prosecution

The learned Chief Prosecutor Senior Advocate Muhammad Tajul Islam strongly opposes the review application and submits:

1. 1. Scope of review extremely limited: Review lies only to correct errors apparent on the face of the record; a rehearing is impermissible.
   2. Prima facie case already found: The impugned order correctly determined that prosecution materials disclose a prima facie case.
   3. Superior responsibility sufficiently pleaded: Whether the accused exercised effective control is a matter for evidence at trial.
   4. No presumption of guilt: The order did not shift the burden of proof but merely determined that the materials, if unrebutted, warrant framing of charges.
   5. Context duly considered: The wider July events were examined and disagreement with that assessment cannot constitute an error.
   6. Selective immunity irrelevant: Executive immunity policies cannot limit the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
   7. Media statements relevant: The petitioner’s televised comments form part of circumstances to be evaluated at trial.

The learned Chief Prosecutor therefore prays for rejection of the review petition.

We have examined Rule 26(3), which states as follows:

“The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may review any of its orders including the order of framing charge(s) in the interest of justice.”

The power is limited and confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal and cannot permit a re-hearing or re-appreciation of materials already evaluated.

After evaluating the submissions advanced by both sides and reviewing the relevant portion of the application, the Tribunal finds that the grounds urged in the petition largely seek to re-open factual assessments, reinterpret materials and revisit conclusions already reached. Such matters fall outside the narrow ambit of review.

1. 1. Prima Facie Case The impugned order demonstrates adequate material forming a prima facie case. No new circumstance or error apparent has been shown.
   2. Superior Responsibility Whether the accused exercised effective control is an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial.
   3. Context of July 2024 Events The Tribunal already considered the context. Disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning cannot found a review.
   4. Selective Immunity Allegations regarding government immunity policies do not constitute an error apparent and are irrelevant to the correctness of the charge-framing order.
   5. Media Statements Whether such statements amount to instigation or contribution is a matter for evidence.
   6. Presumption of Innocence Rules 37 and 38 of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010 run as follows:

“37. When the accused appears or is brought before the Tribunal and if the Tribunal, upon consideration of record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, finds that there is no sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, it shall discharge the accused and record its reasons for so doing.

38(1). If, after consideration and hearing under rule 37, the Tribunal is of opinion that there is sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, the Tribunal shall frame one or more charges for the offences of which he is accused and he shall be asked whether he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged.

Provided that if the accused does not reply either as guilty or not guilty or remains silent or if he says such thing which is not relevant, then the accused shall be deemed to have replied as not guilty.

(2) An accused pleading not guilty will get at least three weeks’ time for preparing his defence.

Analysis of Rules 37 and 38(1) of the ICT-2 Rules of Procedure, 2010

Before addressing the merits of the review application, it is necessary to clarify the statutory scheme governing discharge and charge-framing, as the petitioner’s challenge is rooted in the contention that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct threshold under Rules 37 and 38(1) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010.

Rules 37 and 38(1) together form the statutory filter through which the Tribunal must determine whether:

1. 1. the accused should be discharged; or
   2. charges should be framed and the matter sent to trial.

The determinative phrase governing both rules is “sufficient grounds to presume” that the accused has committed the alleged offence(s).

Structure and Purpose of the Two Rules

Rule 37 — Discharge

Rule 37 requires the Tribunal, upon the accused’s appearance, to examine:

• • i. the record,
  • ii. the documents submitted,

• • iii. and the submissions of the parties.

If the Tribunal finds no sufficient ground to presume commission of an offence, it must discharge the accused with recorded reasons. This is a mandatory statutory duty.

Rule 38(1) — Framing of Charges

Conversely, if such sufficient grounds exist, the Tribunal shall frame one or more charges and proceed to take the plea of the accused.

Thus, Rules 37 and 38(1) represent two mutually exclusive outcomes of the same evaluative process.

Meaning of “Sufficient Ground to Presume”

The expression “sufficient ground to presume” is not defined in the Rules, but its meaning is well-settled in:

i. criminal procedural practice of the subcontinent,
ii. international criminal jurisprudence (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL), and
iii. the functional purpose of preliminary scrutiny before trial.

It denotes a prima facie threshold:

a. not proof beyond reasonable doubt,
b. not probability of guilt,
c. not conclusive evaluation,

but a legally cognizable factual basis for the case to proceed.

A. Presumption is Distinct from Proof

At this stage, the Tribunal does not determine guilt. The Tribunal only examines whether, on the face of the materials:

(i) an inference of involvement may reasonably be drawn.

This standard mirrors the charge-framing threshold in other jurisdictions and international tribunals.

B. “Sufficient” — A Qualitative Indicator

“Sufficient” indicates a quantum higher than speculation. The materials must:

(i) show a factual foundation, and
(ii) be capable of supporting the allegations if unrebutted.

C. Comparative International Standard

The phrase aligns with international jurisprudence:

1. 1. ICTY — Prosecutor v. Krstić: If a reasonable trier of fact could infer involvement, charges may be framed.
   2. ICTR — Prosecutor v. Akayesu: The threshold is low; evidence need only form a basis for framing charges.

International tribunals including ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL use the equivalent standard of: “a prima facie case” or “reasonable grounds to believe.”

Thus, “presume” authorizes a preliminary inference, not a conclusion.

Relationship Between Rules 37 and 38

Rule 37 is the screening mechanism. Rule 38(1) is triggered only after the Rule 37 threshold is met.

Thus, the phrase “sufficient grounds to presume” is the operative legal bridge between the two rules.

The statutory scheme creates a minimalist prima facie threshold. The Tribunal is not required to engage in detailed evaluation or weigh evidence at this stage.

Its function is only to ensure that the case has a factual and legal foundation sufficient to proceed to trial.

The term “presume” in the present order is equivalent to prima facie satisfaction, not a judicial finding of guilt.

This doctrinal framework supports the Tribunal’s conclusion that the impugned order did not suffer from any misapplication of the standard and that the charge-framing decision was consistent with Rules 37 and 38(1).

We find no instance in the impugned order of burden-shifting or presumption of guilt. The expression “grounds to presume” conforms to Bangladeshi criminal procedure and international practice.

Therefore, the Tribunal is correct in law to use “grounds to presume” at the charge-framing stage.

Additional Consideration Regarding Language Used in the Review Application

During the hearing, the learned Chief Prosecutor drew our attention to paragraph 10 of the review application and submitted that the expression “the so-called July movement” is inappropriate, unwarranted and inconsistent with the standard of language expected in pleadings before this Tribunal. Paragraph 10 reads:

“10. That it was submitted that the prosecution had not demonstrated the existence of any widespread or systematic attack as fundamentally required in a case involving crimes against humanity. The petitioner, in his discharge petition, provided evidence showing that the so-called July movement devolved into violent insurrection by militant elements, facts absent in the Formal Charge.”

The learned counsel for the defence attempted to offer an explanation.

Upon consideration, we find that the expression “the so-called July movement” is unnecessary, undesirable, and not consonant with the degree of neutrality, restraint and decorum required in proceedings under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. Parties before this Tribunal are expected to employ language befitting the seriousness of the forum.

However, while the expression is unwarranted, it does not affect the merits of the review application. It does not create any error apparent on the face of the record nor does it furnish a ground for reconsidering the findings of the impugned order.

ORDER

For the reasons above, we hold that none of the thirty-two grounds discloses any error apparent on the face of the record or any circumstance warranting review under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes Tribunal-2 Rules of Procedure, 2010.

Accordingly, the Review Petition is rejected.

The order dated 02.11.2025 framing charges against the accused-petitioner shall remain undisturbed.

Let the case proceed in accordance with law.

Thereafter, opening statement in the case has been placed before us by the learned Prosecutor Md. Abdus Sobhan Tarafder.

The learned prosecutor also prayed for an adjournment verbally which is considered and allowed.

01 December, 2025 is fixed for examination of the prosecution witnesses.

The Jail Authority is directed to produce the sole accused, Hasanul Haq Inu before this Tribunal on the aforesaid date, without fail.

 

 

 

 

The Tribunal’s Analysis

Rule 26(3) states: “The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may review any of its orders including the order of framing charge(s) in the interest of justice.”

The power is limited and confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal and cannot permit a re-hearing or re-appreciation of materials already evaluated.

The Tribunal finds that the grounds urged in the petition largely seek to re-open factual assessments, reinterpret materials and revisit conclusions already reached — falling outside the narrow ambit of review:

1. Prima Facie Case: Adequate material forming a prima facie case was demonstrated. No new circumstance or error apparent has been shown.
2. Superior Responsibility: Whether the accused exercised effective control is an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial.
3. Context of July 2024 Events: The Tribunal already considered the context; disagreement with its reasoning cannot ground a review.
4. Selective Immunity: Allegations regarding government immunity policies do not constitute an error apparent and are irrelevant to the correctness of the charge-framing order.
5. Media Statements: Whether such statements amount to instigation or contribution is a matter for evidence.
6. Presumption of Innocence: The Tribunal clarified the meaning of “sufficient ground to presume” under Rules 37 and 38(1), noting it denotes a prima facie threshold — not proof beyond reasonable doubt, not probability of guilt, not conclusive evaluation — but a legally cognizable factual basis for the case to proceed. No instance of burden-shifting or presumption of guilt was found in the impugned order.

Additional Consideration — Language in the Review Application

The learned Chief Prosecutor drew attention to paragraph 10 of the review application and submitted that the expression “the so-called July movement” is inappropriate and unwarranted. The Tribunal agreed, finding the expression unnecessary, undesirable, and not consonant with the neutrality and decorum required in proceedings under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. However, it does not affect the merits nor constitute an error apparent on the face of the record.

Today is fixed for opening statement, examination of prosecution witnesses and further hearing of the application under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010 seeking review of Order No. 06 dated 02.11.2025, by which the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s application for discharge under Rule 37.

The sole accused, Hasanul Haq Inu has been produced before this Tribunal by the Jail Authority.

This is an application under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2)) Rules of Procedure, 2010 seeking review of Order No 06 dated 02.11.2055, by which the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s application for discharge under Rule 37.

We have heard Mr Muhammad Tajul Islam, the learned Chief Prosecutor, assisted by learned prosecutor Mr Md Abdus Sobhan Tarafder

We have also heard Mr Mansarul Haque Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner. The record has also been carefully perused.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mansurul Haque Chowdhury submits, in substance, that the impugned order suffers from material legal and factual errors warranting review under Rule 26(3). His submissions (grounds I–XXXII) may be summarised as follows:

1. Superior responsibility not established: The Tribunal wrongly assumed the petitioner held superior or political authority, contrary to Article 28 of the Rome Statute and jurisprudence in Bemba, Delalić and other international tribunals requiring proof of “effective control.”
2. Presumption of guilt: The impugned order allegedly shifted the burden of proof at the charge-framing stage, contrary to Articles 66–67 of the Rome Statute and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR.
3. Failure to consider the nature of July 2024 events: The Tribunal is said to have overlooked bilateral and insurgent aspects of the July events, including extremist infiltration, arson, armed attacks, destruction of public installations and jailbreaks.
4. Selective immunity: The interim administration’s immunity to certain protestors creates an appearance of selectivity inconsistent with section 3 of the ICT Act.
5. Media comments cannot create liability: The Tribunal wrongly treated accused Hasanul Haq Inu’s televised remarks as incitement, contrary to the UN Working Group’s Opinion on the Shahriar Kabir matter.
6. Non-application of judicial mind: The Tribunal relied on an incomplete factual record and ignored exculpatory materials.

Thus, the learned Senior Advocate urges that the charge-framing order is legally unsustainable and liable to be reviewed and set aside.

Submissions on behalf of the Prosecution

The learned Chief Prosecutor Senior Advocate Muhammad Tajul Islam strongly opposes the review application and submits:

1. Scope of review extremely limited: Review lies only to correct errors apparent on the face of the record; a rehearing is impermissible.
2. Prima facie case already found: The impugned order correctly determined that prosecution materials disclose a prima facie case.
3. Superior responsibility sufficiently pleaded: Whether the accused exercised effective control is a matter for evidence at trial.
4. No presumption of guilt: The order did not shift the burden of proof but merely determined that the materials, if unrebutted, warrant framing of charges.
5. Context duly considered: The wider July events were examined and disagreement with that assessment cannot constitute an error.
6. Selective immunity irrelevant: Executive immunity policies cannot limit the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
7. Media statements relevant: The petitioner’s televised comments form part of circumstances to be evaluated at trial.

The learned Chief Prosecutor therefore prays for rejection of the review petition.

We have examined Rule 26(3), which states as follows:

“The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may review any of its orders including the order of framing charge(s) in the interest of justice.”

The power is limited and confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal and cannot permit a re-hearing or re-appreciation of materials already evaluated.

After evaluating the submissions advanced by both sides and reviewing the relevant portion of the application, the Tribunal finds that the grounds urged in the petition largely seek to re-open factual assessments, reinterpret materials and revisit conclusions already reached. Such matters fall outside the narrow ambit of review.

 

1. Prima Facie Case The impugned order demonstrates adequate material forming a prima facie case. No new circumstance or error apparent has been shown.
2. Superior Responsibility Whether the accused exercised effective control is an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial.
3. Context of July 2024 Events The Tribunal already considered the context. Disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning cannot found a review.
4. Selective Immunity Allegations regarding government immunity policies do not constitute an error apparent and are irrelevant to the correctness of the charge-framing order.
5. Media Statements Whether such statements amount to instigation or contribution is a matter for evidence.
6. Presumption of Innocence Rules 37 and 38 of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010 run as follows:

“37. When the accused appears or is brought before the Tribunal and if the Tribunal, upon consideration of record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, finds that there is no sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, it shall discharge the accused and record its reasons for so doing.

38(1). If, after consideration and hearing under rule 37, the Tribunal is of opinion that there is sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, the Tribunal shall frame one or more charges for the offences of which he is accused and he shall be asked whether he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged.

Provided that if the accused does not reply either as guilty or not guilty or remains silent or if he says such thing which is not relevant, then the accused shall be deemed to have replied as not guilty.

(2) An accused pleading not guilty will get at least three weeks’ time for preparing his defence.

Analysis of Rules 37 and 38(1) of the ICT-2 Rules of Procedure, 2010

Before addressing the merits of the review application, it is necessary to clarify the statutory scheme governing discharge and charge-framing, as the petitioner’s challenge is rooted in the contention that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct threshold under Rules 37 and 38(1) of the International Crimes (Tribunal-2) Rules of Procedure, 2010.

Rules 37 and 38(1) together form the statutory filter through which the Tribunal must determine whether:

1. the accused should be discharged; or
2. charges should be framed and the matter sent to trial.

The determinative phrase governing both rules is “sufficient grounds to presume” that the accused has committed the alleged offence(s).

Structure and Purpose of the Two Rules

Rule 37 — Discharge

Rule 37 requires the Tribunal, upon the accused’s appearance, to examine:

• i. the record,
• ii. the documents submitted,

• iii. and the submissions of the parties.

If the Tribunal finds no sufficient ground to presume commission of an offence, it must discharge the accused with recorded reasons. This is a mandatory statutory duty.

Rule 38(1) — Framing of Charges

Conversely, if such sufficient grounds exist, the Tribunal shall frame one or more charges and proceed to take the plea of the accused.

Thus, Rules 37 and 38(1) represent two mutually exclusive outcomes of the same evaluative process.

Meaning of “Sufficient Ground to Presume”

The expression “sufficient ground to presume” is not defined in the Rules, but its meaning is well-settled in:

• i. criminal procedural practice of the subcontinent,
• ii. international criminal jurisprudence (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL), and
• iii. the functional purpose of preliminary scrutiny before trial.

It denotes a prima facie threshold:

• a. not proof beyond reasonable doubt,
• b. not probability of guilt,
• c. not conclusive evaluation,

but a legally cognizable factual basis for the case to proceed.

1. Presumption is Distinct from Proof

At this stage, the Tribunal does not determine guilt. The Tribunal only examines whether, on the face of the materials:

(i) an inference of involvement may reasonably be drawn.

This standard mirrors the charge-framing threshold in other jurisdictions and international tribunals.

1. “Sufficient” — A Qualitative Indicator

“Sufficient” indicates a quantum higher than speculation. The materials must:

• (i) show a factual foundation, and
• (ii) be capable of supporting the allegations if unrebutted.

1. Comparative International Standard

The phrase aligns with international jurisprudence:

1. ICTY — Prosecutor v. Krstić: If a reasonable trier of fact could infer involvement, charges may be framed.
2. ICTR — Prosecutor v. Akayesu: The threshold is low; evidence need only form a basis for framing charges.

International tribunals including ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL use the equivalent standard of: “a prima facie case” or “reasonable grounds to believe.”

Thus, “presume” authorizes a preliminary inference, not a conclusion.

Relationship Between Rules 37 and 38

Rule 37 is the screening mechanism. Rule 38(1) is triggered only after the Rule 37 threshold is met.

Thus, the phrase “sufficient grounds to presume” is the operative legal bridge between the two rules.

The statutory scheme creates a minimalist prima facie threshold. The Tribunal is not required to engage in detailed evaluation or weigh evidence at this stage.

Its function is only to ensure that the case has a factual and legal foundation sufficient to proceed to trial.

The term “presume” in the present order is equivalent to prima facie satisfaction, not a judicial finding of guilt.

This doctrinal framework supports the Tribunal’s conclusion that the impugned order did not suffer from any misapplication of the standard and that the charge-framing decision was consistent with Rules 37 and 38(1).

We find no instance in the impugned order of burden-shifting or presumption of guilt. The expression “grounds to presume” conforms to Bangladeshi criminal procedure and international practice.

Therefore, the Tribunal is correct in law to use “grounds to presume” at the charge-framing stage.

Additional Consideration Regarding Language Used in the Review Application

During the hearing, the learned Chief Prosecutor drew our attention to paragraph 10 of the review application and submitted that the expression “the so-called July movement” is inappropriate, unwarranted and inconsistent with the standard of language expected in pleadings before this Tribunal. Paragraph 10 reads:

“10. That it was submitted that the prosecution had not demonstrated the existence of any widespread or systematic attack as fundamentally required in a case involving crimes against humanity. The petitioner, in his discharge petition, provided evidence showing that the so-called July movement devolved into violent insurrection by militant elements, facts absent in the Formal Charge.”

The learned counsel for the defence attempted to offer an explanation.

Upon consideration, we find that the expression “the so-called July movement” is unnecessary, undesirable, and not consonant with…

he degree of neutrality, restraint and decorum required in proceedings under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. Parties before this Tribunal are expected to employ language befitting the seriousness of the forum.

However, while the expression is unwarranted, it does not affect the merits of the review application. It does not create any error apparent on the face of the record nor does it furnish a ground for reconsidering the findings of the impugned order.

ORDER

For the reasons above, we hold that none of the thirty-two grounds discloses any error apparent on the face of the record or any circumstance warranting review under Rule 26(3) of the International Crimes Tribunal-2 Rules of Procedure, 2010.

Accordingly, the Review Petition is rejected.

The order dated 02.11.2025 framing charges against the accused-petitioner shall remain undisturbed.

Let the case proceed in accordance with law.

Thereafter, opening statement in the case has been placed before us by the learned Prosecutor Md. Abdus Sobhan Tarafder.

The learned prosecutor also prayed for an adjournment verbally which is considered and allowed.

01 December, 2025 is fixed for examination of the prosecution witnesses.

The Jail Authority is directed to produce the sole accused, Hasanul Haq Inu before this Tribunal on the aforesaid date, without fail.

 

 

 

 

The Tribunal’s Analysis

Rule 26(3) states: “The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may review any of its orders including the order of framing charge(s) in the interest of justice.”

The power is limited and confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal and cannot permit a re-hearing or re-appreciation of materials already evaluated.

The Tribunal finds that the grounds urged in the petition largely seek to re-open factual assessments, reinterpret materials and revisit conclusions already reached — falling outside the narrow ambit of review:

1. Prima Facie Case: Adequate material forming a prima facie case was demonstrated. No new circumstance or error apparent has been shown.
2. Superior Responsibility: Whether the accused exercised effective control is an evidentiary matter to be determined at trial.
3. Context of July 2024 Events: The Tribunal already considered the context; disagreement with its reasoning cannot ground a review.
4. Selective Immunity: Allegations regarding government immunity policies do not constitute an error apparent and are irrelevant to the correctness of the charge-framing order.
5. Media Statements: Whether such statements amount to instigation or contribution is a matter for evidence.
6. Presumption of Innocence: The Tribunal clarified the meaning of “sufficient ground to presume” under Rules 37 and 38(1), noting it denotes a prima facie threshold — not proof beyond reasonable doubt, not probability of guilt, not conclusive evaluation — but a legally cognizable factual basis for the case to proceed. No instance of burden-shifting or presumption of guilt was found in the impugned order.

Additional Consideration — Language in the Review Application

The learned Chief Prosecutor drew attention to paragraph 10 of the review application and submitted that the expression “the so-called July movement” is inappropriate and unwarranted. The Tribunal agreed, finding the expression unnecessary, undesirable, and not consonant with the neutrality and decorum required in proceedings under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. However, it does not affect the merits nor constitute an error apparent on the face of the record.